Ventresco v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr.

Motion for Summary Judgment, Employment, Age Discrimination, Sex Discrimination. No genuine issues as to any material fact existed regarding plaintiff's claims for age or sex discrimination. Defendant presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case by presenting facts which demonstrated that defendant's reasoning for termination of plaintiff's employment was pretextual. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.

The trial court erred in entering judgment for defendant because the greater weight of competent, credible evidence regarding proximate cause established that the decedent's death was the natural and probable consequence of defendant's employee's failure to supervise the decedent's care.

Wrongful death survivorship medical malpractice standard of care causation magistrate Civ.R. 53. Plaintiff was the surviving spouse of a decedent who suffered a pulmonary embolism six days after he was discharged from defendant's hospital. The pulmonary embolism ultimately led to decedent's death, and plaintiff brought a wrongful death and survivorship action under a theory of medical malpractice. Upon considering the testimony of fact witnesses and expert witnesses, the magistrate determined that plaintiff did not prove medical malpractice by a preponderance of the evidence. The magistrate found that defendant's employees did not breach the standard of care when treating decedent, as their treatment was consistent with decedent's symptoms and test results. The magistrate further found that plaintiff failed to prove that the alleged breach of the standard of care—the failure to order an ultrasound to test for deep vein thrombosis—proximately caused decedent's death. The magistrate found insufficient evidence to establish that deep vein thrombosis would have been detected at any point during decedent's hospitalization.

Buy and Sell Contract—Mineral Rights—Warranty Deed—Negligence—Breach of Contract—Statute of Limitations—Third Party—Cause of Action—Accrual Date. The Bells hired Orr Land Company LLC (Orr) and its employee Ellerman to represent them in selling their real property. Orr found a buyer and the Bells entered into a buy and sell contract with the buyer, which provided, as pertinent here, that the sale excluded all oil, gas, and mineral rights in the property. Orr then retained Land Title Guarantee Company (Land Title) to draft closing documents, including the warranty deed. In 2005 the Bells signed the warranty deed and sold the property to the buyer. The Bells didn't know that the warranty deed prepared by Land Title didn't contain any language reserving the Bells' mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. For over nine years, the Bells continued to receive the mineral owner's royalty payments due under an oil and gas lease on the property. In 2014 the lessee oil and gas company learned that the Bells didn't own the mineral rights, so it began sending the payments to the buyer. After that, the Bells discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights as provided in the buy and sell contract. In 2016 the Bells filed this negligence and breach of contract action against defendants Land Title, Orr, and Ellerman. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Bells' claims were untimely because the statute of limitations had run. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Bells contended that the district court erred in granting defendants' motions to dismiss because they sufficiently alleged facts that, if true, establish that the statute of limitations didn't begin to accrue on their claims until the oil and gas company ceased payment in September 2014, which is when they contended they discovered that the warranty deed didn't reserve their mineral rights. A plaintiff must commence tort actions within two years