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Grimball v. Mississippi & Alabama Railroad

Unknown CourtJanuary 15, 1844

Case Details

Judge(s)
Thacher
Status
Published
Procedural Posture
Error from Circuit Court of Hinds County; writ of error filed; case remanded for incurable errors in trial court proceedings

Related Laws

No specific laws identified for this ruling.

Outcome

The Supreme Court remanded the case due to procedural errors in the trial court, specifically regarding non-compliance with the sixty-day rule requiring security for costs and other incurable errors in obtaining the verdict and judgment.

Excerpt

<p>Error from the Circuit Court of Hinds county.</p> <p>The facts are accurately set out in the argument of the Messrs. Briggs.</p> <p>The Mississippi and Alabama Railroad Company, suing to the use of Robert Jaffray, instituted an action of assumpsit to the May term, 1839, of Hinds Circuit Court, against Grimball, Long & McGowan, on a promissory note for $500, dated September 7th, 1837, and due at four months, made by said defendants, and one Trahern, who was not sued.</p> <p>At the return term, plea of the general issue was filed for all the defendants.</p> <p>At the September term, 1840, the cause was continued under the sixty day rule for costs, upon motion of the circuit clerk and sheriff.</p> <p>This rule was not complied with, the security for costs was not given.</p> <p>On the 4th day of January, 1842, judgment was entered up in favor of Brandon Bank use- v. Grimball, Long & Me Gowan, for $660 ; verdict having been found.</p> <p>McGowan has sued out his writ of error, in the names of all the defendants, and bis writ of “summons and severance,” against Grimball & Long, has been returned executed.</p> <p>As the points of practice under the sixty day rule, as it is commonly called, arise daily, the attention of the Court is called to the fact exhibited in the record, that a rule on the plaintiff, requiring security for costs, was not complied with, and its opinion solicited as to the construction of the statute. How. & Hutch, p. 587.</p> <p>And whether, at the expiration of the sixty days, if the rule be not complied with, the case must not go off at all events.</p> <p>And whether, if the benefit of the rule may seem to have been waived by the defendants, whether this waiver, by the defendants, can suffice to keep a cause on the docket, when this rule was granted in favor of the officers of Court.</p> <p>But whatever may be the view taken of this matter by the Court, there is one error which is incurable, viz. : The verdict was obtained by, and a judgment render

Similar Rulings

Hindmarch
Unknown CourtJun 1889

<p>EEBOE TO THE COUNT OE COMMON PLEAS OE ERIE COUNTY.</p> <p>No. 113 January Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 198 February Term 1887, C. P.</p> <p>On March 2, 1887, a declaration in the common counts was filed in an action of assumpsit brought by William H. Hind-march against Edward Hoffman, claiming the sum of 1400. The defendant pleaded non-assumpsit, with leave, etc.</p> <p>By agreement in writing, the cause was submitted to the decision of the court, without a jury, under the act of April 22, 1874, P. L. 109, and on February 22, 1888, the court, Gunnison, P. J., filed the following decision :</p> <p>BINDINGS OE EACT.</p> <p>On the morning of October 10, 1885, one Richard Savanaek stole from the plaintiff, in Buffalo, N. Y., a sum of money, f400 of which upon the same day he deposited with the defendant, to be returned to him or upon his order. There is no allegation that the defendant knew the money was stolen at the time, and as a fact I find he did not know it. He was after-wards notified by the attorney for the plaintiff that the plaintiff claimed the money, that it had been stolen from him by Savanack, and after this notice he paid it, upon the order of Savanack, to Messrs. Branda ge, Weaver & Bell, of Buffalo, receiving from them a bond to indemnify him against any liability to any other person for the money. Upon his refusal afterwards to pay the amount to the plaintiff, this action in assumpsit was brought.</p> <p>CONCLUSIONS OK LAW.</p> <p>I have been unable to find any authority sustaining the right to maintain assumpsit in a case of this kind. The rules governing the action are well established, and inquire that there should be privity of contract, express or implied, between the parties, in order to maintain it: Finney v. Finney, 16 Pa. 380 ; Wells v. Stewart, 5 Binn. 325 ; Allen v. Irwin, 1 S. & R. 549. “ To maintain assumpsit, privity of contract, either express or implied, is necessary. The mere fact of one man’s money coming into the hands of

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Gleason
Unknown CourtDec 1903

<p>Special Assumpsit against the defendant as surviving partner of Ambro Hildreth, deceased, upon a promissory note signed with the firm name of H. C. Gleason & Co. Heard on general demurrer to the defendant’s second plea, at the March Term, 1902, Washington County, Start, J., presiding. 'Demurrer sustained pro forma, and plea adjudged insufficient. The defendant excepted.</p> <p>The plea demurred to is as follows: “And for a further plea in this behalf, etc., the defendant says that the plaintiff ought not to have or maintain, etc., because the defendant says, that after the said several, supposed debts and causes of action in said declaration mentioned' were contracted and accrued, and before the commencement of this suit by the plaintiff in this behalf, to- wit, on the' eighteenth day of October, 1898, the said defendant became and was adjudged a bankrupt, in accordance with an Act of Congress entitled ‘An act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States/ at, to- wit, Burlington aforesaid, and that the said defendant received his discharge as such bankrupt on, to wit, the first day of May, 1899, from the United States District Court for the district of Vermont, and1 that the debts were contracted, and the said causes of action, — if any there be— in said declaration mentioned, and each of them, did accrue to the said plaintiff before the said defendant soi became a bankrupt as aforesaid, to wit, at Richmond in the county of Chittenden on the eleventh day of June, 1888, and of this the said defendant puts himself on the country.”</p> <p>The plea of bankruptcy is sufficient, at least against a general demurrer. 3 Chitty Pleading, 10 Ahí- Ed. *956; The Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 21, f; Downer v. Chamberlin, 21 Vt. 414; Belnap v. Davis, 21 Vt. 409.</p> <p>In the reported cases when a discharge in bankruptcy has been pleaded, and the plaintiff claimed that his case was not affected by such discharge, the plaintiff has replied specially. Batchel

Defendant Win
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Unknown CourtMay 1903

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Remanded
Barnes
Unknown CourtOct 1902

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Plaintiff Win
Guffy
Unknown CourtNov 1896

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Defendant Win

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