Failure to Accommodate Cases

The plaintiff, who was employed as a nurse by the defendant, the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, sought to recover damages for employment discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Con- necticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA) (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The plaintiff was diagnosed with allergic and nonallergic rhinitis and asthma and began experiencing debilitating reactions when exposed to scents. As a result, she requested, and the committee tasked with reviewing requests for accommodation pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) on behalf of the defendant approved, certain workplace accommodations, including designating the unit to which the plaintiff was assigned as a scent-free environment and providing a high efficiency particulate air filtration system for that unit. Some employees failed to comply with the scent-free designation, and, to avoid adverse reactions, the plaintiff would use fans to disperse scents and seek refuge in an office that was free of scents. The plaintiff's attorney subsequently requested a meeting with the defendant in order to engage in the informal, interactive process required by CFEPA, pursu- ant to which the employee and the employer are to identify the precise limitations resulting from the employee's disability and potential, reason- able accommodations for those limitations. The chairperson of the ADA review committee met with the plaintiff and her attorney, but, with limited exceptions, the defendant took no additional measures to enforce the scent-free designation. After filing a complaint with and obtaining a release of jurisdiction from the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO), the plaintiff commenced the present action, alleging unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of her disabil- ity. While the case was pending, the defendant updated its scent exposure protocols, and those updates prohibited the plaintiff from using fans

Summary Judgment Civ.R 56 Breach of Contract Disability Discrimination Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Reasonable Accommodation Retaliation Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Unjust Enrichment. Plaintiff was denied admission to defendant's college of medicine because he had previously matriculated at another medical school, not because of a disability or his legal action against his prior medical school. Moreover, plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation for admission to make himself otherwise qualified under the ADA. As such, plaintiff was never an enrolled student at defendant's college of medicine and thus no binding contract existed between them. Additionally, defendant's retention of the application fee was not unjust enrichment because the decision to decline admission was exercised with professional judgment. Lastly, declined admission is not actual, or fear of, physical peril as required for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the court issued summary judgment in favor of defendant on all claims.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 meaningful appellate review statement of reasons Ohio Civil Rights Act R.C. Chapter 4112 disability discrimination employment discrimination retaliation failure-to-accommodate discrimination 12-hour shifts. The trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to set forth detailed reasoning in its journal entry granting summary judgment to the defendant. A hospital was entitled to summary judgment on its employee's disability-discrimination, failure-to-accommodate, and retaliation claims where the hospital's reasonable staffing judgment required nurses to work twelve-hour shifts, the employee's doctor restricted the employee from working more than eight hours at a time and the employee and his doctor proposed no alternative accommodation other than working all eight-hour shifts. The employee's requested accommodation would have required the hospital to create a new shift for him, would have required other nurses to pick up the employee's patients for four hours at the end of each of his shifts, and would have negatively affected patient care by increasing the number of patient handoffs between nurses it was therefore not a reasonable accommodation.

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject . . . any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the . . . laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . mental disability [or] physical disability . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 46a-64 (a) (1)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of . . . intellectual disability [or] mental disability . . . .'' The defendant M filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commis- sion on Human Rights and Opportunities, on behalf of his minor child, A, alleging that the plaintiff board of education had discriminated against A on the basis of A's mental disability. A, who had been diagnosed with several mental and cognitive disorders, attended a public magnet school, where he initially was enrolled as a special education student who was entitled to an individualized education plan and special accommodation services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.). The school subsequently determined, against the wishes of A's parents, that A would no longer be designated as a special education student under the IDEA. Thereafter, A sustained a concussion during an incident at school, and A's parents kept A out of school until he was symptom free on the basis of the recommendation of A's physician. During A's absence, the board sent a habitual truancy notice to A's parents and held a planning and placement team meeting, which was attended by M and various representatives of the board, among other individuals, to discuss A's eligibility for special education services. At that meeting, M attempted to offer a letter from A's physician regarding A's post-concussion syndrome, but the board declined to accept