Sara Marie Poe Mossbeck v. John Pollard Hoover, Jr.

R.C. 2151.414/permanent custody best interest of the child manifest weight. The trial court's determination that CCDCFS made reasonable efforts to reunite Mother and children was proper. The trial court considered factors under R.C. 2151.414 for abandonment, lack of action, best interest of the children and custodial history. The trial court's judgment of permanent custody to CCDCFS was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's argument that the trial court committed reversible error fails where the record supports that the trial court's determination was in the best interest of the children.

CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION II APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BECKHAM COUNTY, STATE OF OKLAHOMA HONORABLE DOUG HAUGHT, TRIAL JUDGE ¶ 0 The trial court judgment (1) ordered father — a prison inmate — to reimburse the Oklahoma Department of Human Services for monies allegedly paid to mother for the support of child under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program and (2) set his continuing/future child support obligation at $109 per month. Father appealed and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Held: The trial court erred in entering a judgment for AFDC reimbursement without being presented evidence to show the amount of AFDC payments to mother. Further, although under Oklahoma's child support statutes (a) appellant's present lack of income and earning capacity due to his incarceration, coupled with his lack of assets, did not mandate that the trial court use zero for his gross monthly income in figuring his child support obligation and (b) it was proper for the trial court to attribute a gross monthly income to him based on the minimum wage for a 40 hour work-week, error occurred in setting the child support obligation at $109 per month because there was no evidence concerning mother's gross monthly income. CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED IN PART; TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND MATTER REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

<bold>1. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody —</bold> <bold>jurisdiction — home state</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by declining jurisdiction over this child custody matter and by concluding that Vermont was the home state of the children, because: (1) the minor children were not living in North Carolina for the required six months prior to the commencement of plaintiff mother's custody proceedings, and except for a six-week period in January and February 2002, the minor children lived continuously in Vermont from August 2001 to July 2002; (2) the totality of circumstances shows the six-week absence was merely a temporary absence, and in light of the numerous relocations and decisions, the parties' intent at the specific time they retrieved the minor children standing alone should not control the determination of whether the absence was temporary; (3) the length of absence from Vermont was a relatively short period of time, especially when compared to the fact that the minor children had spent almost the entire previous year in Vermont; and (4) Vermont's exercise of jurisdiction is proper under both North Carolina's UCCJEA provisions and Vermont's UCCJA provisions.</block_quote> <bold>2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation — custody — notice —</bold> <bold>substantial conformity</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a child custody case when it found that Vermont had issued its order in substantial conformity with the UCCJA and that plaintiff mother had notice and was aware of the pendency of the issue of jurisdiction before the Vermont court on 18 September 2002, because: (1) plaintiff conceded that the notice of hearing stated in all capital letters that both parties must appear and failure to appear meant it was possible for the court to issue parental rights and responsibilities based on the evidence presented by the other party; and (2) plaintiff responded to defendant's motion and specifically raised

Divorce; Evid.R. 611; expert witness; expert report; separate property; financial tracing; division of property; motion to show cause; contempt; financial misconduct; distributive award; child tax exemption; temporary support; time limitations; due process; attorney fees; abuse of discretion; custody determination; best interest of the children; marital debts; imputed income. Our standard of reviewing decisions of a domestic relations court is generally the abuse-of-discretion standard. Upon review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence from an expert witness related to the financial tracing of various claim separate property. The court did not abuse its discretion in its division of marital property and separate property, or in its allocation of marital debts and liabilities. Plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to a distributive award where defendant-appellee did not commit financial misconduct. The allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and the order to alternate the child tax exemption was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the trial court did not err in imputing income to defendant-appellee.

<p>Appeal, No. 2, April T., 1920, by libellant, from order and decree of C. P. Cambria County, June T., 1919, No. 154, making absolute a rule for alimony and counsel fees pendente lite in the case of Daniel E. Swank v. Ada M. Swank.</p> <p>Libel in divorce. Before O’Connor, J.</p> <p>Petition for alimony and counsel fees, pendente lite.</p> <p>The court entered the following order:</p> <p>And now, March 17, 1920, the rule for alimony and costs pendente lite and counsel fees is made absolute, and it is ordered that the libellant pay unto William A. McGuire, Esquire, the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars as counsel fees, as well as fifty dollars monthly for respondent’s maintenance pendente lite and costs; the said maintenance pendente lite to date from October 1, 1919, and continue during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, or until further order of the court; the foregoing amounts to be paid to William A. McGuire, attorney for respondent, or until further order of the court; the foregoing amounts to be paid to William A. McGuire, attorney for respondent, on or before April 1, 1920.</p> <p>Error assigned was the order of the court.</p>