Workers’ Compensation Cases

Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (§ 31-293 (a)), an injured employee may assert a claim against and recover damages from a tortfeasor who is allegedly liable for the employee's work-related injury, even if the employee is entitled to workers' compensation benefits for that injury, and an employer that has paid or has become obligated to pay those benefits to the employee "shall have a lien upon any judgment . . . or any settlement received by the employee from the [tortfeasor]." The plaintiff, as executrix of the decedent's estate and as the decedent's surviving spouse, had filed for workers' compensation benefits after the decedent died of mesothelioma, which was caused in substantial part by his exposure to products containing asbestos during the course of his employ- ment with the defendants, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and the town of Manchester. Prior to filing her claims for benefits, the plaintiff settled numerous product liability actions that she had brought against the manu- facturers and suppliers of the products containing asbestos to which the decedent had been exposed, with 70 percent of the net settlement proceeds awarded to the decedent's estate as damages for his personal injuries and death, and 30 percent of the proceeds awarded to the plaintiff for her loss of consortium. With respect to the plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits, an administrative law judge of the Workers' Compensation Commis- sion found that the decedent's exposure to asbestos, both at home and during the course of his employment with the defendants, was a significant factor in causing the decedent to develop mesothelioma. Because the decedent's meso- thelioma was caused in substantial part by this exposure to asbestos during his employment, total incapacity benefits were awarded to the decedent's estate and survivor's benefits were awarded to the plaintiff. The administra- tive law judge determined, however, that the defendants, as the decedent's e

Summary judgment granted to employer on workers' compensation claim; "qualifying chemical test"

Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; workers' compensation claim; R.C. 4123.01(C)(5); preexisting condition; substantially aggravated; clear and unambiguous statute; and objective pre-injury medical evidence. The trial court erred when it granted an employer's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff-appellant worker provided, pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(5), objective clinical findings, objective test results, and subjective complaints to support his claim that his work incident caused a substantial aggravation of preexisting conditions.

Workers' compensation; spinal stenosis; expert opinions; manifest weight; high-dose steroids. The trial court's judgment finding that plaintiff was entitled to additional workers' compensation benefits was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though there were conflicting expert opinions where there was evidence corroborating the plaintiff's expert opinion and there was no evidence corroborating the employer's expert opinion.

Workers' Compensation Act; Pleasant claim; Rule 12(b) dismissal; subject-matter jurisdiction; special-employee doctrine

1. The employee's injury occurred "in the course of" employment for the purpose of Minnesota Statutes section 176.021, subdivision 1 (2024), because the undisputed facts show that the employee sustained the injury within an hour of the end of the workday, the injury occurred at the workplace, and the employee was engaged in employment-related activity. 2. Minnesota Statutes section 176.021, subdivision 9 (2024), which excludes from workers' compensation liability injuries that occur while an employee is participating in a voluntary employer-sponsored recreational program, applies only to employer programs that are for the benefit of employees. Affirmed.

¶0 Employer moved to dismiss Employee's claim pursuant to 85A O.S. § 69 (A)(4)(b) after Employee did not receive or seek medical benefits for a period of nine months. Administrative Law Judge denied Employer's motion to dismiss, and the Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed. We retained the matter for disposition and reverse the order of the Workers' Compensation Commission.

Commission did not err awarding temporary total disability and medical benefits for compensable injury by accident arising out of employment; credible evidence supports finding Rose as employer had power to control appellee as employee, rather than independent contractor; injury arose out of employment as cause of accident was condition peculiar to workplace

Commission erred denying medical and temporary total disability benefits based on finding appellant was an independent contractor; appellant was employee as employer exerted high level of control, required daily progress reports, directed means and methods, and dictated working hours; reversed and remanded to Commission for further proceedings

Objections to magistrate's decision recommending denial of relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order granting an employee's application for an additional award of compensation based on a violation of a specific safety requirement and ordering the commission to either deny the application or grant a rehearing are overruled. By its plain language, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-13(D)(1) applies when "employees may be exposed to moving ground or cave-ins," and it does not require the employee to be inside a trench. Although the employee's accident occurred in Michigan, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-13(D)(1) applies, because compliance with that rule does not preclude an employer from also complying with Michigan's rules, which only apply when an employee is required to enter a trench. Objections overruled, and writ denied.

A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers' compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative's statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply.

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no

Workers' Compensation independent contractor, employer-employee relationship NCDOT, off-duty police officer, traffic control work Hayes factors employment contract simultaneous control