Bray v. Bray

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for defamation from the defendant, who filed a counterclaim for breach of the parties' separation agreement, alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff was in arrears on his obligation to pay unallocated alimony and child support. Thereafter, the plaintiff withdrew his complaint, the parties stipulated to the amount due on the counterclaim, and the trial court rendered judgment on the counter- claim in accordance with the parties' stipulation. The defendant subse- quently applied for, and was granted, a property execution on the con- tents of a storage unit rented in the name of the plaintiff's father, and filed a claim for a determination of interests in the disputed property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that the plaintiff owned the contents of the storage unit but that a variety of items in the storage unit were exempt from property execution pursuant to statute (§ 52-352b). On the defendant's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in determining, sua sponte, that certain property was statutorily exempt from execution; pursuant to the plain language of the applicable statute (§ 52-361b [d]), a judgment debtor may claim an exemption by returning a signed exemption claim form indicating the property claimed to be exempt, and because § 51-361b (d) makes clear that if a judgment debtor chooses to claim an exemption, the judgment debtor must return the exemption claim form, which the plaintiff here failed to do, the statutory procedures provided for in § 52- 361b (d), which provide for notice, a stay of the property execution and a hearing to determine the rights to the disputed property, were not triggered. 2. Even if the plaintiff could assert a claim of exemption over the levied property without filing the necessary form, the plaintiff failed to seek a determination that the property was exempt, and, thus, the trial court should not have exempted any of the items from execution because i

Plaintiff was a partner of a physician practice and a limited partner in a real estate investment limited partnership. Continuing employment with the physician practice was a condition of remaining a limited partner. Following the termination of Plaintiff's employment with the physician group, Plaintiff, the physician group, and the limited partnership entered into a Separation Agreement. The limited partnership agreed not to redeem Plaintiff's interest in the limited partnership if he did not expand his practice outside Giles and Hickman Counties. Plaintiff began practicing outside these counties, and the limited partnership redeemed Plaintiff's interest. Plaintiff objected and filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief. The trial court granted the limited partnership's motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings. Plaintiff appealed, and we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the trial court's orders issued follow- ing a hearing on the defendant's motion for contempt. Pursuant to a separation agreement entered into by the parties and incorporated into the judgment of dissolution, the plaintiff was obligated to name the defendant as the beneficiary of a $900,000 life insurance policy; however, the plaintiff was not required to pay more than $3500 for the annual premium for the insurance. In 2008, the court issued an order increasing the life insurance coverage the plaintiff was required to maintain from $900,000 to $1.8 million. The order made no mention of the $3500 cost limitation. In 2019, the plaintiff communicated to the defendant that he would be discontinuing any further life insurance coverage because the costs had become excessive. Coverage under the original policy lapsed in March, 2019. The plaintiff then obtained a life insurance policy through L Co., effective May, 2019, but it contained an exclusion for any and all claims arising out of the insured person piloting any type of aircraft. The plaintiff owned a private aircraft and flew it ten to thirty times per month. In June, 2019, the court issued certain orders relating to the defendant's motion for contempt regarding the insurance coverage that the plaintiff had obtained: the plaintiff was required to apply to five separate insurance companies to obtain adequate insurance without a piloting exclusion, and, in the event that an application was rejected, or it was accepted with a piloting exclusion, the plaintiff was to transfer to the defendant as security for the life insurance obligation a mortgage in the face amount of $1.8 million on property owned by the plaintiff, and, until there was life insurance without a piloting exclusion or the mortgage deed had been recorded, the plaintiff was prohibited from piloting any aircraft or being a passenger in any airplane pil