Wrongful Termination Cases

Whether a notice of lease termination provided to a tenant of public housing by a public housing authority stated specific grounds for termination as required by 24 C.F.R. 966.4(l)(3)(ii) (2019).

The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating the griev- ant, J, a member of the defendant union, to her employment as executive director of the city's Commission on Equal Opportunities. In that posi- tion, J oversaw construction contract compliance and enforcement of the chapter of the city's code of ordinances that requires building con- tractors doing business with the city to hire certain percentages of women, minorities and city residents. The union filed a grievance, claim- ing that the city did not have just cause to terminate J's employment. Thereafter, pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the matter proceeded to a hearing before an arbitration panel, which issued an award in which it found that the city had proven only three of the eleven factual claims that it had asserted justified J's termination, specifically, that she failed to comply with a certain request for informa- tion during the city's investigation of the relationship between the com- mission and a certain training and employment program created and funded by the city, which was operated under the auspices of the com- mission, until it was spun off into a legally separate private entity, that she formed C Co., a private company that advertised contract compliance services in Connecticut, without informing the city, and that she issued four memoranda under her signature soliciting donations for the subject program from contractors in lieu of fines, despite having been warned by the city's corporation counsel office that doing so could expose her, commission staff or the city to potential claims of bribery. The panel concluded that, although J's misconduct was serious in nature, the city was not justified in terminating J's employment. The panel, therefore, ordered that J be reinstated to her position; however, she did not receive two years of back pay and benefits. The city filed an application to vacate the award, claiming that the award violated the

The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award reinstating the griev- ant, J, a member of the defendant union, to her employment as executive director of the city's Commission on Equal Opportunities. In that posi- tion, J oversaw construction contract compliance and enforcement of the chapter of the city's code of ordinances that requires building con- tractors doing business with the city to hire certain percentages of women, minorities and city residents. The union filed a grievance, claim- ing that the city did not have just cause to terminate J's employment. Thereafter, pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the matter proceeded to a hearing before an arbitration panel, which issued an award in which it found that the city had proven only three of the eleven factual claims that it had asserted justified J's termination, specifically, that she failed to comply with a certain request for informa- tion during the city's investigation of the relationship between the com- mission and a certain training and employment program created and funded by the city, which was operated under the auspices of the com- mission, until it was spun off into a legally separate private entity, that she formed C Co., a private company that advertised contract compliance services in Connecticut, without informing the city, and that she issued four memoranda under her signature soliciting donations for the subject program from contractors in lieu of fines, despite having been warned by the city's corporation counsel office that doing so could expose her, commission staff or the city to potential claims of bribery. The panel concluded that, although J's misconduct was serious in nature, the city was not justified in terminating J's employment. The panel, therefore, ordered that J be reinstated to her position; however, she did not receive two years of back pay and benefits. The city filed an application to vacate the award, claiming that the award violated the

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, T Co., for, inter alia, the alleged wrongful termination of her employment in violation of the statutory (§§ 3-94h and 53a-157b) public policy against making false statements with the intent to deceive or mislead. The plaintiff was employed by T Co. as a paralegal and reported to G, an attorney. G asked the plaintiff to prepare an affidavit stating something that the plaintiff alleged was not true regarding a litigation matter. The plaintiff drafted the affidavit but refused to notarize it because she knew it was false. G kept asking the plaintiff about the status of the affidavit and the plaintiff repeatedly stated that it was not filed because she would not sign it. T Co. terminated the plaintiff's employment approximately eight days after G first asked her to draft the affidavit. The defendant filed a motion to strike the count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy, arguing that she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that T Co.'s conduct at issue contravened the public policy cited. The trial court granted T Co.'s motion to strike, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erred in granting T Co.'s motion to strike as to the count of the complaint alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy, as the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts that, if proven, would fall under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine; when read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the alleged facts were sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff's employment was termi- nated because she refused to assist T Co. in misleading the court and others involved in the subject litigation by notarizing the allegedly false affidavit, and both §§ 3-94h and 53a-157b outline a public policy against knowingly assisting an affiant in submitting false statements to a court. Argued October 19, 2020—officia