In re A.J.

Anders appeal. The trial court did not err when it terminated appellant's parental rights because the decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time and should not be placed with either parent, and termination of appellant's parental rights was in the child's best interest. Judgment affirmed.

The Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children's mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents' petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents' petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother's parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children's best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother's application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment dismissing the fost

<p>Appeal from District Court, Second District; Hon. N. J. Harris, Judge.</p> <p>Application by Catherine Lambing Hummel for a wri,t of habeas corpus against Samuel J. Parrish and Caddie K. Parrish to obtain the custody of her minor child. Prom an order awarding the custody of the child to the defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>APPELLANT'S POINTS.</p> <p>The presumption is that the parent is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the care of his children and that the interests and welfare of said children are best subserved when under such care and control. (Wilson v. Mitchell, 111 Pac. 23, 30 L. It. A. N. S. 511; Miller v. Miller, 123 la. 165, 98 N. W. 631; Swarens v. Swarens, 97 Pac. 968; State v. Martin, [Minn.] 103 N. W. 888; Terry v. Johnson, [Neb.] 103 N. W. 318; Hibbeite v. Bains, 78 Miss. 695, 51 L. it. A. 839.)</p> <p>Before the legal right of the parent to the custody of the child will be ignored or invaded by the court, it must be established by plain and certain proofs either that the parent is unfit to be entrusted with the care of minor children or that he has abandoned the child and surrendered its care and custody to the respondents. And he who seeks to withhold the custody of a minor child from its natural parents has the burden of establishing either unfitness or abandonment. ( Wilson v. Mitchell, supra; Eibbette v. Bains, supra; Wier v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 6 L. R. A. 672; Norvall v. Zing-master, 57 Neb. 159, 77 N. W. 373.)</p> <p>The natural guardian of a bastard child is the mother, and unless it appears by clear and satisfactory proof that she is manifestly unsuited to give it proper training, or that she has surrendered the child to respondents substituting them in her own place so that they stand m loco parentis to the child, and that she has continued this condition of affairs so long a time that a severance of the relationship between the child and respondents would surely be detrimental to the child then clearly she is entitled t

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court awarding sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, O, to the plaintiff and imposing certain restrictions on his visitation with O. After the plaintiff initiated the underlying marital dissolution action, the parties filed numerous motions with the court, and, given the volume and nature of the motions, the court ordered that neither party could file any additional motions without first requesting leave from the court, with an exception for ex parte emergency requests approved by the guardian ad litem. The parties thereafter entered into an agreement to dissolve their marriage, which indicated that, although they agreed upon the division of their marital property and debt and the issue of alimony, they had been unable to resolve issues related to custody, access and care of O and that those issues should be resolved by the court in subsequent proceedings after completion of a custody evaluation by S, a clinical psychologist. The court subsequently rendered a judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated the parties' agreement. S filed her custody evaluation with the court, and the custody hearing was scheduled to commence in March, 2020, but, due to the COVID-19 pan- demic, it did not go forward as scheduled. When the trial ultimately commenced, the court heard testimony from L, a social worker from the Department of Children and Families, over repeated objections by the defendant. L testified that she had investigated an anonymous call made to the department concerning the plaintiff's purported physical removal of O from a baseball game in which he was participating. During L's testimony, a redacted version of the relevant department investigation protocol was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit. L testified that her investigation included, among other things, interviews with O and conversations with G, O's former therapist, and that, as a result of her investigation, the dep

reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities father designated residential parent Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) trial court conducted independent review R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii) evidence supported finding of change in circumstances evidence supported finding that best interest for father to be designated residential parent freedom of speech minimum wage imputed for child support