In re Madison C.

The respondent mother appealed from the trial court's judgments rendered for the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor children. The mother, who had been defaulted for failure to appear at the termination proceedings, claimed, inter alia, that the court violated her right to due process by con- structively depriving her of her right to the effective assistance of coun- sel. Held: The respondent mother's claim that the trial court's constructive deprivation of counsel constituted structural error for which prejudice was presumed and a rule of automatic reversal applied was unavailing, as this court declined to apply such a rule in the context of child protection cases. Even if this court assumed that the trial court constructively deprived the respondent mother of her right to the effective assistance of counsel, the mother failed to show resulting prejudice and, thus, any violation of that right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if this court assumed that the trial court violated the respondent mother's due process rights when it denied her counsel's request for a continuance of the hearing on the termination petitions because the mother was not present, any error was harmless. Even if this court assumed that the trial court violated the respondent mother's due process rights by failing to provide her and her counsel with adequate notice of the hearing on the petitions to terminate the mother's parental rights, the mother failed to explain at the hearing on the motion to open the judgments what additional evidence she would have presented had she and her counsel received proper notice and, accordingly, the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Argued September 10—officially released November 25, 2024 In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not di

The respondent mother appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court terminating her parental rights with respect to her minor child, W. W was born in Guatemala and immigrated to New Haven in 2018 with the respondent father. In 2019, following a sexual assault by a family member, W was adjudicated neglected and committed to the care of the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families. From mid-2019 through December, 2021, the Department of Children and Families had limited and sporadic contact with the mother, who remained in Guatemala, and between December, 2021, and August, 2022, the mother did not respond to communications from the department. The mother immigrated to New Haven in July, 2022. The department was unaware of this until August, 2022, when the mother appeared, unannounced, at a supervised visit between W and the father. Thereafter, the department referred the mother to various services, with which she was reluctant to engage until early 2023. Trial on the termination of parental rights petition commenced in March, 2023. The petitioner ini- tially alleged that, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (D)), no ongoing parent-child relationship existed between the mother and W. At the conclusion of the evidentiary portion of the trial, the petitioner's counsel orally moved to amend the petition to add the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate as to the mother, pursuant to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i), ''to conform to the proof elicited at trial.'' In the absence of any objection or request for a continuation, the trial court granted the motion and, thereafter, terminated the respondents' parental rights, determining, inter alia, that the petitioner proved that the mother had failed to rehabili- tate but not that an ongoing parent-child relationship between the mother and W did not exist. Held: 1. The respondent mother could not prevail on her claim that she was denied her due process right to the effective assistance of counsel

The Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children's mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents' petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents' petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother's parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children's best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother's application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment dismissing the fost

In this parental termination case, maternal Grandparents sought termination of both Mother's and Father's rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support and (2) abandonment by willful failure to visit. The trial court found no grounds for termination as to Mother and only one ground—failure to support—as to Father. The trial court however found that it was not in the child's best interest to terminate Father's rights. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.