Henning v. Commissioner of Correction

The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of murder, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that his second criminal trial counsel, S, did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel when he made a decision not to present the testimony of G, the petitioner's former girlfriend and mother of his child, who had offered alibi testimony at the petitioner's first criminal trial. Held: The habeas court correctly concluded, in light of all of the evidence, that S made a reasoned, strategic choice, after a thorough investigation, not to pre- sent both an alibi defense and a misidentification defense, as S investigated G as an alibi witness, considered her relationship to the petitioner, and determined that she would not make a good witness, and, instead, focused his defense on challenging the police investigation and the state's identifi- cation evidence. The habeas court did not err in its determination that S's conduct in failing to present an alibi defense at the petitioner's second criminal trial did not constitute deficient performance. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection of the respondent's counsel to a hypothetical question posed to an expert witness for the petitioner related to S's allegedly deficient performance, as the question could not reasonably be separated from the essence of the ultimate issue that was before the court, namely, whether the standard of care required S to present the alibi defense. Argued March 26, 2025—officially released February 10, 2026

The petitioner, who had been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree in connection with the shooting of a pizza delivery driver, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, C, had rendered ineffective assistance. At the petitioner's criminal trial, the defense theory was that another individual, D, with whom the petitioner was visiting on the night of the shooting, had committed the charged offenses, but D testified that it was the petitioner who had made plans to rob a delivery driver and who had used D's cell phone to call and case various businesses, including the pizza restaurant that employed the victim. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment. Although the Appellate Court agreed with the petitioner's claim that C had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate D's cell phone records, a majority of that court ultimately concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by C's deficient performance. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court, challenging the Appellate Court's determination on the issue of prejudice. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice stemming from C's failure to investigate D's cell phone records, as there was a reasonable probability that, but for C's failure to undertake such an investigation and to introduce some or all of the records at trial, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to the peti- tioner's guilt, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction that the habeas court grant the habeas petition, vacate his convictions, and order a new trial. The

The petitioner, who had previously pleaded guilty to possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution, appealed, following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court dismissing his second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly dismissed his habeas petition, which claimed that a prior habeas court had improperly denied his application for the appointment of counsel on appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, as the resolution of the petitioner's claim did not involve issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve in a different manner, or that were adequate to deserve encourage- ment to proceed further. The habeas court properly dismissed the habeas petition pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 23-29 (2)) for failure to state a claim on which habeas corpus relief could be granted, as the petitioner's claim asking the second habeas court to review and address the validity and legal soundness of a prior habeas court's decision to deny the petitioner's request to appoint counsel on appeal was beyond the power and authority of the second habeas court, and the proper procedural vehicle to have challenged the first habeas court's determination should have been by a motion for review pursuant to the rule of practice (§ 63-7). Argued September 15—officially released December 9, 2025