Breach of Contract Cases

The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant after he defaulted on a promissory note secured by the mortgage. The mortgage agreement included a provision authoriz- ing the plaintiff to purchase force placed insurance coverage for the property if the defendant failed to maintain adequate coverage. The defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim, and asserted various special defenses, including unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which were predicated on allega- tions relating to the plaintiff's purchase of force placed flood insurance from A Co., an insurance provider. The defendant did not challenge the plaintiff's right to purchase the force placed insurance but alleged that the plaintiff was involved in an undisclosed kickback scheme with A Co., pursuant to which the plaintiff used A Co. as its exclusive force placed insurance provider, and, in exchange, A Co. provided the plaintiff with certain rebates, including free or below cost mortgage services. The defendant claimed that, instead of passing those rebates on to him, the plaintiff charged him more than the cost of purchasing the force placed coverage, contrary to both the provisions of the mortgage agree- ment and certain representations the plaintiff had made to him. The defendant's answer also included numerous allegations concerning the plaintiff's nationwide kickback scheme with A Co. and its impact on borrowers generally. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the special defenses and the counterclaim, which the trial court granted in part. In connection with its decision to strike the special defenses of unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the trial court reasoned that the allegations concerning the kickback scheme were broad and related to borrowers generally instead of to the defendant specifically, and, therefore, the allegations did not arise from the mak

Federal Arbitration Act arbitration agreement motion for protective order motion to stay discovery motion to compel arbitration. - Trial court's denial of appellants' motions to stay discovery and for a protective order while appellants' motion to compel arbitration remained pending was immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act, which applied to the arbitration agreements at issue, because the orders effectively denied appellants' motion to compel arbitration.

The plaintiffs, B, E, and M Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant car dealership for alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with the purchase and sale of a plow truck. B, the managing member of M Co., testified that, on January 21, 2015, he signed an instalment contract on behalf of M Co. for the purchase of the plow truck. E, who was not a member of M Co., cosigned the contract, and B drove the truck off the lot. The plaintiffs did not submit this purported contract as an exhibit in the trial court. A few days later, B returned to the showroom at the request of D, one of the defendant's salesmen, to return the purchase documents so that corrections could be made. B was assured that the terms of the documents would not change. B and E claimed that they never signed any other documents in connection with the sale of the plow truck. Both parties, however, submitted into evidence an instalment contract dated January 26, 2015, which identified the plow truck as the purchased vehicle and listed an increased sales price, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer loan period than that which the plaintiffs alleged had been quoted by D and incorporated into the original contract. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant forged their signatures on the January 26, 2015 contract documents. They also alleged that the window sticker on the plow truck, known as a Monroney sticker, did not reflect the vehicle's true price. D died sometime after the purchase of the plow truck and was never deposed in this action. G, the owner of the defendant, was called to testify at the trial by the plaintiffs. She stated that, although she did not have firsthand knowledge of the events surrounding the transaction, she had discussed it with D and there was no indication that there had been a deal or contract that reflected the terms the plaintiffs claimed were set forth in the Janu

The plaintiff financing company sought to recover damages from the defen- dants, a limited liability company and its principal, D, for breach of contract in connection with the defendants' alleged failure to make payments under a motor vehicle lease agreement. After the defendants were defaulted for failure to appear, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment and rendered a default judgment for the plaintiff. Less than four months later, and more than two years after the plaintiff had commenced its action, the defendants moved to open and set aside the default judgment pursuant to statute ((Rev. to 2019) § 52-212). In an affidavit accompanying the motion to open, D attested that the vehicle in question had serious defects that made it dangerous to operate and that the defendants had declared the lease void and returned the vehicle to the car dealership from which it was leased. D further attested that he mistakenly thought that the case had been resolved, that there were good defenses to the plaintiff's action, including breach of warranties and misrepresentations, and that the defendants would file a counter- claim when the judgment was opened. The plaintiff objected, and, after a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to open, concluding that the motion had been untimely filed and had no basis. The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, which acknowledged that the trial court incorrectly had determined that the motion was untimely but determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the motion on the ground that it had no basis. On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to open, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded with direction to reverse the trial court's judgment and for further proceedings: This case

1. A party may use allegations in a verified complaint to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment if (1) the allegations are made on personal knowledge, (2) the allegations are based on facts that would be admissible in evidence, and (3) the face of the complaint shows the competence of the verifying party to testify on the matters stated, consistent with Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03(d). 2. Minnesota does not recognize a cause of action for breach of an illusory contract.

Motion to compel arbitration and/or stay proceedings abuse of discretion contractual interpretation de novo review R.C. 2711.02 written arbitration agreement agreement not signed intent to be bound meeting of the minds performance of contract containing arbitration clause. Appellee's performance under the purchase order constituted its acceptance of the terms contained therein, including the arbitration clause. Thus, the dispute between the parties, which arose out of the purchase order, was required to be arbitrated. The trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

Appellants failed to provide timely notice of termination, causing the lease agreement to automatically renew for the following month. The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision in favor of appellee and denying appellants' objection. Judgment affirmed.