In re L.R.-R.

R.C. 2151.414/permanent custody best interest of the child manifest weight. The trial court's determination that CCDCFS made reasonable efforts to reunite Mother and children was proper. The trial court considered factors under R.C. 2151.414 for abandonment, lack of action, best interest of the children and custodial history. The trial court's judgment of permanent custody to CCDCFS was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant's argument that the trial court committed reversible error fails where the record supports that the trial court's determination was in the best interest of the children.

Dependency and Neglect—Attorney–Client Privilege for Expert Report. Based on a report from neighbors, the Jefferson County Division of Children, Youth, and Families (the Division) removed the children in this case and placed them with their maternal grandfather, where they remained throughout the proceedings. The Division filed a petition in dependency and neglect based on the fact that mother left the 3-year-old twins home alone for over six hours. This family had been involved with child protective services on two prior occasions due to physical abuse and severe injuries to the children. Before the hearing, mother requested appointment of a child psychology expert to evaluate her parenting time. Because mother was indigent, the court appointed the expert at the state's expense. Based on the expert's report, mother elected not to call the expert as a witness, but the guardian ad litem (GAL) requested the expert's report. The juvenile court ordered the report disclosed and allowed the GAL to call the expert to testify at the termination hearing. The juvenile court adjudicated the children dependent and neglected and adopted treatment plans for the parents. The GAL subsequently filed a motion to terminate the parent–child relationships, and the court terminated mother's and father's parental rights. On appeal, mother argued that the juvenile court violated her attorney–client privilege when it required disclosure of the expert's report and admitted the report and the expert's testimony at the termination hearing. Under CRS § 19-3-610(1), when an indigent parent's attorney requests appointment of an expert, the attorney–client privilege generally protects communications between the parent and the expert. However, here much of the expert's report and testimony concerned observations of the children, and thus fell outside the privilege. In addition, the expert advised mother, orally and in writing, that the evaluation and interview would not be considered confidential a

<bold>1. Constitutional Law — effective assistance of counsel — tardiness</bold> <block_quote> Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding even though his counsel was late on the second of five days of hearing after a lunch recess, because: (1) respondent failed to demonstrate how his attorney's tardiness caused him to be denied a fair hearing; and (2) there was no way of determining what respondent's attorney was precluded from asking based on her failure to make an offer of proof as required by N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 103.</block_quote> <bold>2. Evidence — hearsay — mental health records of children</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err in a termination of parental rights case by admitting, over objection, mental health records of two of the minor children, because: (1) even assuming arguendo that the records contain inadmissible hearsay, in a bench trial it is presumed that the judge disregarded any incompetent evidence that may have been admitted unless it affirmatively appears that he was influenced thereby; and (2) respondent has not pointed to any specific instances of hearsay upon which the trial court improperly relied.</block_quote> <bold>3. Termination of Parental Rights — past abuse — reasonable probability</bold> <bold>of continued abuse — emotional and behavioral problems</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not abuse its discretion by terminating respondent father's parental rights, because: (1) the trial court found that all three children had been abused and exhibited symptoms of that abuse, and respondent admitted that he physically<page_number>Page 279</page_number> beat and abused the children; (2) the court determined there was a reasonable probability that respondent would again abuse the children if they were returned to his care based on the testimony of respondent's individual therapist; (3) the children's therapist test

<bold>Termination of Parental Rights — failure to appoint</bold> <bold>guardian ad litem to parent — mental illness</bold> <block_quote> The trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by failing to appoint respondent mother a guardian ad litem under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-1111</cross_reference>(a)(6) when she has a diagnosis of bipolar affective disorder with possible psychotic disorder, because: (1) the trial court referenced respondent's mental wellbeing<page_number>Page 154</page_number> and its concern that respondent was unable to raise the minor children without assistance repeatedly in its written orders before and after receiving respondent's psychological evaluations; (2) it was the court's repeated findings that respondent was incapable of parenting her minor children based upon her mental illness in addition to respondent's own motion that triggered the requirement for appointment of a guardian ad litem; and (3) while respondent may be competent for some purposes, including her ability to assist counsel and maintain employment, it does not necessarily follow that she is not debilitated by her mental illness when it comes to parenting her children.</block_quote> <bold>2. Termination of Parental Rights — extraordinary</bold> <bold>delay in entering order — prejudicial error</bold> <block_quote> The trial court erred in a termination of parental rights case by delaying entry of an order until almost one year after completion of the hearing even though N.C.G.S. §§ <cross_reference>7B-1109</cross_reference>(e) and <cross_reference>7B-1110</cross_reference>(a) set the deadline no later than thirty days following the completion of the hearing, and the case is reversed, because: (1) the Court of Appeals has been apt to find prejudice in delays more than six months or more; (2) the need to show prejudice diminishes as the delay between the termination hearing and the date of entry of the order terminating parental rights increase

<bold>1. Termination of Parental Rights — combined with abuse hearings —</bold> <bold>reunification efforts futile or dangerous</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by simultaneously conducting all adjudicatory and dispositional hearings related to both a child abuse and neglect petition and the termination of parental rights where the court found that reunification efforts would be dangerous or futile. The importance of clarity of findings and conclusions was emphasized.</block_quote> <bold>2. Termination of Parental Rights — reunification efforts not required —</bold> <bold>threat of harm to child</bold> <block_quote> The trial court properly complied with N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-507</cross_reference> in a child abuse and termination of parental rights proceeding where it did not require DSS to use reasonable efforts for reunification. The court found that the threat of harm to the child made it too dangerous to use reasonable efforts to reunify the child with respondent.</block_quote><page_number>Page 640</page_number> <bold>3. Termination of Parental Rights — basis — detailed findings of abuse</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by finding and concluding that respondent's parental rights should be terminated. Although respondent contended that the termination was based on a felony child abuse charge, it is clear that the trial court based the termination on detailed findings and conclusions as to the ongoing, severe, and repeated abuse of the child.</block_quote> <bold>4. Termination of Parental Rights — best interests of child factors</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding and concluding that it was in a child's best interests to terminate parental rights where the court properly considered the factors enumerated in N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-1110</cross_reference>(a).</block_quote>