Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co.

<p>Appeal, No. 119, Oct. T., 1912, by defendants, from decree of C. P. Allegheny Co., Jan. T., 1911, No. 710, on bill in equity in case of 'Maebeth-Evans Glass Company v. Harry A. Schnelbach and Jefferson Glass Company.</p> <p>Bill in equity for an injunction.</p> <p>Shafer, J., found the facts to be as follows:</p> <p>First. The Maebeth-Evans Glass Company was incorporated in 1899,. and has been principally engaged since that time in the manufacture and sale of glassware for illuminating, purposes. Mr. George A. Macbeth has been president of the company since its organization, and has been engaged in the manufacture of glass since about 1872.</p> <p>. , Second. At the time of the formation of the MaebethEvans. Glass Company the defendant Harry Schnelbach was in the employ of the Thomas Evans Glass Company, one of the constituent companies out of which the plaintiff company was formed, and he thereupon entered into the employ of the plaintiff company and remained in its employ until about the beginning of the year 1910, being employed, as a factory superintendent.</p> <p>Third. Beginning in the year 1900 or soon thereafter George A. Macbeth on behalf of the plaintiff company began a series of investigations and experiments for the purpose of discovering a method of making a better semi-translucent glass for illuminating purposes than those theretofore known. The defect in the glass which he .endeavored to remedy was that the means taken to make it more or less opaque also prevented the diffusion of light through it, and the object was to make a glass which should appear to be opaque and yet should allow the light to be diffused through it. For this purpose Mr. Macbeth consulted the literature on glass-making and consulted with Mr. Nash of the Tiffany works and had him make experiments, but without success. He then employed a chemist, Mr. Silverman, to investigate the matter and make experiments, about September of 1902, and these experiments were continued to the su

<p>Two actions in the district court for Ramsey county. The Williams action was by a taxpayer on his own behalf and on behalf of other taxpayers similarly situated. The Earner action was by the owner of a manufacturing plant at which a large number of women workers, adult and minor, were employed. Both actions were to restrain the members of the Minimum Wage Commission from expending any money in furtherance of the provisions of Laws 1913, p. 789, c. 547, and to restrain defendant Iverson, as state auditor, from auditing any claims incurred by the commission on account of anything done under the provisions of the act and to restrain him from issuing any warrant in payment of any such claim.</p> <p>Plaintiffs obtained orders requiring defendants to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue. Prom an order in each case, Catlin, J., granting plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary injunction, defendants appealed. Prom an order in the Earner case overruling their demurrer to the complaint, defendants appealed.</p> <p>The experience of the world and our common knowledge are continually changing. Things unknown a century ago are now familiar to us all; children of today are fully 'acquainted with modem inventions, such as telephones, electric lights, and other modern improvements; this common knowledge is not the same as it was even 25 years ago. Therefore the power of government termed the police power, being based upon common knowledge of what is injurious to the health, morals or welfare of the public, must of necessity be elastic as is the common knowledge itself. When that experience and knowledge have taught us that certain things are injurious in any of these respects, then the police power expands to meet the necessity caused by onr increased knowledge.</p> <p>Under our form of government the legislature determines whether conditions call for corrective legislation. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 660, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. ed. 205. The legislature, in pas

Torts—Elements of tortious interference with contract—Establishing lack of justification element in tort of tortious interference with contract—Factors in determining whether an actor has acted improperly in intentionally interfering with a contract or prospective contract of another—Establishment of privilege of fair competition will defeat claim of tortious interference with contract, when—Listings of names, addresses, or telephone numbers that have not been published or disseminated constitute trade secrets, when—Whether particular knowledge or process is a trade secret is a question of fact determined by trier of fact upon greater weight of the evidence.

<p>Bill in equity, filed in the Superior Court on June 14, 1910, and afterwards amended, in which the plaintiff, a corporation engaged extensively in the business of manufacturing and selling leather welting used in the manufacture of shoes, and a successor of the Union Welting Company, sought to enjoin the defendant, who since 1897 continuously had been in the employ of the plaintiff and its predecessor, from disclosing or making use of trade secrets alleged to belong to the plaintiff, the plaintiff averring that the defendant had obtained knowledge thereof in the course and by reason of his confidential employment. There also was a prayer for an accounting from the defendant and a return of the whole or a part of the salary paid to him in the last year and a half of his employment, the plaintiff averring that during that period, while drawing full pay from the plaintiff, the defendant was giving a large part of his time, energy and attention to the construction and equipment of a rival manufactory of his own without the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent.</p> <p>The case was referred to James D. Colt, Esquire, as master. Upon the filing of the master’s report, the plaintiff moved that it be recommitted to the master for him to incorporate in the report further specified findings of fact. The motion was denied and the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>An interlocutory decree confirming the report, and a final decree dismissing the bill then were entered by order of Hardy, J., and the plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<bold>Employer and Employee; Wrongful Interference —</bold> <bold>interference with contract — covenant not to compete</bold> <bold>and termination by new employer</bold> <block_quote> Summary judgment for defendant was affirmed in an action for tortious interference with contract where defendant's evidence was that plaintiff worked for defendant before going to work for a competitor (CCA); plaintiff had signed a non-compete agreement with defendant; defendant sought to enforce that agreement and to prevent the loss of trade secrets; a lawsuit was filed; and CCA dismissed plaintiff. Defendant did not demand that plaintiff be fired (only that violations of the agreement cease); defendant threatened to sue but provided CCA with no incentive to fire plaintiff; defendant's intent was only to protect its own interests; and similar cases had resulted in negotiation and settlement rather than termination. Plaintiff provided no evidence to the contrary.</block_quote>