Disability Discrimination Cases

Disability, Ohio Civil Rights Act, Americans with Disabilities Act, Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, substantially limits, physical impairment, constructive discharge, R.C. Chapter 4112, R.C. 4112.06(E), R.C. 4112.08, R.C. 4112.02(A), Adm. Code 4112-5-08(E), Adm. Code 4112-5-01, 42 U.S.C. 12102(4), 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(1)(i), earnings, back pay

R.C. 4112.02 summary judgment material transitory minor disabled regarded as disabled record of disability impairments major life activities prima facia case disability discrimination pretext workers' compensation. Summary judgment was proper because appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facia case of disability discrimination. Prior to her workplace injury, appellant could not establish that she was a disabled individual under R.C. 4112.02. Appellant failed to offer evidence that she could safely and substantially perform the job's essential functions after the workplace injury, with or without accommodations.

The plaintiff, whose prior employment as a police officer with the defendant city of Hartford had been terminated, sought to recover damages from the city for, inter alia, its failure to rehire him as a police officer because of his disability, narcolepsy. The city had posted a job listing seeking applications from nonresidents of Hartford for a police officer position. Applicants were required to apply online and to include with their appli- cations a ''CHIP'' card signifying that they had successfully completed certain physical ability tests required of police officer candidates. The plaintiff, who was not a resident of Hartford, was among fifty-two appli- cants who did not submit a CHIP card with their applications and, thus, was determined by the city to be unqualified for the police officer position. In a two count complaint alleging violations of a provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), the plaintiff claimed that the city had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and retaliated against him for having previously brought a lawsuit against the city in connection with the termination of his prior employment as a police officer. The city, which was aware at the time the plaintiff applied for the police officer position that he had been diagnosed with narcolepsy, moved for summary judg- ment, asserting that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to both counts of the plaintiff's complaint and that it was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the city's motion, conclud- ing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of either disability discrimination or retaliation and that, even if he had established a prima facie case as to those claims, summary judgment was warranted on both counts because the city had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for its decision not

Civilly committed appellant claims that the district court erred by denying his motion for default judgment and dismissing his claims against respondents after determining that he failed to plead facts sufficient to prove that (1) he has a disability under either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) (2) he has a valid breach-of-contract claim and (3) respondents violated the Minnesota Comprehensive Adult Mental Health Act (the mental-health act). We affirm.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, disability discrimination pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.) and for interference with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.) following the termination of her employment. The plaintiff was first hired by the defendant in 1995 but her position was eliminated and she was termi- nated in June, 2015. The plaintiff was rehired for a new position in August, 2015, and was subject to a probationary period for her first 120 days at work. In September, 2015, the plaintiff injured her left knee and lower back while at work. The plaintiff was placed on modified work duty but was eventually placed on an indefinite leave of absence and remained on leave until October, 2015. She missed additional work in November, 2015, after she experienced a flare-up of her knee injury. All of the time that she missed from work was considered workers' compensation leave by the defendant. The plaintiff received two negative performance evaluations in January and February, 2016, based solely on her performance while she was at work. The plaintiff was terminated for her poor job performance in March, 2016. During the trial on the plaintiff's complaint, the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the plaintiff's FMLA interference claim, concluding that there was no evidence to support the claim that the plaintiff made an FMLA request to the defendant. On the plaintiff's remaining claims, the jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly declined to charge the jury with regard to the plaintiff's claim of interference with the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: the plaintiff failed to satisfy the preliminary requirement for the court to consider her interference claim, namely, that she made an initial showing