Hostile Work Environment Cases

CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION ORDER - Appellate court must defer to trial court on credibility determinations and trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant engaged in a pattern of conduct which caused Appellee mental distress and thus did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee's request for civil stalking protection order.

CIVIL - summary judgment deposition testimony Civ.R. 56 factual testimony/legal conclusions genuine issues of material fact workers' compensation retaliation R.C. 4123.90 disability discrimination R.C. 4112.02 Ohio public policy wrongful termination jeopardy, clarity and causation workplace safety Article II, Sections 34 and 35 of the Ohio Constitution R.C. 4101.11 and .12 R.C. 4121.13(A) and .17(A) OSHA 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1) and (2)

Civ.R. 56(C), R.C. 4112. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff Guess' claim for retaliation and Plaintiffs' claims for racial discrimination and hostile work environment created by racial harassment. The Court found that Plaintiff Guess' retaliation claim was time-barred. Additionally, the Court found that Plaintiffs could not establish that Defendants treated a non-protected, similarly-situated person more favorably. Also, the Court found that Plaintiffs could not establish that any alleged harassment was severe enough to create a hostile work environment or that it was based on race. Because there was no genuine issues of material fact that Plaintiffs could not establish their prima facie cases, the Court found that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' claims.

Motion for judgment on the pleadings Civ.R. 12 question of law de novo cross-claim pro se litigant App.R. 12 App.R. 16 motion to withdraw as counsel plain error right to counsel negligence injury proximate cause negligent hiring breach of contract hostile work environment wrongful termination. The trial court did not commit plain error in granting the motion to withdraw from appellant's representation filed by the attorneys for the childcare center. Appellant did not have a right to counsel in the civil proceedings in the trial court. The assertions and allegations in appellant's cross-claims cannot be read to have pled any actionable claims against the childcare center, or the childcare center's owner, manager, or employees. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the childcare center's motion for judgment on the pleadings.