Hostile Work Environment Cases

Summary judgment Title VII employment discrimination and retaliation sexual harassment

Single joint employer doctrine retaliatory discharge sexual harassment/hostile work environment jury interrogatories plain error closing arguments

The plaintiff, Pamela Azar, appealed the grant of a motion for judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants, the Town of Lincoln, the Lincoln School Committee, and John Ward, in his official capacity as finance director for the Town of Lincoln, on her hostile work environment and retaliation claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial justice erred in granting the motion because the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find both a hostile work environment and that the defendants had retaliated against her in response to her advocacy for her disabled son's education. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's hostile work environment claims pursuant to the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA), G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42, and the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities Act (CRPDA), G.L. 1956 chapter 87 of title 42, were barred by the statute of limitations because the events to which the plaintiff testified occurred more than three years prior to the filing of the complaint. The Court also held that the plaintiff's retaliation claim pursuant to the CRPDA was barred because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Finally, the Court concluded that her retaliation claim pursuant to the RICRA failed as a matter of law because the plaintiff did not provide sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find that the defendants' actions were in retaliation for the plaintiff's advocacy for her son. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

The evidence when viewed in Appellant's favor does not demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the third requirement of a prima facie case for hostile work environment based on sex The actions, even when viewed in her favor, were not severe and pervasive as to affect employment Appellant could not establish she was treated differently than a similarly situated person Appellees were not required to accommodate Appellant Appellees established a qualified privilege on the defamation claim Appellant's reliance on a statement by someone without authority to make it did not constitute actionable fraud Settlement agreement did not foreclose statutory claims.