Court Rulings

T was discharged from her employment with company G in the midst of an investigation by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) into sex-based wage disparity in one of the departments of the company. T was not employed in that department, but was perceived by G as having played a significant role in instigating the investigation and participating therein. The EEOC brought suit to enjoin G from interfering with its investigation and, inter alia, to require G to reinstate T, who was not a party to that suit. The suit was settled upon G's payment of $ 20,000 to T in consideration of her release of a broad range of potential claims against it, including a claim for reinstatement. Held: That a substantial portion of the payment was allocable to a claim for a tort-like injury and a substantial portion of the payment was allocable to other claims, predominantly of a contractual nature. In the absence of more precise evidence in the record, it is found that half of the $ 20,000 was allocable to the tort-like claim. Cf. Eisler v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 634, 640-641 (1973). It is therefore held, further, that half of the $ 20,000 payment is excludable from T's gross income under sec. 104(a)(2), I.R.C. 1954, as \damages received * * * on account of personal injuries.\

In this multi-party, multi-claim employment suit, the trial court did not err in its damages determination. It also did not abuse its discretion by not granting appellant's request for attorney fees, as she did not demonstrate that appellee, Dayton Board of Education, acted in bad faith. Further, the trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion for summary judgment on various tort claims raised against both the Board of Education and individual district employees. Similarly, the trial court did not err in overruling appellant's motion for summary judgment against school district employees. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered appellant's counsel to pay $470 in attorney fees. Judgments affirmed.

Appellant Rhododendron has not identified anywhere in the record where it sought a delay under Civ.R. 56(F) or otherwise alleged prejudice as a result of the trial court's considering the appellees' summary-judgment motion without first resolving a pending motion to compel discovery. This failure by Rhododendron waived the issue. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of appellee Thomas Bradley Harris on a claim alleging a violation of Ohio's Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The record reveals a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Harris misappropriated a trade secret under R.C. 1331.61(B)(2)(b) by knowingly using \design-history files\ from a company called NovoSource without consent in a way that violated a duty to limit his use of the files. A trier of fact reasonably might find the existence of such a duty based on testimony about an oral agreement between Harris and Andrew Cothrel, the CEO of NovoSource, limiting Harris' use of the files. The record reveals no genuine issue of material fact, however, as to whether appellees Andrew Rynearson or Jack Diamond misappropriated the design-history files by impermissibly using them. The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against appellant Rhododendron on two counts alleging breach of contract. Rhododendron brought the claims as assignee and successor in interest to the rights of NovoSource. But the contracts at issue were not among the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. The contracts explicitly were excluded from the NovoSource assets that Rhododendron acquired. Finally, the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against Rhododendron on three other counts. The appellees' summary-judgment motion partially incorporated by reference arguments made in their earlier motion to dismiss counts one, two, and fourteen. But the act of incorporating by reference arguments made in a prior motion to dismiss did not impermissibly \convert\ the motion to dismiss into o

Pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 23-24), once a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed in the Superior Court, ''[t]he judicial authority shall promptly review [the] petition . . . to determine whether the writ should issue. The judicial authority shall issue the writ unless it appears that . . . the court lacks jurisdiction . . . the petition is wholly frivo- lous on its face . . . or . . . the relief sought is not available.'' Pursuant further to the rules of practice (§ 23-29), ''[t]he judicial authority may, at any time, upon its own motion or upon motion of the respondent, dismiss the petition . . . if it determines [inter alia] that . . . the court lacks jurisdiction . . . [or] the petition . . . fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief can be granted . . . .'' The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a guilty plea, of the crime of robbery in the third degree, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and to have his conviction vacated or dismissed. The petitioner alleged that he had received a sentence of unconditional discharge in connection with the robbery conviction but that he remained incarcerated on unspecified other charges and that the robbery conviction was adversely affecting his eligibility for parole on the other charges. The habeas court granted the petitioner's applica- tion for a waiver of fees but took no action as to his request for the appointment of counsel. Shortly thereafter, however, the court, sua sponte and without providing the petitioner with notice or an opportunity to be heard, dismissed the petition pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 on the ground that the habeas court lacked jurisdiction because the petitioner was not in custody for the conviction that he was challenging at the time he filed the petition. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting