Henderson v. Oregon Department of Human Services

Workers' compensation-Appeals-R.C. 4123.512-Consent provision of R.C. 4123.512(D) does not violate Article IV, Section 5(B) of Ohio Constitution because workers' compensation appeals under R.C. 4123.512 are special statutory proceedings and consent provision renders Civ.R. 41(A) clearly inapplicable-Consent provision does not violate Equal Protection Clauses of Ohio and federal Constitutions because distinct classification of claimants in employer-initiated workers' compensation appeals is rationally related to legitimate purposes of limiting improper payments made during pendency of appeals and avoiding unnecessary delay in appeal process-Consent provision does not violate due-process guarantees of Ohio and federal Constitutions because provision is rationally related to legitimate purposes of avoiding needless extension of appeal process designed to run quickly, financial effects on system as whole, and waste of judicial resources-Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring unconstitutional the statute (§ 52-190a [a]) that requires a complaint sounding in medical malpractice to be accompanied by a good faith certificate and a letter authored by a similar health care provider opining that there appeared to be evidence of medical negligence. In 2006, following the suicide of his wife, the plaintiff had brought a medical malpractice action against his wife's treating psychiatrist, A, and his employer, C Co., but failed to append to the complaint the good faith certificate and opinion letter required by § 52-190a (a). Although the plaintiff subsequently obtained an opinion letter and amended his complaint, the trial court dismissed the counts of the amended complaint sounding in medical negligence on the ground that the original complaint failed to comply with § 52- 190a (a). The trial court subsequently rendered judgment for A and C Co. on the remaining counts. Thereafter, in 2011, the plaintiff com- menced two additional actions against A and C Co., their telephone answering service, T Co., and its owners, and other governmental offi- cials, employees and entities, among others, in which he challenged the dismissal of his medical malpractice action. Those actions, both of which included the claim that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, ultimately were resolved against the plaintiff. In 2016, the plaintiff, representing himself, commenced the present action against A, C Co., T Co. and its owners, the state, the Appellate Court, and five Superior Court judges. Thereafter, the trial court granted A and C Co.'s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claims directed against them were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as the plaintiff previously had or could have raised and litigated those claims in one of the 2011 actions. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by T Co. and its owners, concluding that the plaintiff's claims against them were barred by the prior