No specific laws identified for this ruling.
The Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed summary judgment for the city and union, holding that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding his claim that he signed a separation/settlement agreement under undue influence.
This summary was generated to explain the ruling in plain English and is not legal advice.
The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating the griev- ant, J, a member of the defendant union, to her employment as executive director of the city's Commission on Equal Opportunities. In that posi- tion, J oversaw construction contract compliance and enforcement of the chapter of the city's code of ordinances that requires building con- tractors doing business with the city to hire certain percentages of women, minorities and city residents. The union filed a grievance, claim- ing that the city did not have just cause to terminate J's employment. Thereafter, pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the matter proceeded to a hearing before an arbitration panel, which issued an award in which it found that the city had proven only three of the eleven factual claims that it had asserted justified J's termination, specifically, that she failed to comply with a certain request for informa- tion during the city's investigation of the relationship between the com- mission and a certain training and employment program created and funded by the city, which was operated under the auspices of the com- mission, until it was spun off into a legally separate private entity, that she formed C Co., a private company that advertised contract compliance services in Connecticut, without informing the city, and that she issued four memoranda under her signature soliciting donations for the subject program from contractors in lieu of fines, despite having been warned by the city's corporation counsel office that doing so could expose her, commission staff or the city to potential claims of bribery. The panel concluded that, although J's misconduct was serious in nature, the city was not justified in terminating J's employment. The panel, therefore, ordered that J be reinstated to her position; however, she did not receive two years of back pay and benefits. The city filed an application to vacate the award, claiming that the award violated the
The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating the griev- ant, J, a member of the defendant union, to her employment as executive director of the city's Commission on Equal Opportunities. In that posi- tion, J oversaw construction contract compliance and enforcement of the chapter of the city's code of ordinances that requires building con- tractors doing business with the city to hire certain percentages of women, minorities and city residents. The union filed a grievance, claim- ing that the city did not have just cause to terminate J's employment. Thereafter, pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the matter proceeded to a hearing before an arbitration panel, which issued an award in which it found that the city had proven only three of the eleven factual claims that it had asserted justified J's termination, specifically, that she failed to comply with a certain request for informa- tion during the city's investigation of the relationship between the com- mission and a certain training and employment program created and funded by the city, which was operated under the auspices of the com- mission, until it was spun off into a legally separate private entity, that she formed C Co., a private company that advertised contract compliance services in Connecticut, without informing the city, and that she issued four memoranda under her signature soliciting donations for the subject program from contractors in lieu of fines, despite having been warned by the city's corporation counsel office that doing so could expose her, commission staff or the city to potential claims of bribery. The panel concluded that, although J's misconduct was serious in nature, the city was not justified in terminating J's employment. The panel, therefore, ordered that J be reinstated to her position; however, she did not receive two years of back pay and benefits. The city filed an application to vacate the award, claiming that the award violated the
The plaintiff, a retired police officer, appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner denying his motion to open a certain stipulation that he and the defendants, the city of New Haven and its workers' compensation administrator, had executed to settle several pending workers' compensation claims related to his employ- ment with the city. The plaintiff had agreed to accept a settlement of his claims for $22,500. On the morning of the stipulation approval hearing before the commissioner, the defendants' counsel presented the plaintiff with the stipulation and a settlement agreement, neither of which the plaintiff had seen before and both of which he signed. The stipulation did not reference the settlement agreement, which required the plaintiff to waive, inter alia, causes of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.). At the stipulation approval hearing, the commissioner canvassed the plaintiff with regard to the stipulation, and approved it after determining that the plaintiff had executed it knowingly and voluntarily. None of the parties asked the commissioner to review or to sign the settlement agreement, and the commissioner did not examine or sign the settlement agreement. After the plaintiff received a $22,500 settlement check, he returned it and sought to open the stipulation pursuant to statute (§ 31-315). He claimed, inter alia, that the stipulation was nugatory on the ground that his execution of the settlement agreement was not knowing and voluntary because the parties had agreed to settle only the workers' compensation claims. The commissioner concluded that opening the stipulation was not warranted because, inter alia, the plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, accident or mistake. The board thereafter affirmed the commissioner's denial of the motion to open, determining that th
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