Paniccia v. Success Village Apartments, Inc.
Case Details
- Judge(s)
- Prescott; Suarez; Bishop
- Status
- Published
- Procedural Posture
- appeal
Related Laws
No specific laws identified for this ruling.
Claim Types
Outcome
The trial court found that Success Village Apartments, Inc. breached its employment contract with Paniccia by terminating him without cause and awarded him $172,969.90 in damages including back pay and prejudgment interest. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the defendant's claims regarding untimeliness of the first judgment, parol evidence, and prejudgment interest.
Excerpt
The plaintiff, P, sought to recover damages from the defendant, S Co., for S Co.'s breach of the parties' employment contract in connection with S Co.'s termination of P's employment. P was hired by S Co. in 2012, pursuant to an employment contract for a term of two years, and his contract was renewed in 2013 for an additional term of two years. In October, 2015, S Co. approved and executed a new employment contract with P for an additional term of two years, to begin on January 25, 2016. Although the 2015 contract was dated October 12, 2015, the board of S Co. approved the contract on October 13, 2015, at a special meeting. In December, 2015, S Co. notified P that his employment would be termi- nated as of January 25, 2016, the date his 2015 contract was to begin. Following a bench trial, the parties executed a joint stipulation providing for an extension of the statutory (§ 51-183b) 120 day deadline for the trial court to render a decision. The trial court issued its memorandum of decision past the agreed upon extended deadline, rendering judgment for S Co. P moved to open and vacate the judgment and for a new trial, which the trial court granted. A new bench trial was held, and the trial court rendered judgment for P. On S Co.'s appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly granted P's motion to open and vacate the judg- ment rendered in the first trial as that court's finding that P did not waive his right to object to the untimely decision was not clearly erroneous: P was under no duty to speak or to protest after the court failed to issue a decision by the agreed upon deadline, prejudgment silence alone was not sufficient to support a finding of waiver under § 51-183b, as there must have been some other act or conduct that either delayed the start of the deadline, created a duty to protest in the silent party or served as an affirmative act of waiver or consent, and S Co. was unable to identify any such act or conduct by P that supported a finding of
Similar Rulings
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