Michalek v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr.

Motion for Summary Judgment, Employment, Age Discrimination, Sex Discrimination. No genuine issues as to any material fact existed regarding plaintiff's claims for age or sex discrimination. Defendant presented legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case by presenting facts which demonstrated that defendant's reasoning for termination of plaintiff's employment was pretextual. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted.

Wrongful death survivorship medical malpractice standard of care causation magistrate Civ.R. 53. Plaintiff was the surviving spouse of a decedent who suffered a pulmonary embolism six days after he was discharged from defendant's hospital. The pulmonary embolism ultimately led to decedent's death, and plaintiff brought a wrongful death and survivorship action under a theory of medical malpractice. Upon considering the testimony of fact witnesses and expert witnesses, the magistrate determined that plaintiff did not prove medical malpractice by a preponderance of the evidence. The magistrate found that defendant's employees did not breach the standard of care when treating decedent, as their treatment was consistent with decedent's symptoms and test results. The magistrate further found that plaintiff failed to prove that the alleged breach of the standard of care—the failure to order an ultrasound to test for deep vein thrombosis—proximately caused decedent's death. The magistrate found insufficient evidence to establish that deep vein thrombosis would have been detected at any point during decedent's hospitalization.

Negligence liability duty open and obvious causation comparative negligence damages parental consortium magistrate. Plaintiff brought this negligence action after suffering injuries on Defendant's premises. Plaintiff's son also asserted a claim for the loss of parental consortium. Plaintiff suffered a puncture injury to her leg after tripping on a curb and landing on a metal bolt protruding from a mulched area in Defendant's parking lot. The magistrate found that Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff as an invitee. Plaintiff did not exceed the scope of her invitation by walking through a mulched area of the parking lot, because the area was obviously worn down by pedestrian use and Defendant's employees walked through the mulched area. Defendant did not breach a duty of care to Plaintiff with respect to the curb, because the danger of the curb should have been open and obvious to the Plaintiff. However, Defendant did breach a duty of care with respect to the protruding bolt, because Defendant knew or should have known it presented a danger. Defendant's breach of care was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury. However, Plaintiff's comparative negligence warranted a 50 percent reduction of any award for damages. The magistrate determined that Plaintiff was entitled to damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. The magistrate also determined Plaintiff's son was entitled to damages for the loss of parental consortium.

<p>Two actions of toet for personal injuries received by the plaintiff on December 3, 1915, under the circumstances described in the opinion, by the falling of the stern of a tug, owned by the defendant in the first action and others, while he was assisting her captain and employees of the defendant in the second action to remove a rope or hawser which had become entangled in the tug’s propeller. Writs dated June 15, 1916.</p> <p>The declarations in both actions contained allegations that on December 3, 1915, the plaintiff “entered into a contract with” the defendant in the first action “to remove a hawser from around the propeller of the tug, which was owned by” that defendant “and operated, controlled and managed by him, his servants, agents, or employees;” and that the plaintiff received his injuries “owing to the joint negligence of the” defendants in the two actions. Further allegations of the declaration in the first action were that the negligence of the defendant therein “consisted in the negligent, careless and improper manner in which the defendant allowed the work of raising the tug ... to be done, the negligence and carelessness of the defendant in supervising and overseeing the way in which the work was done, in using improper methods to raise said tug, in using improper and defective tools, material and machinery in doing said work and negligence and carelessness of the captain of said tug.” The further allegations of the declaration in the second action were that the negligence of the defendant in that action “consisted in furnishing improper and defective material, machinery and tools with which the tug Ida M. Chase was raised, improperly, carelessly and negligently raising of the said tug and negligence and carelessness on the part of the engineer of said defendant in performing his work and negligence of the defendant in employing unfit, improper and inexperienced employees to do the work.”</p> <p>In the Superior Court, the actions were tried toget

<bold>1. Pharmacists — misfilling of prescription</bold> <bold>— failure to instruct on peculiar susceptibility</bold> <block_quote> The trial court erred in a negligence case arising out of defendant pharmacist's misfilling of a prescription by failing to instruct the jury on the peculiar susceptibility of plaintiff, and plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, because: (1) there was evidence at trial that an ordinary person would have been injured in the form of the normal toxicity effect of the pertinent drug such as vomiting, nausea, and slowed heart rate; (2) there was evidence that plaintiff's heart damage and stroke were caused by a hyper-sensitive drug reaction to the pertinent drug; (3) the jury sent a note during deliberations evidencing that the jury was confused by the instructions given by the judge; (4) there were allusions throughout the trial to a hypersensitive drug reaction of plaintiff, yet the jury was in no way instructed on what to do with this evidence; and (5) plaintiff requested a jury instruction on peculiar susceptibility while defendants requested one as well in the language<page_number>Page 727</page_number> of N.C.P.I. Civ. 102.20, and given the incomplete state of the record, through no fault of appellant, it cannot be said that plaintiff waived his objection and failed to preserve any error for appeal.</block_quote> <bold>2. Witnesses — qualifications — expert</bold> <bold>testimony</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a negligence case arising out of the misfilling of a prescription by excluding a doctor's opinion on causation, because: (1) the doctor admitted that he was not an expert in the area in which he was testifying and further admitted that he came to have his opinion solely by reading the opinion of another expert in the field; and (2) the exclusion was harmless where the same opinion was elicited from several other experts throughout the trial.</block_quote> <bold>3. Appeal and Error