Workers’ Compensation Cases

Summary judgment granted to employer on workers' compensation claim; "qualifying chemical test"

Whether an employee's injury, caused by an accidental discharge of the handgun he wascarrying in his waistband, arose out of his employment in the sense that it wascaused by a risk of employment or was incidental to his work duties.

Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; workers' compensation claim; R.C. 4123.01(C)(5); preexisting condition; substantially aggravated; clear and unambiguous statute; and objective pre-injury medical evidence. The trial court erred when it granted an employer's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff-appellant worker provided, pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(5), objective clinical findings, objective test results, and subjective complaints to support his claim that his work incident caused a substantial aggravation of preexisting conditions.

Workers' compensation; spinal stenosis; expert opinions; manifest weight; high-dose steroids. The trial court's judgment finding that plaintiff was entitled to additional workers' compensation benefits was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though there were conflicting expert opinions where there was evidence corroborating the plaintiff's expert opinion and there was no evidence corroborating the employer's expert opinion.

Workers' Compensation Act; Pleasant claim; Rule 12(b) dismissal; subject-matter jurisdiction; special-employee doctrine

1. The employee's injury occurred "in the course of" employment for the purpose of Minnesota Statutes section 176.021, subdivision 1 (2024), because the undisputed facts show that the employee sustained the injury within an hour of the end of the workday, the injury occurred at the workplace, and the employee was engaged in employment-related activity. 2. Minnesota Statutes section 176.021, subdivision 9 (2024), which excludes from workers' compensation liability injuries that occur while an employee is participating in a voluntary employer-sponsored recreational program, applies only to employer programs that are for the benefit of employees. Affirmed.

Workers' compensation—Mandamus—Violations of specific safety requirements ("VSSRs")—Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(J)(1) (requiring that fall-protection gear be provided to employees exposed to hazards of falling)—Employer failed to establish that Industrial Commission failed to perform a legal duty or abused its discretion in granting claimant's application for VSSR award for violation of Adm.Code 4123:1-3-03(J)(1)—Some evidence supports commission's finding that claimant was not assisting in installation of fall-protection system when he fell—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ affirmed.

¶0 Employer moved to dismiss Employee's claim pursuant to 85A O.S. § 69 (A)(4)(b) after Employee did not receive or seek medical benefits for a period of nine months. Administrative Law Judge denied Employer's motion to dismiss, and the Workers' Compensation Commission affirmed. We retained the matter for disposition and reverse the order of the Workers' Compensation Commission.

Commission did not err awarding temporary total disability and medical benefits for compensable injury by accident arising out of employment; credible evidence supports finding Rose as employer had power to control appellee as employee, rather than independent contractor; injury arose out of employment as cause of accident was condition peculiar to workplace

Commission erred denying medical and temporary total disability benefits based on finding appellant was an independent contractor; appellant was employee as employer exerted high level of control, required daily progress reports, directed means and methods, and dictated working hours; reversed and remanded to Commission for further proceedings

Objections to magistrate's decision recommending denial of relator's request for a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order granting an employee's application for an additional award of compensation based on a violation of a specific safety requirement and ordering the commission to either deny the application or grant a rehearing are overruled. By its plain language, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-13(D)(1) applies when "employees may be exposed to moving ground or cave-ins," and it does not require the employee to be inside a trench. Although the employee's accident occurred in Michigan, Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-13(D)(1) applies, because compliance with that rule does not preclude an employer from also complying with Michigan's rules, which only apply when an employee is required to enter a trench. Objections overruled, and writ denied.

A sales representative for a product vendor was injured while in a Tractor Supply store performing his job. The sales representative received workers' compensation benefits from his employer, a hardware product company, and then proceeded with a tort case against Tractor Supply. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that Tractor Supply was the sales representative's statutory employer within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 113(a) and, therefore, his recovery from his employer was his exclusive remedy. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tractor Supply.

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no

Pursuant to statute (§ 31-294c (b)), whenever an employer contests liability to pay workers' compensation benefits, the employer ''shall file'' with the workers' compensation administrative law judge, on or before the twenty-eighth day after the employer has received the employee's written notice of claim, a notice of intention to contest the employee's right to compensation benefits. The defendants, F Co. and F Co.'s insurer and third-party workers' compensa- tion benefit administrator, appealed from the decision of the Compensa- tion Review Board, which upheld the decision of the administrative law judge precluding the defendants from contesting liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff during the course of his employment with F Co. Within twenty-eight days of receiving the plaintiff's notice of claims, F Co. mailed to the administrative law judge a notice of intention to contest the plaintiff's right to compensation benefits pursuant to § 31- 294c (b), but the administrative law judge did not receive the notice of intention until after the twenty-eight day statutory period elapsed. The administrative law judge thereafter granted the plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, concluding that, because F Co. had failed to commence payment for the claims or file its notice of intention to contest within twenty-eight days following receipt of the plaintiff's notice of claims, as required by § 31-294c (b), the defendants were presumed to have accepted the compensability of the plaintiff's alleged injuries and precluded from contesting his claims. The board upheld the administrative law judge's decision, and, there- after, the defendants appealed. Held that the board properly upheld the administrative law judge's decision to preclude the defendants from contesting liability, as F Co. did not file its notice of intention to contest with the administrative law judge on or before the twenty-eighth day after receiving the plaintiff's no

Workers' Compensation independent contractor, employer-employee relationship NCDOT, off-duty police officer, traffic control work Hayes factors employment contract simultaneous control

Pursuant to statute (§ 7-433c (a)), ''a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department,'' who successfully passed a physical examination that failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease before beginning such employment and then subsequently suffered any condi- tion or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his disability, is entitled to ''receive from his municipal employer compensation and medical care in the same amount and the same manner as that provided under [the Workers' Compensation Act] . . . from the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered . . . . [These] benefits . . . shall be in lieu of any other bene- fits which such . . . fireman . . . may be entitled to receive from his municipal employer under the provisions of [the Workers' Compensation Act] or the municipal or state retirement system under which he is covered . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 7-433c (b)), ''those persons who began employ- ment on or after July 1, 1996, shall not be eligible for [heart and hyperten- sion] benefits'' under § 7-433c (a). Pursuant further to statute (§ 7-425 (5)), ''except as otherwise provided,'' the word ''member,'' as used in part II of chapter 113 (title 7) of the General Statutes, ''means any regular employee . . . receiving pay from a participating municipality . . . who has been included by such munici- pality in the pension plan as provided in section 7-427, but shall not include any person who customarily works less than twenty hours a week . . . .'' The named defendant, the town of Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Department, appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which upheld the workers' compensation commissioner's decision that the plaintiff's claim for heart and hypertension benefits was compensable under § 7-433c (a). The town originally hired the plaintiff as a part-time firefighter in 1992, prior to which he passed a physical examination that reveal