Constructive Discharge Cases

Arbitration Agreement waiver scope. Trial court properly found that the parties' dispute was not governed by arbitration plaintiff's claims existed independently of the employment relationship and her R.C. Chapter 4112-based claims were not subject to arbitration due to lack of sufficient evidence of assent and/or waiver.

The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant employer, alleging that he was constructively discharged in violation of public policy. The plaintiff had been employed as a licensed optician manager in the defendant's optical department in a JCPenney store and alleged that the defendant improperly required him to provide optomet- ric assistance services to the doctor of optometry in the store. The plaintiff claimed that, under a declaratory ruling issued by the Board of Examiners for Optometrists and a cease and desist consent order issued by the Board of Examiners for Opticians, employees, including opticians, under the control of unlicensed third parties were prohibited from performing services for licensed optometrists. The plaintiff also alleged that his duties violated the public policy embodied in the statute (§ 31-130 (i)) requiring JCPenney and the defendant to have a staffing permit before providing staffing services to the optometrist. The plaintiff further alleged that he was forced to resign when the defendant refused his requests to be excused from these duties. The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that its allegations could not satisfy the requirements of a constructive discharge claim. The defendant asserted that the declaratory ruling and the cease and desist order were not binding and did not create a private right of action for optometric assistants. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff's reliance on § 31-130 (i) was misplaced because the plaintiff did not allege that optometrists employed by the defendant charged the defendant for hiring opticians. The trial court, relying on Brittell v. Dept. of Correction (247 Conn. 148), determined that, to prevail on his constructive discharge claim, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant intended to force him to resign. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint and rendered judgment for

The plaintiff, John Ferreira, appealed from the dismissal of his first amended complaint against his former employer, Child and Family Services of Newport County. The plaintiff had asserted claims such as defamation constructive termination discrimination based on disparate treatment, age, and gender pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42 and G.L. 1956 § 28-5-7 and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A hearing justice of the Superior Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that his first amended complaint fulfilled the purpose of the general pleading rules by providing adequate notice to the defendant of his claims and that he should have been allowed to again amend his complaint. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not sufficiently stated any of the claims he asserted in his amended complaint. The Court also held that the amended complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice because the hearing justice had previously explained the deficiencies in the plaintiff's complaint, but the plaintiff had not rectified the problems when he filed his first amended complaint. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Trial court did not err in ruling on appellant's motion to compel or in its determination that appellant's statistical evidence was not probative of discrimination.

The plaintiff, a former tenured schoolteacher, sued the Williamson County Board of Education and three administrators alleging that she was forced to resign after the defendants "bullied, stalked, intimidated, and defamed" her during the 2015–2016 school year. She asserted claims for wrongful termination, breach of contract, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court dismissed all of the claims asserted in the original complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted but permitted the plaintiff to file an amended complaint to revise and restate her claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following discovery, the court summarily dismissed the two remaining claims as asserted in the amended complaint. On appeal, the plaintiff challenges the Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) dismissal of her wrongful termination and negligence claims, and the summary dismissal of her claims for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm the trial court's determination the plaintiff's negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are barred by the Governmental Tort Liability Act and Teachers' Tenure Act, respectively. We have also determined that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of a compensable injury in her claim for breach of contract. As for the plaintiff's claim of wrongful termination, we respectfully disagree with the trial court's determination that the doctrine of constructive discharge is inapplicable to wrongful termination claims under the Teachers' Tenure Act. Therefore, we reverse the dismissal of the plaintiff's wrongful termination claim and remand this claim for further proceedings. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.