Discrimination Cases

Motion to compel arbitration contract contractual capacity ratification R.C. 2711.02. The trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration. The record reflects that a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement existed because it had been ratified by appellant's guardian.

Summary judgment opportunity to arbitrate grievance collective bargaining agreement agreement to arbitrate statutory age discrimination claim statute of limitations R.C. 4112.02 180 days grievance procedure tolling R.C. 4112.14 alternative pleading Civ.R. 56(F) motion. Trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendant-employer where plaintiff-employee's age discrimination claim under R.C. 4112.02 was barred by the 180-day statute of limitations the allegation in plaintiff's complaint that he was a member of a protected class under R.C. 4112.14 did not alternatively plead a cause of action under R.C. 4112.14 plaintiff's use of the grievance procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement did not toll the statute of limitations.

Trial court did not err in providing jury instruction requested by appellees, nor did court err in ruling on appellant's request to pursue a claim for retaliation in age discrimination action.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on appellant's breach of contract claim as related to the termination of her administrative positions. However, trial court erred in granting summary judgment on appellant's breach of contract claim related to the cancellation of appellant's endowed professorship where appellee failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Trial court did not err in determining that it lacked jurisdiction over constitutional due process claim. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on discrimination claim because appellant failed to meet her burden of demonstrating prima facie case and pretext. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on retaliation claim because appellant failed to demonstrate prima facie case.

A 62-year-old former employee of the Macon County School System sued the Board of Education on the grounds of age discrimination and retaliation under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. She alleged that her supervisor, the school principal, made age related discriminatory remarks and demoted her after she complained about a co worker's repeated, sexually explicit comments. In its answer, the Board of Education contended that the re-assignment was a lateral transfer and was justified by nondiscriminatory reasons. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination or retaliation, and that the Board produced undisputed evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for transferring Plaintiff. We respectfully disagree, having concluded that Plaintiff identified and produced evidence to establish a prima facie case for both claims and to create a genuine issue of fact concerning whether the Board's stated reasons are pretexts for discriminatory or retaliatory animus. For these reasons, the Board was not entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

CIVIL - gender discrimination motion for summary judgment Civ.R. 12(B)(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction collective bargaining agreement grievance procedure requires final, binding arbitration R.C. 4117.10(A) abuse of discretion failure to consider evidence beyond court's jurisdiction prima facie case failure to establish replacement by male or that a similarly situated male with same deficiencies was treated more favorable failure to compel no transcript of conference.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's motion to amend her complaint, to include facts regarding her PTSD diagnosis and claims of racial and disability discrimination, eight months after she filed her administrative appeal from the termination of her teaching contract. The trial court did not consider Appellant's prior discipline at another school when determining that she was subject to termination, and Appellant was not denied due process. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Appellant's failure to enter third quarter final grades was good and just cause for termination. Judgment affirmed.