Gilchrist v. Commissioner of Correction

The petitioner, who had been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree in connection with the shooting of a pizza delivery driver, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, C, had rendered ineffective assistance. At the petitioner's criminal trial, the defense theory was that another individual, D, with whom the petitioner was visiting on the night of the shooting, had committed the charged offenses, but D testified that it was the petitioner who had made plans to rob a delivery driver and who had used D's cell phone to call and case various businesses, including the pizza restaurant that employed the victim. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment. Although the Appellate Court agreed with the petitioner's claim that C had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate D's cell phone records, a majority of that court ultimately concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by C's deficient performance. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court, challenging the Appellate Court's determination on the issue of prejudice. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice stemming from C's failure to investigate D's cell phone records, as there was a reasonable probability that, but for C's failure to undertake such an investigation and to introduce some or all of the records at trial, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to the peti- tioner's guilt, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction that the habeas court grant the habeas petition, vacate his convictions, and order a new trial. The

The petitioner, who had previously pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution, appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed his habeas petition, which claimed that a prior habeas court had improperly denied his application for the appointment of counsel on appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, as the resolution of the petitioner's claim did not involve issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve in a different manner, or that were adequate to deserve encourage- ment to proceed further. The habeas court properly dismissed the habeas petition pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-29 (2)) for failure to state a claim on which habeas corpus relief could be granted, as the petitioner's claim asking the second habeas court to review and address the validity and legal soundness of a prior habeas court's decision to deny the petitioner's request to appoint counsel on appeal was beyond the power and authority of the second habeas court, and the proper procedural vehicle to have challenged the first habeas court's determination should have been by a motion for review pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 63-7). Argued September 15—officially released December 9, 2025

The petitioner, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, filed a fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court, upon the request of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely given that it had been filed beyond the time limit for successive petitions set forth in the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d)). The court held an eviden- tiary hearing, during which the petitioner testified that he had filed a timely third habeas petition but withdrew it prior to trial on the advice of his prior habeas counsel. The petitioner further testified that counsel did not discuss § 52-470 (d) and that, if the petitioner had known that withdrawing his third petition and refiling would result in an untimely petition, he would not have done so. The habeas court dismissed the fourth habeas petition as untimely, concluding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in filing the petition. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. The peti- tioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted the petition for certification, vacated the judgment of this court, and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333). Held that, after further consideration of the issue raised in this appeal, the proper remedy was to remand the matter to the habeas court for a new hearing and good cause determination under § 52-470 (d) and (e), consistent with the principles set forth in Rose, Rapp v. Commissioner of Correction (224 Conn. App. 336), and Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction (223 Conn. App. 562). Argued April 8—officially released May 14, 2024

<p>When an application on habeas corpus is denied because the writ had been suspended, and thereafter, and before appeal taken is allowed, the suspension is revoked, the question of power of the authorities to suspend the writ becomes a moot one not calling for determination by this court.</p> <p>A proceeding in habeas corpus is a civil, and not a criminal, proceeding, and as final orders of Circuit or District Courts of the United States in such a proceeding can only be reviewed in this court by appeal, under § 10 of the Act of July I, 1902, 32 Stat., 1369, a final order of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands in habeas corpus is governed by the same rules and can only be reviewed by appeal and not by writ of error.</p>

<p>Appeal from District Court, Second District; Hon. N. J. Harris, Judge.</p> <p>Application by Catherine Lambing Hummel for a wri,t of habeas corpus against Samuel J. Parrish and Caddie K. Parrish to obtain the custody of her minor child. Prom an order awarding the custody of the child to the defendants, plaintiff appeals.</p> <p>APPELLANT'S POINTS.</p> <p>The presumption is that the parent is a fit and suitable person to be entrusted with the care of his children and that the interests and welfare of said children are best subserved when under such care and control. (Wilson v. Mitchell, 111 Pac. 23, 30 L. It. A. N. S. 511; Miller v. Miller, 123 la. 165, 98 N. W. 631; Swarens v. Swarens, 97 Pac. 968; State v. Martin, [Minn.] 103 N. W. 888; Terry v. Johnson, [Neb.] 103 N. W. 318; Hibbeite v. Bains, 78 Miss. 695, 51 L. it. A. 839.)</p> <p>Before the legal right of the parent to the custody of the child will be ignored or invaded by the court, it must be established by plain and certain proofs either that the parent is unfit to be entrusted with the care of minor children or that he has abandoned the child and surrendered its care and custody to the respondents. And he who seeks to withhold the custody of a minor child from its natural parents has the burden of establishing either unfitness or abandonment. ( Wilson v. Mitchell, supra; Eibbette v. Bains, supra; Wier v. Marley, 99 Mo. 484, 6 L. R. A. 672; Norvall v. Zing-master, 57 Neb. 159, 77 N. W. 373.)</p> <p>The natural guardian of a bastard child is the mother, and unless it appears by clear and satisfactory proof that she is manifestly unsuited to give it proper training, or that she has surrendered the child to respondents substituting them in her own place so that they stand m loco parentis to the child, and that she has continued this condition of affairs so long a time that a severance of the relationship between the child and respondents would surely be detrimental to the child then clearly she is entitled t