Wrongful Termination Cases

When an employee is suing an employer for an intentional tort, the employee must present evidence that the employer possessed the actual intent to harm an employee.

intentional infliction of emotional distress, severe and debilitating, wrongful discharge, public policy, child abuse, remittitur, attorney fees, lodestar calculation, contingency fee agreement, deviation, sanctions, frivolous conduct, R.C. 2323.51, media. Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict or JNOV where sufficient evidence was presented that defendant's conduct caused plaintiff severe and debilitating emotional distress whether plaintiff's evidence actually proved her case was for the jury to determine. Plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy survived defendant's motion for directed verdict and JNOV because the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy for wrongful termination when the defendants terminated her for not dissuading the report of child abuse. Trial court abused its discretion by ordering remittitur without considering any of the criteria that must be met before a court may grant remittitur, including that the plaintiff agreed to the reduction in damages. The trial court abused its discretion in limiting the review of attorney fees to only those incurred by the lead attorney and then deviating from the lodestar amount based solely on the contingency fee agreement. Contacting a media outlet to cover a trial does not constitute frivolous conduct in violation of R.C. 2323.51 where the information provided is protected speech and does not violate the ethical rules.

Common pleas court decision affirming resolution that terminated public school teacher's employment contract affirmed trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that teacher improperly asserted herself into a situation that was being handled by two others or by refusing to apply R.C. 3319.41(C) because there was no threat to others for the teacher to quell.

Arising out of and in the course of employment work-related activity negligence theory

WORKERS' COMPENSATION - summary judgment Civ.R. 56 genuine issue of material fact compensable workplace injury arising out of employment unexplained slip or fall neutral origin direct benefit.

The plaintiff, Terry Andoscia, appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of North Smithfield, by and through its finance director, Cheryl Ficarra, and the town administrator, Paulette Hamilton (collectively, the defendants). The matter arose from the plaintiff's termination from employment during his fourth consecutive two-year term appointment as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that his appointment constituted a contract of employment and, therefore, his termination without cause constituted a breach of contract and a violation of his constitutional rights. The Superior Court subsequently entered final judgment for the defendants. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that no contract of employment existed under the facts as presented. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.

The plaintiff, Terry Andoscia, appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of North Smithfield, by and through its finance director, Cheryl Ficarra, and the town administrator, Paulette Hamilton (collectively, the defendants). The matter arose from the plaintiff's termination from employment during his fourth consecutive two-year term appointment as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that his appointment constituted a contract of employment and, therefore, his termination without cause constituted a breach of contract and a violation of his constitutional rights. The Superior Court subsequently entered final judgment for the defendants. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that no contract of employment existed under the facts as presented. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.

School board employees were not entitled to statutory immunity on age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether they acted with malice, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly in pursuing disciplinary proceedings against appellee. Employees were entitled to immunity as to retaliation claims where court identified no conduct attributable to them in denying summary judgment on the merits of the claim.

Career state employee just cause unsatisfactory job performance N.C.G.S. section 1A-1, rule 41(a)(1)

SERB did not abuse its discretion in dismissing relator's ULP complaint for lack of probable cause where the plain language of the expiring CBA permitted either party to declare an impasse in negotiations and proceed to mediation when, after 45 days from the expiration of the CBA, the parties were unable to reach an agreement. Objections overruled writ of mandamus denied.

State Human Resources Act, NCGS 126-1 et seq Title 25, Subchapters I and J of NC Administrative Code ALJ required findings of fact and conclusions of law just cause to terminate back pay for procedural violation.

Employee's writ of mandamus denied.

We granted permission to appeal to clarify the nature of the employment relationship of a trial judge's secretarial assistant. We hold that a trial judgeʼs secretarial assistant is an at-will employee. As a result, the secretarial assistant's employment may be terminated at any time during the term of the trial judge to whom he or she is assigned, either by the judge or the secretarial assistant. If the relationship is not terminated during the trial judge's term, the secretarial assistant's employment automatically terminates when the trial judge's service ends. Because the plaintiff secretarial assistant's employment automatically ended when the trial judge's term ended and because she remained employed until the end of the trial judge's term, as a matter of law, the defendant did not tortiously interfere with the plaintiff's employment relationship. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial court, and remand for entry of a judgment granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint, and for any further proceedings, consistent with this decision, that may be necessary in the trial court.