Failure to Accommodate Cases

Planned community, fiduciary duty, R.C. 1702.30(B), Fair Housing Amendments Act, reasonable accommodation, restrictive covenants.

The Rio Blanco County Department of Human Services (Department) became involved with the parents in this case as a result of concerns about the children's welfare due to the condition of the family home, the parents' use of methamphetamine, and criminal cases involving the parents. Attempts at voluntary services failed, and on the Department's petition for dependency and neglect, the district court ultimately terminated the parents' rights. On appeal, the parents contended that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify them with their children. Specifically, the parents contended that the Department did not give them sufficient time to complete the services under their treatment plans and failed to accommodate their drug testing needs. The termination hearing was not held until more than a year after the motion to terminate was filed. For nine months before the motion to terminate was filed, the Department provided numerous services to the parents, including substance abuse therapy, therapeutic visitation supervision, drug abuse monitoring, and a parental capacity evaluation. The Department also provided counseling for the children. Both parents missed drug tests and tested positive during the testing period, and both were arrested for possession of methamphetamine during the pendency of the case. The Department made reasonable accommodations to meet the parents' needs and the parents had sufficient time to comply with their treatment plans. The record supports the trial court's findings that termination was appropriate because (1) the court-approved appropriate treatment plan had not been complied with by the parents or had not been successful in rehabilitating them (2) the parents were unfit and (3) the conduct or condition of the parents was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. Father also contended that the trial court's decision to interview the 9-year-old twin children together in chambers fundamentally and seriously affected the basi

The question whether the trial court erred by overruling Appellant's motion to stay the writ of restitution pending objections is moot because the court later did grant a stay. Even if the trial court's reasons for overruling Appellant's objections to the magistrate's decision are erroneous, the errors are harmless. The overruling of the objections was correct for other reasons. The notice of termination of Appellant's lease was not defective. Appellee did not waive Appellant's lease breach, because Appellee did not accept payments from Appellant after it served the notice of termination. Appellee effectively granted Appellant the reasonable accommodation that she requested. Judgments affirmed.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 lack of informed consent negligence. The court found that Dr. Emlich was not an employee of OSUMC, and that pursuant to R.C. 2317.54, plaintiff could not prevail on a claim of lack of informed consent against OSUMC as a matter of law. Further, plaintiff provided no evidence from which to infer that OSUMC breached any duty to plaintiff with respect to telephonic interpreter services provided to plaintiff. Defendant OSUMC's motion for summary judgment was granted.

Summary judgment/Disability discrimination and failure to accomodate

Limitations agreement contained in an employment application is enforceable as a contract where it is supported by consideration in the form of the employer's promise to review the prospective employee's application.

R.C. 2307.91 et seq., Ohio Asbestos Reform Act, Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51, et. seq., railroad worker, competent medical authority, substantial occupational exposure to asbestos. Viewed in a light most favorable to claimant pursuant to R.C. 2307.92, the trial court properly denied railroad employers' motion for administrative dismissal of employee's claim under the Ohio Asbestos Reform Act and FELA. The Ohio Asbestos Reform Act's prima facie requirements are procedural, not substantive, in nature. Appellee, a smoker suffering from cancer who claims railroad asbestos exposure during employment is a substantial cause of his impairment, must provide substantiation from a competent medical authority. Asbestos exposure is not required to be the sole or predominant cause, but a "predominate" cause, i.e., a substantial factor. A trial court is not precluded from considering supplemental medical evidence offered to support the prima facie case as the rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings.

ADA, termination