Wrongful Termination Cases

Workers' compensation—Temporary-total-disability compensation—Court of appeals correctly determined that some evidence in record supported Industrial Commission's finding that claimant was medically able to perform light-duty job that employer made available to him—Court of appeals erred in determining whether job was objectively offered in good faith and in issuing writ of mandamus on that basis ordering commission to grant claimant's request or hold new hearing—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and limited writ issued ordering commission to determine whether employer offered light-duty job in good faith and to issue new order.

R.C. 2711.01, arbitration, R.C. 2711.02, stay of trial pending arbitration, economic duress, procedural and substantive unconscionability. The trial court's grant of appellee's motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration is supported by the record. Appellant has failed to demonstrate the presence of economic duress that would invalidate the enforceability of the arbitration agreement or that the agreement is unconscionable.

Violation of ERISA

Motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration nonsignatories arbitration agreement nursing facility admission agreement. - Trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration where the defendants, who were nonsignatories to the arbitration agreement, failed to demonstrate (1) how they could enforce the agreement despite their status as nonsignatories (2) how the plaintiffs were bound by an agreement they too had not signed and (3) that the plaintiffs' claims arose out of the nursing facility admission agreement, as required by the arbitration agreement.

The trial court correctly ordered that $10,000 disbursed from appellant's 401(k) plan and held in trust by his attorney be paid to Ace Sprinkler, Inc.'s receiver for distribution to an Ace employee and to appellant's former partner in the business. The funds were not protected by R.C. 2329.66, and appellant was unjustly enriched by the funds, which came from the employee's and partner's payroll deductions. Judgment affirmed.

This appeal arises from the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to three state employee defendants. The plaintiff, also a state employee, sued the defendants in their individual and official capacities related to the plaintiff's termination from his employment. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. The defendants then filed a joint motion for attorneys' fees, relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-113, which permits a state employee to recover attorneys' fees when the employee is the "prevailing party" on claims filed against the employee in the employee's individual capacity. The trial court granted this motion and awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the defendants. This appeal followed. We affirm.

The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over a certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to determine whether there should be an arbitration-specific exception to Colorado's traditionally defined doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court held that Colorado's law of equitable estoppel applies in the same manner when a dispute involves an arbitration agreement as it does in other contexts. The Court recognized that under Colorado law, equitable estoppel requires proof of four elements—one of which is detrimental reliance. Thus, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can only assert equitable estoppel against a signatory in an effort to compel arbitration if the nonsignatory can demonstrate each of the elements of equitable estoppel, including detrimental reliance.

Baum sustained work-related injuries that caused him to be temporarily totally disabled. United Airlines (UAL) paid Baum full pay under its wage continuation plan after he sustained an admitted work-related injury, but UAL also claimed a credit on its final admission of liability (FAL) for the comparable temporary total disability (TTD) benefits it would have otherwise been statutorily required to pay Baum. This credit increased Baum's reported TTD benefits, pushing them over the statutory cap. Baum challenged UAL's right to take the credit. The Division of Workers' Compensation director concluded that benefits paid under the wage compensation plan are not similar to vacation or sick leave. Therefore, their accrual and exercise did not bar UAL from taking the claimed TTD credit. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel) affirmed on review. On appeal, Baum argued that CRS § 8-42-124 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because the plan was approved by the director without the opportunity for injured workers to challenge it in court. UAL's plan was adopted and approved before Baum sustained any injury. Baum could not meet the threshold test of being deprived of a property interest without due process when the plan was approved because he had no such interest when the plan was approved. Baum also argued that this absence of appellate review of wage continuation plans violates separation of powers. The separation of powers doctrine does not guarantee that the judicial branch will be given oversight over every action taken by a governmental entity. In adopting CRS § 8-24-124, the legislature made wage continuation plans subject to the director's, not its own, approval. Further, the judicial branch is not excluded from reviewing these plans through court review of agency actions. The approval of CRS § 8-42-124 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Baum next contended that the Panel erroneously affirmed the director's grant of summar

The petitioner, who had been convicted of felony murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim inside the victim's home during what appeared to be a botched burglary, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that the state deprived him of his due process right to a fair trial insofar as it failed to correct the trial testimony of L, a former director of the state police forensic laboratory, that a red substance on a towel found in the victim's home after the murder tested positive for blood when no such test had been conducted and when subsequent testing conducted in connection with the present habeas action revealed that the red substance was not in fact blood. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition. With respect to the petitioner's due process claim, the court concluded that, because L mistakenly but honestly believed that the towel tested positive for blood and, thus, did not give perjured testimony, the burden was on the petitioner to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability of a different verdict if the correct evidence had been disclosed. Applying this standard, the habeas court determined that L's testimony was immaterial because, among other things, the state's criminal case against the petitioner did not rely on forensic evidence. Rather, the state proved its case primarily on the basis of testimony from witnesses who testified as to certain incriminating statements that the petitioner had made to them, testimony from neighbors of the victim that they heard a loud vehicle in the vicinity around the time of the murder, when the petitioner and his alleged accomplice, B, had stolen and were driving a vehicle without a muffler, and the testimony of the petitioner's girlfriend, who contradicted the petitioner's statements to the police regarding his whereabouts on the night of the murder. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed, claiming that the habeas court applied the incorrect sta

Board of Education, termination of contract, abuse of discretion, referee's report, findings of fact and recommendation, R.C. 3319.16