Hummel v. Parrish

The Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children's mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents' petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents' petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother's parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children's best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother's application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment dismissing the fost

<p>When an application on habeas corpus is denied because the writ had been suspended, and thereafter, and before appeal taken is allowed, the suspension is revoked, the question of power of the authorities to suspend the writ becomes a moot one not calling for determination by this court.</p> <p>A proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding, and as final orders of Circuit or District Courts of the United States in such a proceeding can only be reviewed in this court by appeal, under § 10 of the Act of July I, 1902, 32 Stat., 1369, a final order of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in habeas corpus is governed by the same rules and can only be reviewed by appeal and not by writ of error.</p>

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of appellant's child to a children services agency where appellant was then incarcerated serving a four-year prison term and where the child's best interest was served by granting permanent custody to the children services agency due to the uncertainty regarding appellant's illicit drug use, employment, income, and housing following her release from prison.

Pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 23-24), once a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed in the Superior Court, ''[t]he judicial authority shall promptly review [the] petition . . . to determine whether the writ should issue. The judicial authority shall issue the writ unless it appears that . . . the court lacks jurisdiction . . . the petition is wholly frivo- lous on its face . . . or . . . the relief sought is not available.'' Pursuant further to the rules of practice (§ 23-29), ''[t]he judicial authority may, at any time, upon its own motion or upon motion of the respondent, dismiss the petition . . . if it determines [inter alia] that . . . the court lacks jurisdiction . . . [or] the petition . . . fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted . . . .'' The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crime of robbery in the third degree, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and to have his conviction vacated or dismissed. The petitioner alleged that he had received a sentence of unconditional discharge in connection with the robbery conviction but that he remained incarcerated on unspecified other charges and that the robbery conviction was adversely affecting his eligibility for parole on the other charges. The habeas court granted the petitioner's applica- tion for a waiver of fees but took no action as to his request for the appointment of counsel. Shortly thereafter, however, the court, sua sponte and without providing the petitioner with notice or an opportunity to be heard, dismissed the petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 on the ground that the habeas court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner was not in custody for the conviction that he was challenging at the time he filed the petition. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting

<p>Habeas corpus proceedings by Florence J. Chappell against Ada Freeman, a probation officer, to obtain the release from custody of Lois Mould, an infant.</p> <p>Exercising original jurisdiction, this court issued the writ of habeas corpus to bring before the court Lois Mould, a female child 12 years of age, who, it was represented, was unlawfully restrained of her liberty by the probation officer of Wayne county. This officer produced the child, as she was commanded to do, and returned that she had her in custody by virtue of an order of the probate court of Wayne county, and also by virtue of an order, finding, and decree of the circuit court for Wayne county. The order of the probate court, juvenile division, made May 11, 1910, is as follows:</p> <p>‘ ‘A petition having been heretofore filed in this court wherein it is alleged that Lois Mould, alias Mole, is a juvenile delinquent person within the meaning of the statutes of the State of Michigan, and on the 14th day of April all parties interested being then represented in open court or having notice, and it then appearing to the court necessary and for the best interests and welfare of said child and the public, the court placed said child in the care and custody of Ada Freeman, a duly appointed probation officer, and ordered said child detained for a period of 80 days, and on the 23d day of April a new complaint having been filed in such matter and after due notice to all persons interested come on for hearing before this court, on the 4th day of May instant, at 8:30 a. m., and Louis W. McClear, an attorney, appearing for the alleged guardian of said child, and requesting an adjournment to this date, and upon hearing this day, said Louis W. McClear again appearing and asking that said matter be further continued, it is ordered that said matter be and the same is hereby continued to the 18th day of May inst.,at 9 o’clock in the forenoon, and, it still appearing to the court that the interests of said child and