Bailey's Admx. v. Gleason
Case Details
- Judge(s)
- Haselton, Munson, Rowell, Stafford, Tyler, Watson
- Status
- Published
- Procedural Posture
- Demurrer sustained pro forma at March Term 1902, Washington County; defendant's second plea adjudged insufficient then overturned on appeal; bankruptcy plea found sufficient in law
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Outcome
Court sustained defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's special assumpsit action on a promissory note, finding that defendant's discharge in bankruptcy on May 1, 1899 extinguished the debt accrued prior to his bankruptcy filing on October 18, 1898.
Excerpt
<p>Special Assumpsit against the defendant as surviving partner of Ambro Hildreth, deceased, upon a promissory note signed with the firm name of H. C. Gleason & Co. Heard on general demurrer to the defendant’s second plea, at the March Term, 1902, Washington County, Start, J., presiding. 'Demurrer sustained pro forma, and plea adjudged insufficient. The defendant excepted.</p> <p>The plea demurred to is as follows: “And for a further plea in this behalf, etc., the defendant says that the plaintiff ought not to have or maintain, etc., because the defendant says, that after the said several, supposed debts and causes of action in said declaration mentioned' were contracted and accrued, and before the commencement of this suit by the plaintiff in this behalf, to- wit, on the' eighteenth day of October, 1898, the said defendant became and was adjudged a bankrupt, in accordance with an Act of Congress entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States/ at, to- wit, Burlington aforesaid, and that the said defendant received his discharge as such bankrupt on, to wit, the first day of May, 1899, from the United States District Court for the district of Vermont, and1 that the debts were contracted, and the said causes of action, — if any there be— in said declaration mentioned, and each of them, did accrue to the said plaintiff before the said defendant soi became a bankrupt as aforesaid, to wit, at Richmond in the county of Chittenden on the eleventh day of June, 1888, and of this the said defendant puts himself on the country.”</p> <p>The plea of bankruptcy is sufficient, at least against a general demurrer. 3 Chitty Pleading, 10 Ahí- Ed. *956; The Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 21, f; Downer v. Chamberlin, 21 Vt. 414; Belnap v. Davis, 21 Vt. 409.</p> <p>In the reported cases when a discharge in bankruptcy has been pleaded, and the plaintiff claimed that his case was not affected by such discharge, the plaintiff has replied specially. Batchel
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Similar Rulings
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