Discrimination Cases

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (1)), it is a discriminatory practice ''[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . lawful source of income . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (3)), it is a discriminatory practice ''[t]o make, print or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . lawful source of income . . . or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages for alleged housing discrimination in connection with certain statements that the defendant H, a real estate salesperson, made regarding the plaintiff's participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. H served as an independent contrac- tor for the named defendant, R Co., a real estate broker. R Co., through H, entered into a listing contract with the defendant V for the exclusive right to lease an apartment owned by V and his wife. Thereafter, the plaintiff, through her real estate agent, B, submitted an application and offer to lease the apartment. After receiving the documents and speaking with V, who wanted the apartment rented by April 1, 2017, H notified B that they were ''all set'' for a lease commencing on that date. B then sent H blank section 8 paperwork to accompany the plaintiff's application. H and B then proceeded to exchange e-mails and text mes- sages, in which H repeatedly indicated that she was not aware that the plaintiff would be using a section 8 voucher, that she would have to speak to V, that the decision was up to V, and that she was not sure if V would want to wait for the section 8 approval process. H eventually texted B that V had received a competing offer for t

CIVIL - Summary judgment age discrimination gender discrimination retaliation McDonnel Douglas test adverse employment action similarly situated individuals Civ.R. 56(C) R.C. 4101.11 R.C. 4101.12.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment by the defendant, which she claimed was the result of pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employ- ment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The defendant hired the plaintiff to work in its brand and creative strategy department. S, the only other employee in the department, was her supervisor. According to the plain- tiff, the two had a good working relationship through the end of her first month of employment, when the plaintiff informed S that she was pregnant. Thereafter, the relationship deteriorated. According to the plaintiff, S no longer invited her to collaborate on projects, became curt and unfriendly, and began to micromanage and criticize her work. S also started to document the plaintiff's alleged performance deficiencies. Less than five weeks after the plaintiff disclosed her pregnancy, S informed the plaintiff that her employment was being terminated for her poor performance. Following a trial to the jury, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and awarded the plaintiff economic damages in addition to prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, and attorney's fees. On appeal to this court, the defendant challenged only one element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, namely, whether she established that the termination of her employment occurred under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict: a. The plaintiff satisfied her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination: there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a rational fact finder could have inferred that the termination of the plaintiff's employment was motivated by discriminatory bia

Court of Claims did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of employer on race and age discrimination claims. Appellant failed to demonstrate that employer's proffered reason for not hiring her was pretext for race or age discrimination. Appellant was not a plainly superior candidate for the position, given the candidates' relative qualifications, and she failed to demonstrate other probative evidence of discrimination. Judgment affirmed.