Breach of Contract Cases

Motion to enforce arbitration award R.C. 2711.09 sanctions contempt temporary restraining order preliminary injunction law-of-the case doctrine res judicata laches. The trial court did not err in granting the appellees' motion to confirm and enforce the arbitration award and setting a damages amount. The damages amount was consistent with the arbitration award mandate that the city of East Cleveland "make all affected [firefighters] whole in back pay/lost benefits who would have been entitled to overtime on the call-out list under the terms of the [CBA] at any/all dates post April 12, 2016." Appellees provided evidence calculating what the city of East Cleveland owed in backpay on any and all dates after April 12, 2016, where the city was in violation of the CBA. Further, the trial court's award of sanctions to the appellees was separate and distinct from its later confirmation of the arbitration award. Appellants were sanctioned for violating the trial court's preliminary injunction ordering them to staff the fire department pursuant to the CBA. The confirmation of the arbitration award quantified damages and was the first time the court issued an entry related to the arbitration award. Accordingly, the law-of-the-case doctrine and res judicata are inapplicable. Laches is also inapplicable because appellants have not demonstrated that there was an unreasonable delay on behalf of the appellees. Judgment affirmed.

The plaintiff, P, sought to recover damages from the defendant, S Co., for S Co.'s breach of the parties' employment contract in connection with S Co.'s termination of P's employment. P was hired by S Co. in 2012, pursuant to an employment contract for a term of two years, and his contract was renewed in 2013 for an additional term of two years. In October, 2015, S Co. approved and executed a new employment contract with P for an additional term of two years, to begin on January 25, 2016. Although the 2015 contract was dated October 12, 2015, the board of S Co. approved the contract on October 13, 2015, at a special meeting. In December, 2015, S Co. notified P that his employment would be termi- nated as of January 25, 2016, the date his 2015 contract was to begin. Following a bench trial, the parties executed a joint stipulation providing for an extension of the statutory (§ 51-183b) 120 day deadline for the trial court to render a decision. The trial court issued its memorandum of decision past the agreed upon extended deadline, rendering judgment for S Co. P moved to open and vacate the judgment and for a new trial, which the trial court granted. A new bench trial was held, and the trial court rendered judgment for P. On S Co.'s appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly granted P's motion to open and vacate the judg- ment rendered in the first trial as that court's finding that P did not waive his right to object to the untimely decision was not clearly erroneous: P was under no duty to speak or to protest after the court failed to issue a decision by the agreed upon deadline, prejudgment silence alone was not sufficient to support a finding of waiver under § 51-183b, as there must have been some other act or conduct that either delayed the start of the deadline, created a duty to protest in the silent party or served as an affirmative act of waiver or consent, and S Co. was unable to identify any such act or conduct by P that supported a finding of

The plaintiffs, who were allegedly victims of sexual contact with and exploi- tation by the defendant while they were minors, sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, assault and battery. Prior to trial, the parties entered into confidential settlement agreements, which included waiver provisions that provided that, in the event of a default by the defendant, the parties consented to the reinstatement of the action to the docket to enforce the agreements and waived any objection to the trial court's continuing jurisdiction beyond four months otherwise proscribed by statute (§ 52-212a). In accordance with the settlement agreements, the plaintiffs withdrew the action in November, 2019. In April, 2020, the defendant failed to make a payment pursuant to the agreements, and the plaintiffs filed a motion to restore the action to the docket. The defendant objected, claiming that his performance was excused due to breaches of the settlement agreements by the plain- tiffs and their counsel. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to restore and, thereafter, denied the plaintiffs' motions for reargument/reconsider- ation, and the plaintiffs appealed to this court. The trial court thereafter marked off the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreements, stayed the proceedings, and denied their motion to reconsider, and the plaintiffs filed an amended appeal. Held: 1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to restore the case to the docket: although the basis for the court's ruling was ambiguous, as it was not clear whether the court found that it did not have the power to grant the plaintiffs' untimely motion to restore because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate fraud or whether it exercised its discretion in denying the motion because it determined the matter was not amenable to summary disposition and should be adjudicated in a breach of contract action, the plaintiffs did not seek an articulation of the

This appeal concerns an alleged breach of contract. Danny Ray Franks ("Mr. Franks") and his spouse Angela May Franks ("Ms. Franks") ("Plaintiffs," collectively) hired Roger Bilbrey ("Mr. Bilbrey") and Bilbrey's Construction, Inc. ("Defendants," collectively) to build a "barndominium," a metal building that looks like a barn with a stained-concrete floor, garage, and living quarters. The parties' contract ("the Agreement"), which was drafted by Mr. Bilbrey, provided that work would start immediately and be completed by Thanksgiving of 2018. However, the project was not completed by that date. Some five months later, the project still was unfinished. Plaintiffs then fired Defendants. Plaintiffs sued Defendants in the Chancery Court for Overton County ("the Trial Court") for breach of contract. The Trial Court ruled in Plaintiffs' favor. Defendants appeal. We hold that time was of the essence under the Agreement. We further find that Defendants committed a material breach of the Agreement by failing to timely complete Plaintiffs' barndominium. We affirm.

Arbitration motion to stay proceedings FINRA Rule 13200 contract interpretation. Parties disagree whether dispute arising out of contract dissolving Appellee's membership and employment arises out of their business activities making it subject to mandatory arbitration under FINRA Rule 13200. Given the strong preference for arbitration and the rather broad definition of "business activities," the trial court did not err in finding that all of Appellants' claims were subject to arbitration. Additionally, the forum-selection clause in the parties' contract did not supersede the arbitration provisions already binding the parties.

Summary Judgment Civ.R 56 Breach of Contract Disability Discrimination Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Reasonable Accommodation Retaliation Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Unjust Enrichment. Plaintiff was denied admission to defendant's college of medicine because he had previously matriculated at another medical school, not because of a disability or his legal action against his prior medical school. Moreover, plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation for admission to make himself otherwise qualified under the ADA. As such, plaintiff was never an enrolled student at defendant's college of medicine and thus no binding contract existed between them. Additionally, defendant's retention of the application fee was not unjust enrichment because the decision to decline admission was exercised with professional judgment. Lastly, declined admission is not actual, or fear of, physical peril as required for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, the court issued summary judgment in favor of defendant on all claims.