Breach of Contract Cases

The magistrate correctly determined Worthington did not show a clear legal right to health insurance coverage during her work as an independent contractor and did not show either that OPERS has a clear legal duty to provide such benefits or that The Ohio State University has a clear legal duty to remedy the gap in healthcare coverage for her. Writ of mandamus denied.

Motion for judgment on the pleadings Civ.R. 12 question of law de novo cross-claim pro se litigant App.R. 12 App.R. 16 motion to withdraw as counsel plain error right to counsel negligence injury proximate cause negligent hiring breach of contract hostile work environment wrongful termination. The trial court did not commit plain error in granting the motion to withdraw from appellant's representation filed by the attorneys for the childcare center. Appellant did not have a right to counsel in the civil proceedings in the trial court. The assertions and allegations in appellant's cross-claims cannot be read to have pled any actionable claims against the childcare center, or the childcare center's owner, manager, or employees. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the childcare center's motion for judgment on the pleadings.

CIVIL - seeking enforcement of an arbitration provision of a Collective Bargaining Agreement and declaratory relief to determine whether the issue of arbitrability falls within the subject-matter jurisdiction of an arbitrator and whether the Union made a timely demand for arbitration SERB has exclusive jurisdiction over Chapter 4117 claims appellant was not an aggrieved party under R.C. 2711.03(A) as he was not a party to the CBA appellant lacked standing to bring his complaint and it was properly dismissed affirmed.

The plaintiff employee appealed from a Superior Court judgment entered in favor of the defendants, the Pascoag Fire District and the Pascoag Fire and Rescue Association, International Association of Firefighters, Local 4908, in this action alleging breach of contract and breach of duty of fair representation. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment because, he contended, there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the district and the union should have been equitably estopped from arguing that plaintiff had failed to pursue the grievance process under the applicable collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice appropriately rejected plaintiff's equitable estoppel claim because he could not establish that the defendants' conduct had induced him to fail to exhaust his administrative remedies. Accordingly, the Court held that the trial justice did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants because, having failed to further pursue his grievance, plaintiff could not establish his claim of breach of duty of fair representation against the union. The Supreme Court further concluded that, because the claim against the union failed, plaintiff's claim against the district for breach of contract necessarily failed also. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Preliminary injunction modification noncompete agreement doctor specialized abuse of discretion likelihood of success on the merits irreparable injury unjustifiable harm to third parties public interest reasonable legitimate business interest undue hardship injury to the public. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the noncompete agreement between appellant and appellee. Appellant did not have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its breach-of-contract claim against the appellee with the noncompete agreement as written, however it did have a substantial likelihood of success under the trial court's modified noncompete agreement. As modified by the court, the noncompete agreement protected appellant's legitimate business interests, did not impose and undue burden on the appellee, and did not injure the public. Further, the modified noncompete agreement would not cause the appellant to suffer irreparable injury. Finally, third parties would be harmed, and the public interest would not be served by enforcing the noncompete agreement as written by appellant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it modified the noncompete agreement between the parties.