Case Details
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- Appeal from judgment of Superior Court of Los Angeles County and from order denying new trial
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Appeal from Superior Court judgment regarding commercial lease dispute where defendant made unauthorized alterations to leased basement premises, compelling plaintiffs to vacate their barber and bath-room business.
Excerpt
<p>Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order denying a new trial.</p> <p>The plaintiffs were partners engaged in the barber and bath-room business, and had leased from one Reynolds,for a term expiring April 26, 1891, the basement of the Nadeau Hotel, on the southeast corner of Spring Street, in the city of Los Angeles. The alterations complained of in the construction of the premises, whereby the plaintiffs were compelled to abandon the basement, were made by the defendant Nathan Siegel, whose store was located at No. 3 Spring Street, directly over the south portion of the basement, who claimed to have authority for the alterations from Mrs. Nadeau, the owner of the hotel. The complaint alleges that by reason of the acts of the defendants, the plaintiffs were compelled to vacate the premises, and in so doing incurred a necessary expense of about $600 in moving their furniture and appurtenances; that it had cost them $2,200 to fit up the basement for their business, that the business had netted them a monthly profit of about $400 per month, and that they had entered into an agreement with one E. Dunham, in the Nadeau Block, to furnish heated water for use in their barber-shop and bath-rooms, during the term of their lease, which agreement was worth to the plaintiff the sum of $725; that by reason of the acts of the defendants they lost this established trade and business, to their damage in the sum of $2,500, and were compelled to abandon permanent improvements made by them at an expense of $965, and to surrender their leasehold interest, which was of the value of $1,500, and prayed judgment for damages in the sum of $6,290. Further facts are stated in the opinion.</p>
Similar Rulings
<p>APPEALS BY PLAINTIFFS FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 2 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.</p> <p>Nos. 177, 204 October Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, Nos. 157, 509 April Term 1888, C. P. No. 2.</p> <p>To No. 157 April Term 1888, of the court below, Nannie R. Collins brought trespass against the Chartiers Valley Gas Company to recover damages for an injury to a water well owned by the plaintiff, alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant. To No. 509 of the same term Mary L. Osbon brought a similar action against the same defendant to recover for a like injury.</p> <p>The two cases having been put at issue, they were tried together on May 6, 1889, when the following facts were shown:</p> <p>Each of the plaintiffs is the owner of a small lot of ground, with a house thereon, situate in the borough of Glenfield in Allegheny county. On each of said lots is a well used to supply water for domestic uses on the premises. On June 7,1887, the defendant, being engaged in the business of producing and supplying natural gas, entered into a written contract with C. J. Hummel, by which Hummel engaged to drill a well for natural gas upon a “ location ” in the borough of Glenfield, distant about 100 feet from the water'well of one of the plaintiffs, and about 125 feet from that of the other. The contract provided that Hummel should encase said gas well with eight and one fourth inch casing to the depth of 700 feet, and deep enough to shut off all fresh water, and below that with six inch casing to shut off any water or caving rock found just above the gas rock, and should warrant the well absolutely free from water and do all work to the satisfaction of the defendant’s superintendent ; all tools, and gas and Avater connections, to be furnished by Hummel, and all casing required for the well to be furnished by the defendant. The contract contained also the following clause: “ All springs to be fully protected from damage, and drillings to be carried from the wells
<p>Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. Turnee A. Gtill, Judge.</p> <p>Action for damages alleged to have occurred by the negligent removal of lateral support to plaintiff’s-building, in consequence of which the latter fell. The trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff could not recover, upon which he took a nonsuit with leave, etc. The plaintiff appealed in due form.</p> <p>The other facts appear in the opinion.</p> <p>(1) A proprietor who makes excavations in his own land, near the premises of his neighbor, in a careless and negligent manner, is liable in damages for injuries to the building of the adjoining owner, which were the consequence of his carelessness and negligence in the work of excavation. Charless v. Rcmkin, 22 Mo. 566; Stevenson v. Wallace, 27 Gratt. 89; Moody v. McClelland, 39 Ala. 52; Myer v. Hobls, 57 Ala. 177; Shafer v. Wilson, 44 Md. 269; Austin v. Railroad, 25 N. Y. 334; Quincy v. Jones, 76 111. 231; McMillan v. Staples, 36 Iowa, 532; Dodd v. Holme, 1 Ad. & Ell. 493; Foley v. Wyeth, 2 Allen, 131; Washburn on Easements [4 Ed.] top p. 582, et seq., side p. 430 et seq., Thompson on Negligence, 276; Cooley on Torts [2 Ed.] top p. 707, side p. 595; Wood on Nuisances [2 Ed.] secs. 189, 190. (2) That the work of excavation was carelessly and negligently done, and that the injury to the building was the result, was clearly established by the evidence. (3) Although work has 'been let to a contractor, this fact will not exonerate a party for whom the work is performed from liability for the negligent acts of the •contractor, or his servants, if the right to control or direct the mode or manner of the work in any respect is retained, or if such control be in fact exercised, or such direction assumed. Speed v. Railroad, 71 Mo. 303; Railroad v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 657; Heffernan v. Benkard, 1 Robertson (N. Y.) 432; Sclnvarts v. Gilmore, 45 111. 457; Faren v. Sellers, 39 La. Ann. 1011; Brophy v. Bartlett, 15 N. E. Rep. (N. Y.) 368; Jones v. Chantry
<p>Appeal from Izard Circuit Court; John W. Mrrks, Judge;</p> <p>1. The appellant was not responsible for the negligence or wrongful acts of an independent contractor. 53 Ark. 503; 55 Ark. 510.</p> <p>2. It was error to admit testimony to establish a parol contract to fix the fences in time to make a crop. The deed could not be varied by parol evidence.</p> <p>3. The court admitted improper testimony as to the value of the crop. For measure of damages, see 56 Ark. 612.</p> <p>1. Land outside of the right of way was taken and appropriated to the use of the appellant in the construction of its roadway ; hence the company, and not- the contractor, was liable for the damage. Elliott on Railroads, § 1063. It is liable for the consequent destruction of the fence. Ib. And for making roads on the land. Ib.</p> <p>2. The agreement to fix the fence in time to protect the crop was contemporaneous with, and a part of the consideration for, the making of the deed, and parol evidence was admissible to prove it. 55 Ark. 112; 27 Ark. 510; 128 Pa. 337; 138 Pa. 230; 156 Mass. 108.</p>
<p>Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Blue Barth ■county to recover damages to a lot on Washington street in Mankato, resulting from the acts of defendant in collecting water and ■discharging it upon plaintiff’s lot. A jury was waived, and the action tried before Severance, J., who ordered judgment for plaintiff. A new trial was refused, and the defendant appealed.</p>
<p>Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Albertson, J., entered February 3, 1912, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, for property injured and destroyed by fire.</p>
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