Hostile Work Environment Cases

The plaintiff employee appealed from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. The trial court had upheld the decision of the named defendant, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, which determined that the defendant employer was not vicari- ously liable for the creation of a hostile work environment by another employee, K, in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court incorrectly had applied the definition of the term ''supervisor,'' adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Vance v. Ball State University (570 U.S. 421), in concluding that the employer could not be held vicariously liable because K, the individual to whom the plaintiff reported and who allegedly made racially discriminatory comments to the plaintiff and in her presence, was not a supervisor under the definition of that term adopted in Vance. Held: The Appellate Court correctly applied to the plaintiff's hostile work environ- ment claim the definition of the term ''supervisor'' adopted in Vance, which is limited to employees who are empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim of the alleged discrimination. Because there was no evidence in the record that K had the authority to take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff, the employer could not be held vicariously liable for K's creation of a hostile work environment. (Three justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued March 20—officially released August 1, 2024

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 expanding allegations on summary judgment disparate treatment sex discrimination hostile work environment constructive discharge appellant's burden on appeal App.R. 12(A)(2) App.R. 16(A)(7). It was appellant's burden, as the appellant, to affirmatively demonstrate reversible error in the record and to substantiate her arguments in support thereof. Appellant did not show that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's claims of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, violation of public policy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellant made no mention of her claims for violation of public policy or intentional infliction of emotional distress in her appellate brief. As to her remaining claims, while appellees met their burden under Civ.R. 56(C), presenting evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating their entitlement to summary judgment based on the lack of evidence of essential elements of each of appellant's claims, appellant did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial on her claims. Appellant did not apply the applicable legal standards and did not show, based on evidence in the record, that a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of appellant on her sex discrimination, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge claims. Review of the record did not reveal any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of appellees.