Court Rulings

P was a physician and a shareholder-employee of C, a professional corporation that renders medical care and treatment through duly licensed physicians. As such, P was covered by C's qualified profit-sharing and pension plans that were available only to physicians who were shareholder-employees. P sold his C stock, divested himself of all his economic interests related to C, and terminated his employee relationship with C. Shortly thereafter, P entered into an independent contractor relationship with C and continued to provide the same services as a physician. Upon terminating his employee relationship, P received a distribution from C's qualified plans. Held: P's change in employment status from that of an employee to that of an independent contractor did not constitute a \separation from the service\ within the meaning of sec. 402(e)(4)(A)(iii), I.R.C. 1954. Therefore, the distribution to P was not a lump-sum distribution, and P is not entitled to use the 10-year averaging method provided by sec. 402(e)(1) in determining the tax on that distribution.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 1 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.</p> <p>No. 32 October Term 1888, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 407 March Term 1887, C. P. No. 1.</p> <p>On February 7, 1887, a summons in case was served in an action by Alfred Hollister against Dr. John S. Dickson and Sarah Dickson, his'wife, -to recover damages for personal injuries received through the alleged negligence of the defendants. Issue.</p> <p>At the trial on November 17, 1887, the facts appearing in evidence were substantially as follows :</p> <p>On April 10, 1886, the plaintiff, a resident of Utica, New York, was in Pittsburgh, as a traveling salesman for a drug house in New York city, and in the afternoon of that day when passing in front of property belonging to the defendants on Ninth street, in the pursuit of his business, he stepped upon the grating which covered a coal-hole in the foot way. The grating was displaced by his step upon it, and turned or slipped away, whereby the plaintiff fell into the coal-hole to his arm-pits, receiving a severe injury upon his right leg below the knee. He was confined to his bed at the St. Charles Hotel for two months, under treatment, and was off duty for still another month. Erysipelas supervened during his confinement. His testimony, as to the occurrence resulting in his injury sufficiently appears in the charge of the court below and in the opinion of this court. Dr. Orr, his physician, testified that the erysipelas set in on the sixth or seventh day; that erysipelas frequently though not usually followed wounds, but if there had been -no wound there would have been no erysipelas. Other witnesses were called by the plaintiff to prove his injuries, the resultant suffering and the expenses incurred, when he rested.</p> <p>The defendants called Thomas Johnson, an employee of the defendants -who had charge of the building in front of which the injury occurred, and who testified that the coal-hole was not in use at the time, and he had secured the grat

Workers' compensation—Permanent-total-disability ("PTD") compensation—Some evidence supports Industrial Commission's determination that claimant engaged in sustained remunerative employment by participating in bartering relationship for reductions of his stall-rental and feed fees while receiving PTD compensation—Commission abused its discretion in choosing March 26, 2009, as date of termination of claimant's PTD compensation—Some evidence supports commission's findings that claimant falsely represented that he was not working and that he made false representations knowingly—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and limited writ of mandamus issued directing commission to determine appropriate date of termination of claimant's PTD compensation.

Workers' compensation—When a claimant voluntarily removes himself from his former position of employment for reasons unrelated to a workplace injury, the claimant is no longer eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation, even if the claimant remains disabled at the time of his separation from employment—State ex rel. Reitter Stucco, Inc. v. Indus. Comm. and State ex rel. OmniSource Corp. v. Indus. Comm. overruled.

Trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of employer where employee failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in support of his claims of age discrimination, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent retention.

In this case, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's order affirming petitioner's county court conviction for harassment. Petitioner asserted that pursuant to People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553 (Colo. 2011), self-defense is an affirmative defense to all crimes requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness. She thus contended that (1) she was entitled to a self-defense affirmative defense instruction to the specific intent crime of harassment, and (2) the county court's refusal to give such an instruction constituted reversible error. Because Pickering does not establish the broad, bright-line rule that petitioner asserts and thus does not require a trial court to give a self-defense affirmative defense instruction in every case requiring intent, knowledge, or willfulness, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment.