Discrimination Cases

Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); R.C. 4112.02; reverse race discrimination; reverse sex discrimination; similarly situated employees; legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; intentional infliction of emotional distress; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; Ohio Const., art. I, § 16; breach of contract. The plaintiff-appellant, a white male, was employed by the defendant-appellee for approximately eight years. While employed, appellant was disciplined multiple times during his tenure. Appellant sued appellee, raising a number of claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee with respect to appellant's claims concerning reverse race discrimination, reverse sex discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and breach of contract. Appellant failed to meet his burden in showing a prima facie case of race discrimination. Appellant did, however, present a prima facie case of sex discrimination. But even though appellant presented a prima facie case of reverse sex discrimination, appellee present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for appellant's termination. Appellant failed to present evidence demonstrating that appellee's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Appellee had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and legally justifiable reason to terminate appellant, and therefore appellant failed to demonstrate that appellee's termination of his employment was "extreme and outrageous." Appellant also failed to present any evidence that he suffered "severe and debilitating injury" as a result of his termination. He failed to present any expert opinion or lay person testimony concerning any significant changes in his emotional or habitual make-up. The only evidence he presented with respect to his "injury" is only his own claims. As such, appellant failed to support his prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress. With respect to appellant'

¶0 Plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging she was terminated because of her mental and physical disabilities. Her sole legal claim was for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the common law claim was prohibited/preempted by the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act. The trial judge granted the motion. Plaintiff then moved to vacate the summary judgment order. Subsequently, the original judge issued an order disqualifying herself. Thereafter, the newly assigned judge granted Plaintiff's motion to vacate the order sustaining summary adjudication. Defendants appealed the order vacating summary judgment, an interlocutory order appealable by right. We retained the appeal and now reverse, remanding with instructions to reinstate the order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.