Court Rulings

CERTIFIED MAIL – SIGNATURE – PANDEMIC – RETURN RECEIPT – CIV.R. 4.1 – SERVICE OF PROCESS - JURISDICTION: Service of process was not effective under Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a) where the mail carrier signed the certified mail receipt on behalf of the recipient due to the Covid-19 pandemic, in contravention of United States Postal Service guidelines, and there was no order permitting the postal employee's signature to constitute proper service on the defendant in light of the pandemic. Therefore, the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant and lacked jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against it.

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-557n [a] [2] [B]) and the common law of this state, respectively, municipalities and their employees enjoy qualified immunity from liability for their negligent acts or omissions in the perfor- mance of duties that require the exercise of judgment or discretion. The plaintiffs, who reside in the borough of Naugatuck on a particular parcel of property that is prone to flooding, appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, the borough and several of its officials, which was rendered on the basis of govern- mental immunity. The plaintiffs had alleged, inter alia, that the defen- dants' negligence caused their property to be inundated by water on eight separate occasions. Specifically, the plaintiffs had alleged that a nearby municipally owned catch basin in the area routinely became clogged or otherwise inadequately redirected storm water away from their property. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' negligence claims were barred by governmental immunity because they involved acts or omissions that required the exercise of judgment or discretion. In granting that motion, the trial court concluded that, because the municipal ordinance setting forth the general duties of the relevant municipal department did not contain specific directions or mandates as to how those duties should be discharged, the plaintiffs' claims necessarily pertained to discretion- ary acts or omissions. The trial court acknowledged this court's decision in Spitzer v. Waterbury (113 Conn. 84), which held that the repair and maintenance of municipally owned drainage systems are ministerial functions, but concluded that, under more recent case law, the duty to repair and maintain drainage systems is discretionary unless an ordi- nance prescribes the particular manner in which that duty is to be discharged. The plaintiff subsequently appealed from the trial court's judgment

Attorney–Client Privilege,Implied Waiver. In this original proceeding pursuant to C.A.R. 21, the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's determination that petitioner State Farm Fire and Casualty Company impliedly waived the attorney–client privilege protecting communications between it and its former counsel when it submitted an affidavit from that former counsel to rebut factual allegations of discovery misconduct. The Court issued a rule to show to cause why the district court's finding of implied waiver should not be reversed and now makes that rule absolute. The attorney affidavit submitted in this case did not put privileged information at issue by asserting a claim or defense that depends on privileged information or attorney advice. Rather, the affidavit contained only factual statements that were intended to rebut allegations of discovery misconduct. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the district court erred in finding that State Farm impliedly waived its attorney–client privilege on the facts presented.

C.A.R. 21.1— Certified Questions of State Law—Colorado Wage Claim Act—Statute of Limitations—Statutory Construction. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21.1 to answer a certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado regarding how far back in time a terminated employee's unpaid wage claims can reach under the Colorado Wage Claim Act, CRS §§ 8-4-101 to -123. The Court held that, under the plain language of CRS § 8-4-109, a terminated employee may seek any wages or compensation that were unpaid at the time of termination however, the right to seek such wages or compensation is subject to the statute of limitations found in CRS § 8-4-122. That statute of limitations begins to run when the wages or compensation first become due and payable and thus limits a terminated employee to claims for the two years (three for willful violations) immediately preceding termination.

Trial court did not err in granting an employer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and alternative motion for new trial on a former employee's race-based discrimination claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework where the employee admitted to accessing a patient's confidential medical records for a purpose, at least in part, unrelated to patient care and such conduct is a terminable offense under the employer's policies. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court's judgment finding that appellant failed to carry his ultimate burden of demonstrating that the adverse employment action resulted from unlawful discrimination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation Act Court-Created Exceptions Employment in an Ultrahazardous Activity