Harassment Cases

summary judgment – gender discrimination – legitimate business reason – pretext – retaliation – judgment based on arguments not asserted

Defendant, Rashunus B. Pearsons, was indicted for two counts of aggravated assault and two counts of harassment. Defendant was uncooperative with his appointed attorneys, and the trial court allowed Defendant to represent himself at trial. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of all counts. On appeal, Defendant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated, that the trial court erred by granting the State's motion in limine to exclude mention of the victim's immigration status, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, and that the trial court deprived him of his right to counsel. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that proper procedure was not followed to secure a waiver of the right to counsel from Defendant and that Defendant did not forfeit his right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.

Upon remand from the federal district court, trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's claims of common law sexual harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring and/or retention. Judgment affirmed.

CIVIL - summary judgment Civ.R. 56(C) employment discrimination R.C. 4112.02(A) disparate treatment retaliation R.C. 4112.02(I) nondiscriminatory and pretextual reasons for termination

The Supreme Court considered whether and when a civil protection order is available to a victim of alleged domestic abuse who comes to Colorado seeking refuge from a non-resident. The Court concluded that an out-of-state party's harassment of, threatening of, or attempt to coerce an individual known by the non-resident to be located in Colorado is a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the state's long-arm statute, CRS § 13-1-124. The Court also concluded that such conduct creates a sufficient nexus between the out-of-state party and Colorado to satisfy the requisite minimum contacts such that the exercise of jurisdiction by a Colorado court to enter a protection order comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The Court reversed the district court's order vacating the permanent civil protection order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This appeal arises from a claim of retaliatory discharge. Randy Roberts ("Roberts") was fired by Tennier Industries, Inc. ("Tennier") for several stated reasons, including that he kept an unmarked bottle of pills at his desk and was insubordinate. Roberts contends that he was, in fact, fired for having complained about a manager who harassed him. Roberts sued Tennier in the Circuit Court for Scott County ("the Trial Court"). Tennier filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it fired Roberts for valid, non-pretextual reasons. Roberts filed a motion to continue in which he requested more time for discovery in order to probe Tennier's practices in situations similar to his. The Trial Court denied Roberts' motion to continue and granted Tennier's motion for summary judgment. Roberts appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the information for which Roberts sought additional time for discovery could have assisted his case and that the Trial Court erred in denying his motion to continue. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings.

Former county employee appeals the dismissal of his claims against the county and the county mayor related to the termination of his employment. In his complaint, the employee raised claims of violations of due process, indemnification, restitution, negligence, invasion of privacy, workplace harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and misrepresentation. After the county and county mayor filed a motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that it would decide the motion without the benefit of a hearing. The trial court eventually dismissed all the claims some claims, however, were dismissed on the basis of summary judgment after the trial court considered a county personnel manual. We conclude that the trial court was entitled to consider the personnel manual as part of the pleadings for purposes of the motion to dismiss under Rule 10.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of all claims raised by the employee under the motion to dismiss standard, with the exception of the employee's claim against the county mayor for false light invasion of privacy. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Summary judgment Title VII employment discrimination and retaliation sexual harassment

summary judgment - sex discrimination - gender discrimination - sexual harassment - privacy interest - R.C. 4112.02(A) - retaliatory discrimination - circumstantial evidence - R.C. 4112.02(I) - aiding and abetting to commit discrimination - R.C. 4112.02(J)

In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Miami Valley Hospital on Noelle Diller's claims of sexual harassment (hostile environment) and retaliation. While the trial court abused its discretion in striking Exhibits B, C, and D, attached to Diller's memorandum in opposition to MVH's motion for summary judgment, since the Exhibits were properly authenticated business records, the documents were either not in dispute, were otherwise part of the record, or were not relevant to the summary judgment decision, and the error was harmless. Judgment affirmed.

J.C. obtained a temporary civil protection order (CPO), issued on JDF Form 399, against her ex-boyfriend Hartsuff. The county court made the CPO permanent in 2015. Among other things, the CPO states that it does not expire and only the court can change it. It prohibits contact of any kind and includes a notice to the protected person that she cannot give the restrained person permission to change or ignore the order. The restrained person is similarly notified that if he violates the order because he believes the protected person has given permission, he is wrong and can be arrested and prosecuted. J.C. called the police and stated Hartsuff was on her front porch threatening her. In addition, J.C. showed the responding officer text messages and logs of phone calls from Hartsuff over the previous two days. Hartsuff was charged with harassment and violation of a protection order, both as acts of domestic violence. Hartsuff raised the affirmative defense of consent, which the trial court allowed. The district attorney sought judicial review pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(4), contending that the harm sought to be prevented by the CPO statute is broader than simply contact between the protected and restrained persons and includes preserving the integrity of a court order and preventing domestic violence. The district court found no abuse of discretion and remanded to proceed with trial. The district attorney appealed. The sole issue on appeal was whether the affirmative defense of consent as defined in CRS § 18-1-505 is available to a defendant who is criminally charged with violating a CPO. The Court of Appeals considered the entire statutory scheme relating to the offense of a violation of a protective order to give effect and meaning to all its parts. Under CRS § 18-1-505, the defense of consent of the victim is not available to any crime unless "the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law

This appeal involves a dispute between landowners over an easement on Plaintiffs' property that allows the Defendants to use the easement for ingress and egress to their homes. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Defendants unlawfully bulldozed the easement, encroached onto Plaintiffs' property, and used threats and intimidation to prevent the Plaintiffs from coming on or using the non-exclusive easement. Defendants counter-sued, alleging that the Plaintiffs were actually the ones engaging in a campaign of harassment, and that the Plaintiffs were preventing the Defendants from the peace and enjoyment of the easement, which they used as their driveway. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were liable to Defendants for nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The trial court also enjoined the Plaintiffs from having any use of the easement. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and partially vacate the injunction. Specifically, we affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the nuisance claim, reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy claims, and vacate the permanent injunction against Plaintiffs to the extent that it prohibits them from the lawful use of their property.

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's order affirming petitioner's county court conviction for harassment. Petitioner asserted that pursuant to People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), self-defense is an affirmative defense to all crimes requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness. She thus contended that (1) she was entitled to a self-defense affirmative defense instruction to the specific intent crime of harassment, and (2) the county court's refusal to give such an instruction constituted reversible error. Because Pickering does not establish the broad, bright-line rule that petitioner asserts and thus does not require a trial court to give a self-defense affirmative defense instruction in every case requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.

School board employees were not entitled to statutory immunity on age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether they acted with malice, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly in pursuing disciplinary proceedings against appellee. Employees were entitled to immunity as to retaliation claims where court identified no conduct attributable to them in denying summary judgment on the merits of the claim.