Wrongful Termination Cases

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE — INFORMED CONSENT — FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION — CIV.R. 42 — JOINT TRIALS — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — ADVERSE INFERENCE — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — DAMAGES — CIV.R. 19 — PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES — PUNITIVE DAMAGES — R.C. 2315.21 — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST — R.C. 1343.03 — GOOD-FAITH EFFORT — R.C. 2323.43 — SETOFF — R.C. 2307.28 — R.C. 2307.25: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered joint trials for two plaintiffs because common questions of law and fact existed where the plaintiffs asserted the same causes of action against the same defendants and the expert testimony presented at trial focused on whether the surgeries performed on the plaintiffs were medically indicated, and because the record does not indicate that the jury ignored the trial court's instruction to consider each case on its own merits. [But see CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority's opinion on this issue subject to a caveat regarding the proper postjudgment considerations when assessing prejudice from the joinder of trials under Civ.R. 42.] The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert medical witness where the witness satisfied the active-clinical-practice requirement in the July 2023 version of Civ.R. 601(B)(5)(b), which assessed the competency of a witness to testify at the time of the alleged medical negligence, because plaintiffs' cases were pending at the time that the trial court applied the amended rule. The trial court did not commit reversible error in issuing an absent-defendant jury instruction advising that defendant doctor's absence from trial gave rise to a negative inference where it also instructed the jury that it retained the discretion to make or reject inferences. The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider and award damages for past medical expenses to plaintiffs where it conditioned the receipt of those damages on the requirement that plaintiffs obtain releases fr

Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56(C); R.C. 4112.02; reverse race discrimination; reverse sex discrimination; similarly situated employees; legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; intentional infliction of emotional distress; wrongful termination in violation of public policy; Ohio Const., art. I, § 16; breach of contract. The plaintiff-appellant, a white male, was employed by the defendant-appellee for approximately eight years. While employed, appellant was disciplined multiple times during his tenure. Appellant sued appellee, raising a number of claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee with respect to appellant's claims concerning reverse race discrimination, reverse sex discrimination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, and breach of contract. Appellant failed to meet his burden in showing a prima facie case of race discrimination. Appellant did, however, present a prima facie case of sex discrimination. But even though appellant presented a prima facie case of reverse sex discrimination, appellee present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for appellant's termination. Appellant failed to present evidence demonstrating that appellee's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Appellee had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and legally justifiable reason to terminate appellant, and therefore appellant failed to demonstrate that appellee's termination of his employment was "extreme and outrageous." Appellant also failed to present any evidence that he suffered "severe and debilitating injury" as a result of his termination. He failed to present any expert opinion or lay person testimony concerning any significant changes in his emotional or habitual make-up. The only evidence he presented with respect to his "injury" is only his own claims. As such, appellant failed to support his prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress. With respect to appellant'

Application and motion to compel arbitration; Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"); grievance; Last Chance Agreement ("LCA"); arbitration; presumption of arbitrability; express exclusion; strong and forceful evidence. Judgment affirmed. Where a CBA contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that an order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. Here, there was a dispute as to whether the employee's grievance was arbitrable based on language in the LCA between the parties. Arbitration of the grievance was not expressly excluded by the LCA because it failed to specify who is to determine whether a violation has occurred. Additionally, the City has failed to meet its burden of overcoming the presumption of arbitrability because it presented no "strong and forceful" evidence of an intention to exclude the grievance from arbitration. Therefore, we find that the trial court properly granted the Union's application and motion to compel arbitration.