Elizabeth Anne Sykes v. Chad Steven Sykes

Estate—Jurisdiction—Constructive Trust—Testamentary Capacity—Undue Influence—Jury Trial—Contempt. Dr. Arlen E. Owens (the decedent) hired Dominguez as his private caregiver in 2010. The decedent died in July 2013. After the decedent's death, his brother and only living heir, Owens, filed a petition for informal probate of the decedent's will, and later a petition for determination of testacy and for determination of heirs, alleging that the will that the decedent had signed in 2012 was the product of undue influence by Dominguez and that the decedent had lacked the capacity to execute the will. He also filed a complaint for recovery of estate assets and asked the court to invalidate the will and order the decedent's estate to be administered under intestate distribution statutes. In 2015, Owens also filed a petition to set aside non-probate transfers for three bank accounts for which Dominguez was payable-on-death (POD) beneficiary. The court imposed a constructive trust over the POD accounts. The court later upheld the will but found that the decedent had not had the capacity to execute the POD designations and had been unduly influenced by Dominguez. After issuance of the final judgment, the court issued a contempt order against Dominguez for violating the constructive trust that included the condition that she could purge the contempt by paying back the money from the bank accounts. On appeal, Dominguez contended that the district court did not have jurisdiction to set aside the POD designations and impose a constructive trust on the POD accounts because Owens and the estate did not have standing to make such requests. A district court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection with estates. The claims regarding the POD designations arose in connection with and were essential to the estate administration. Thus, the court had jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust, Owens had standing, and the court had jurisdiction

The Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS") removed three children from the custody of their parents and placed them with foster parents in March 2012 because one of the children, an infant, was severely malnourished. By July 2012, the children's mother was cooperating with DCS and complying with a permanency plan that set the goal for the children as reunification with their mother or another relative. The mother continued to comply with the permanency plan for the next sixteen months that the children were in foster care. On the day the children were scheduled to begin a trial home visit with the mother, July 31, 2013, the foster parents filed a petition in circuit court seeking to terminate the mother's parental rights and to adopt the children. After the foster parents filed their petition in circuit court, the juvenile court, which had maintained jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect proceeding, ordered DCS to place the children with the mother for the trial home visit. The circuit court trial on the foster parents' petition did not occur until September 2015. By that time, the children had resided with the mother on a trial basis for two years without incident. The mother, DCS, and the guardian ad litem appointed by the juvenile court in the dependency and neglect proceeding opposed the foster parents' petition. The foster parents and a guardian ad litem appointed by the circuit court sought termination of the mother's parental rights. After the multi-day trial, the trial court dismissed the petition, finding that the foster parents had proven a ground for termination by clear and convincing proof but had failed to establish by clear and convincing proof that termination is in the children's best interests. The foster parents appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We granted the mother's application for permission to appeal and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment dismissing the fost

<p>This case was decided by the court En Banc.</p> <p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County.</p> <p>Statement.</p> <p>On December 21st, 1908, John M. Prall brought in the circuit court for Hillsborough county, Florida, a suit in equity for a divorce from his wife Emma L. Prall. In the amended bill of complaint it is alleged that the couple were married April 3, 1895, at Fort Dodge, Iowa; that they lived together in Iowa and two children were born to them; that during their married life till he finally separated from her, the complainant was a faithful and devoted husband; that during their residence in Iowa the wife became enamored with a strange religious sect and a devotee at its altar; * * * that from the time of her conversion to the belief of this sect the defendant began to be estranged from the complainant because of his inability to join her in the adoption of the tenets of this religion;” that to please her he moved to Estero in Lee county, Florida, where the sect was established; that the wife “further yielding to the doctrine of this sect, which holds as one of its beliefs that the members of the sect or union are married in Christ and are not properly married to any one, withdrew herself from all marital relations with complainant, abjuring him in every way and telling him that his approaches were obnoxious to her; that she refused to * * * allow complainant the privileges of a husband; that during this time the respondent became more and more undutiful in her relations towards complainant, being enraged with complainant on account of his refusal to submit all of their property to be community property with the said religious society as aforesaid; thaf^lie constantly chided him upon his sinfulness and sought to estrange his children from him. Moreover complainant says that respondent ceased in every way to render services to him as a wife, and instead of extending to him courtesy and respect due a husband, maligned him and abused him in t

The juvenile court did not err by granting permanent custody of appellant's child to a children services agency where appellant was then incarcerated serving a four-year prison term and where the child's best interest was served by granting permanent custody to the children services agency due to the uncertainty regarding appellant's illicit drug use, employment, income, and housing following her release from prison.

This is a post-divorce child custody action involving two children, who were sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time of the most recent trial. The parties were divorced by order of the Sullivan County Law Court ("divorce court") in July 2001. Concomitant with the divorce decree, the divorce court entered a permanent parenting plan designating the father as the primary residential parent. Although the permanent parenting plan was modified in 2003 and 2007, the divorce court had most recently modified the permanent parenting plan in February 2009 ("2009 PPP") upon the parties' stipulation that a material change in circumstance had occurred. The divorce court maintained the father's designation as the primary residential parent and awarded to the father 268 days of annual residential co-parenting time as compared to Mother's 97 days. At some point following entry of the 2009 PPP, the mother relocated to Texas, and the father and the children relocated to Washington County, Tennessee. Upon the mother's request, the case was transferred to the Washington County Circuit Court ("trial court") in April 2014. On March 20, 2015, the mother filed a motion in the trial court to modify custody and child support, as well as a motion for civil and criminal contempt against the father, alleging various violations of the 2009 PPP. Following a hearing regarding the contempt allegations, the trial court entered an order on June 30, 2015, finding the father in "technical contempt" and directing him to pay an expert witness fee as a sanction. Following participation in mediation, the parties announced an agreement, which the trial court ratified in a permanent parenting plan order entered on June 30, 2015 ("2015 PPP"). The 2015 PPP maintained the father's designation as the primary residential parent and provided the mother with 85 days of residential co-parenting time, a great part of which was to be exercised at her residence in Texas. On October 2, 2015, the mother filed an "e