Retaliation Cases

workers' compensation retaliation, disability discrimination, public policy wrongful termination, employer intentional tort, loss of consortium

Immunity of political subdivision employee judgment on the pleadings reverse racial discrimination R.C. 2744.03(A) R.C. 2744.09. Plaintiff's complaint for claims of reverse racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation contained sufficient allegations for the liability of defendant political subdivision employee pursuant to the exceptions to immunity set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a) and (b). The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Plaintiff Kelly Phelps brought this action for sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act ("THRA") against her employer, the State of Tennessee. Plaintiff worked as a server at the restaurant at Paris Landing State Park ("the park"). She alleged that Josh Walsh, the assistant park manager who was described as "second in command" at the park, sexually assaulted her at an "after-party" on State property that immediately followed a Halloween party hosted by the park at the restaurant and inn. She further alleged that after she reported the incident, Defendant, among other retaliatory actions, allowed Walsh to continue working around her at the park as usual, and to continue harassing and threatening her. Following extensive discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment. The trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Walsh was Plaintiff's supervisor whether he "sexually harassed women at Paris Landing State Park prior to the Halloween party" and Defendant was aware of it and whether "a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Mr. Walsh's action in grabbing [Plaintiff] by the neck and thrusting his body against her in a sexual manner was 'extremely serious' and sufficient to impose liability on the Defendant." However, the trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant because it found that the sexual assault did not occur "in the workplace." Regarding the retaliation claim, the trial court held that Plaintiff did not establish that Defendant took a "materially adverse action" against her after she reported the assault. We hold that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the alleged harassment and discrimination affected a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff's employment, and whether Defendant unlawfully retaliated against her. We vacate the judgment of the trial court.