Court Rulings

Condemnation—Highest and Best Use—Lost Income—Costs. The Board of County Commissioners of Weld County (the County) filed a petition in condemnation to extend a public road over 19 acres of DPG Farms, LLC's 760-acre property (the property). When condemnation proceedings were initiated, the property was used primarily for agricultural and recreational purposes. The parties stipulated to the County's immediate possession of the 19 acres and proceeded to a valuation trial. The dispute centered on the highest and best use of 280 acres that contained gravel deposits. DPG's experts testified about the highest and best use of the property. The district court determined, as a matter of law, that the evidence was too speculative to support a finding that water storage was the highest and best use of the relevant area (Cell C) instead, it determined that the highest and best use of those acres was gravel mining, but not water storage as well. The jury awarded DPG $183,795 in damages for the condemned property and nothing for the residue. DPG then requested costs. The district court rejected a substantial portion of the costs on grounds that they were disproportionate to DPG's success and that certain expert evidence had been excluded. On appeal, DPG contended that the district court erred in rejecting water storage as the highest and best use of certain portions of the property. The Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence that the district court's determination was based on and concluded that the district court did not err in determining, as a matter of law, that the evidence was too speculative to support a jury finding that water storage was the highest and best use of Cell C. DPG also argued that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of lost income, arguing that it was admissible pursuant to an income capitalization approach to valuing the property. DPG's evidence of a potential income stream was admissible not as the measure of its damages but rather as a factor that

Defendant was asked to leave a bar, and when she refused, staff called police. The police questioned defendant outside the bar. She appeared upset and intoxicated, and without prompting said, "I don't have anything on me." When the police conducted a pat down, defendant resisted and was arrested. The police search of defendant produced what was later identified as cocaine. A jury found her guilty of possessing a controlled substance and resisting arrest. On appeal, defendant contended that insufficient evidence supported her conviction for possessing a controlled substance. She asserted that the evidence only established that she had a residue of cocaine, and it was insufficient to support a jury inference that she knowingly possessed it. Even if the evidence didn't establish that the cocaine powder was a usable quantity, the jury could have inferred knowing possession from the cocaine's location and packaging and defendant's evasive behavior and comments. Defendant also contended that the district court erred in denying her challenge for cause as to prospective juror E.D. because he was legally biased as a "compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency." E.D. was an employee of the Homeland Security Fusion Center, which is not a public law enforcement agency within the meaning of CRS § 16-10-103(1)(k). Therefore, the court didn't err in denying defendant's challenge for cause as to E.D. Defendant further contended that the district court's reasonable doubt illustrations during voir dire impermissibly lessened the prosecutor's burden of proof, violating her right to due process. Here, the court's illustrations didn't lower the prosecution's burden of proof because in the context of the entire record, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law. Defendant also argued that the district court plainly erred by refusing to declare a mistrial because two prospective jurors exposed the jury to extraneous information about the arresting officer during

H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010) ID 3676 (PDF) (1) Whether an alien has presented sufficient evidence to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is a legal determination that is reviewed de novo by the Board of Immigration Appeals. (2) In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are sufficient to meet a legal standard such as a "well-founded fear," the Board has authority to give different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge. (3) State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations. (4) The evidence presented by the respondents, considered in light of State Department country reports specific to Fujian Province, failed to establish a reasonable possibility that either respondent would be subject to forced sterilization due to having two children born in the United States or would face penalties or sanctions so severe that they would rise to the level of persecution.

<bold>Libel and Slander — Report of suspected child abuse — presumption of good</bold> <bold>faith — actual malice</bold> <block_quote> Although plaintiff-customer contends defendant-salesperson reported plaintiff's behavior of suspected child abuse or neglect to the Department of Social Services based on retaliatory motives, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing summary judgment in favor of defendants on the slander per se claim because: (1) N.C.G.S. § 7A-543 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-301</cross_reference>) imposes an affirmative duty for anyone with cause to suspect child abuse or neglect to report that conduct; (2) N.C.G.S. § 7A-550 (now N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>7B-309</cross_reference>) provides immunity from liability to those who act in accordance with the reporting statute and presumes the reporter's good faith; and (3) plaintiff did not meet her burden under N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>8C-1</cross_reference>, Rule 301 to show defendant's bad faith or actual malice.</block_quote>

Sexual Assault on a Child—Due Process—Mistrial—Prior Criminality—Videotaped Interview—Inconsistent Statements—Sexually Violent Predator—Findings of Fact. A jury found Salas guilty of sexual assault on a 9-year-old child by one in a position of trust and sexual assault on a child, pattern of abuse. The trial court's order found him to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). On appeal, Salas contended that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his rights to due process, a fair trial, and an impartial jury by denying his motion for a mistrial after victim's grandmother testified by giving a nonresponsive answer to a question which, Salas contended, impermissibly referred to prior criminality. Because grandmother's remark was fleeting, minimally prejudicial, and immediately followed by a curative instruction, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Salas's motion for a mistrial. Salas next contended that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request to play a videotaped interview of grandmother. Here, defense counsel sufficiently confronted grandmother with her inconsistent statements and she either explained or conceded them. Thus admission of the videotape would have been cumulative, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Salas also argued that the trial court's determination that he qualified as an SVP failed to satisfy statutory and due process requirements because the court never made specific findings of fact in support of its determination as required by CRS § 18-3-414.5(2). While the record evidence might support a conclusion that Salas either promoted or established a relationship with the victim for purposes of sexual victimization, the court did not make specific findings on this matter, and other evidence might lead to the opposite conclusion. This error was substantial and cast serious doubt on the reliability of the SVP designation.