In re Estate of Owens

This is a post-divorce child custody action involving two children, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the most recent trial. The parties were divorced by order of the Sullivan County Law Court ("divorce court") in July 2001. Concomitant with the divorce decree, the divorce court entered a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent. Although the permanent parenting plan was modified in 2003 and 2007, the divorce court had most recently modified the permanent parenting plan in February 2009 ("2009 PPP") upon the parties' stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred. The divorce court maintained the father's designation as the primary residential parent and awarded to the father 268 days of annual residential co-parenting time as compared to Mother's 97 days. At some point following entry of the 2009 PPP, the mother relocated to Texas, and the father and the children relocated to Washington County, Tennessee. Upon the mother's request, the case was transferred to the Washington County Circuit Court ("trial court") in April 2014. On March 20, 2015, the mother filed a motion in the trial court to modify custody and child support, as well as a motion for civil and criminal contempt against the father, alleging various violations of the 2009 PPP. Following a hearing regarding the contempt allegations, the trial court entered an order on June 30, 2015, finding the father in "technical contempt" and directing him to pay an expert witness fee as a sanction. Following participation in mediation, the parties announced an agreement, which the trial court ratified in a permanent parenting plan order entered on June 30, 2015 ("2015 PPP"). The 2015 PPP maintained the father's designation as the primary residential parent and provided the mother with 85 days of residential co-parenting time, a great part of which was to be exercised at her residence in Texas. On October 2, 2015, the mother filed an "e

<bold>1. Pleadings — Rule 11 sanctions — factual</bold> <bold>investigation</bold> <block_quote> There was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that plaintiff violated the factual certification requirement of N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>1A-1</cross_reference>, Rule 11, justifying the imposition of sanctions in a case which rose from the division of family assets. An attorney representing the estate made an independent investigation and concluded that there was no factual basis for claims of fraud or undue influence; a similar inquiry by plaintiff would have found ample evidence that his mother was competent and fully involved in managing both her business and personal affairs until her death.</block_quote> <bold>2. Pleadings — Rule 11 sanctions — entire record</bold> <bold>considered</bold> <block_quote> The entire record was before the court at a Rule 11 sanctions hearing, not just plaintiff's testimony that he made a reasonable inquiry, because defendant's motions were explicitly based on the record of the case.</block_quote> <bold>3. Pleadings — frivolous appeals — authority to</bold> <bold>sanction under Rule 11</bold> <block_quote> The authority to sanction frivolous appeals by shifting expenses incurred on appeal is exclusively granted to the appellate courts under Appellate Rule 34. The trial court here abused its discretion by awarding under Rule 11 attorney fees and costs incurred by defendants in defending plaintiff's appeal to the Court of Appeals and his petition to the Supreme Court.</block_quote><page_number>Page 310</page_number> <bold>4. Pleadings — Rule 11 sanctions — discovery</bold> <bold>resulting from complaint</bold> <block_quote> Although plaintiff argues that the proper basis for discovery sanctions is N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>1A-1</cross_reference>, Rule 26(g) rather than N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>1A-1</cross_reference>, Rule 11, the document in issue here is plaintiff's complaint and Rule 11 appl

The plaintiffs, retired city firefighters, filed a motion for contempt alleging that the defendant city had violated a judgment of the trial court incorpo- rating a settlement agreement in which the defendant had agreed to provide a health benefits package administered by A Co., and that the package would not change without the plaintiffs' written consent or a legislative mandate. The defendant thereafter replaced the plan adminis- tered by A Co. with a health insurance plan administered by C Co. and a prescription drug plan administered by V Co. The plaintiffs claimed that, by making this change, the defendant had diminished the health insurance benefits to which they were entitled pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Following a hearing on the contempt motion, the trial court concluded that the agreement was clear and unambiguous and that the defendant violated the judgment by changing the plaintiffs' health insurance plan administrators without their written consent. The court, however, denied the motion for contempt because all of the claims submitted by the plaintiffs under the C Co. plan were paid in a manner identical to the A Co. plan and, therefore, the court concluded that the defendant had not wilfully violated the judgment. On the plaintiffs' appeal and the defendant's cross appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt: this court concluded that the trial court incorrectly determined that the defendant violated the agreement by changing the third-party administrators because the reference to the A Co. plan in the agreement was used to establish the health-care benefits to which the plaintiffs were entitled, the agreement did not state that a specific third party must administer those benefits in perpetuity, the defendant's agreement that it would not change or diminish the benefits that comprised the entire health- care package did not extend to the question of which entity would operate as

This appeal concerns a lawsuit between brothers over funds belonging to their late mother, Helen D. Turley ("Decedent"). Tim Turley, executor of Decedent's estate ("the Estate"), deposited $138,605.14 from a Y-12 Federal Credit Union ("Y-12 FCU") account owned by Decedent into an estate account at ORNL Federal Credit Union ("ORNL FCU"). An issue arose because William Dean Turley was named sole payableon- death beneficiary on the Y-12 FCU account, and he asserted the funds were his. ORNL FCU filed a complaint for interpleader in the Chancery Court for Anderson County ("the Trial Court") to determine the funds' owner. In a cross-claim, Tim Turley and the Estate alleged that William Dean Turley exercised undue influence over Decedent and that Decedent was incompetent when she named William Dean Turley as the payable-on-death beneficiary on the account. William Dean Turley filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The Estate and Tim Turley appeal. We hold that William Dean Turley successfully demonstrated that the evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish undue influence, fraud, or lack of mental competency, and there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. We reverse the Trial Court's judgment, however, to the extent it awarded attorney's fees and expenses to William Dean Turley, as these fees and expenses were awarded in contravention of the American Rule. Otherwise, we affirm.