Court Rulings

Workers' compensation—R.C. 4123.65 requirement that settlements of workers' compensation claims against self-insured employers be in writing and not be effective for thirty days after signing applies to claims on appeal to a common pleas court under R.C. 4123.512 as well as to claims still at the administrative level.

On June 23, 1964, a portion of petitioners' land was condemned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Appraisal values were obtained. On June 13, 1966, petitioners filed a Petition for Appointment of a Board of Viewers requesting just compensation and detention damages. The Court of Common Pleas appointed a Board of Viewers with direction to assess damages in accordance with law. Petitioners later made an offer to settle their claim and Pennsylvania made a counteroffer. The condemnation claim was settled on the basis of Pennsylvania's counteroffer ($ 44,500) which included detention damages, interest, and cost of litigation. On October 31, 1966, the Court of Common Pleas approved the settlement by an order, which allocated $ 14,500 for the land condemned and $ 30,000 for severance damages. The inclusion of interest as one element in a lump-sum condemnation settlement is required as a standard practice by Pennsylvania law. In placing the claim in line for payment pursuant to the settlement, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania made an allocation of the gross amount ($ 44,500) between detention damages of $ 5,804.35 and the net award of $ 38,695.65. Held, that $ 5,804.35 was received by petitioners as detention damages, which is in the nature of interest, and therefore taxable as ordinary income under sec. 61(a)(4), I.R.C. 1954.

Torts—Wrongful termination in violation of public policy—Employee terminated after questioning employer's failure to accurately report earnings to Bureau of Unemployment Compensation—Employee failed to meet jeopardy element of claim for wrongful termination—R.C. Chapter 4141 does not contain a personal remedy for an employee when employer fails to accurately report earnings—Remedies in statutes sufficiently protect society's interest in discouraging employers from engaging in prohibited behavior.

The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction over a certified question of law from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to determine whether there should be an arbitration-specific exception to Colorado's traditionally defined doctrine of equitable estoppel. The Court held that Colorado's law of equitable estoppel applies in the same manner when a dispute involves an arbitration agreement as it does in other contexts. The Court recognized that under Colorado law, equitable estoppel requires proof of four elements—one of which is detrimental reliance. Thus, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement can only assert equitable estoppel against a signatory in an effort to compel arbitration if the nonsignatory can demonstrate each of the elements of equitable estoppel, including detrimental reliance.

Trial court did not err by affirming SPBR decision that terminated employee was protected by whistleblower statute and that whistleblower activity motivated the termination because trial court could find there was reliable, probative, and substantial evidence to support conclusion that employee had a reasonable, good-faith belief that criminal activity occurred and that superiors may have considered whistleblower activity in deciding to terminate employee.

This appeal addresses the authority of a county election commission to make a factual determination on the qualifications of a candidate seeking to be placed on a ballot. In this case, the defendant filed a petition to run for circuit court judge. A registered voter filed a complaint with the county election commission arguing that the defendant did not reside in the judicial district and, consequently, should not be placed on the ballot. The election commission held a hearing on the complaint and voted unanimously to place the defendant on the ballot. The defendant won the election. The plaintiff, the defendant's defeated opponent in the election, filed this election contest based solely on the defendant's alleged failure to meet the residency requirement. The trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. Both held that the substance of the plaintiff's complaint was a challenge of the election commission's administrative decision on the defendant's residency, governed by the 60-day statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-102 for a petition for a writ of certiorari. Because the complaint was not filed within sixty days of the county election commission's final decision, it was dismissed as untimely. On appeal to this Court, we hold that, by necessary implication, the county election commission had the authority under Tennessee's election statutes to hold a quasi-judicial hearing to make a factual determination to resolve the voter's complaint challenging the defendant's residency. We also hold that the county election commission's decision to certify the defendant as a qualified candidate on the ballot was a final administrative decision subject to judicial review by common-law writ of certiorari. The plaintiff, who had actual notice of the county election commission's actions, was "aggrieved" by the election commission's final administrative decision within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-9-101 and, thus, h

intentional infliction of emotional distress, severe and debilitating, wrongful discharge, public policy, child abuse, remittitur, attorney fees, lodestar calculation, contingency fee agreement, deviation, sanctions, frivolous conduct, R.C. 2323.51, media. Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict or JNOV where sufficient evidence was presented that defendant's conduct caused plaintiff severe and debilitating emotional distress whether plaintiff's evidence actually proved her case was for the jury to determine. Plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy survived defendant's motion for directed verdict and JNOV because the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy for wrongful termination when the defendants terminated her for not dissuading the report of child abuse. Trial court abused its discretion by ordering remittitur without considering any of the criteria that must be met before a court may grant remittitur, including that the plaintiff agreed to the reduction in damages. The trial court abused its discretion in limiting the review of attorney fees to only those incurred by the lead attorney and then deviating from the lodestar amount based solely on the contingency fee agreement. Contacting a media outlet to cover a trial does not constitute frivolous conduct in violation of R.C. 2323.51 where the information provided is protected speech and does not violate the ethical rules.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to address whether an employee may assert a private right of action against her employer under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-2-107, referred to as the Tennessee Tip Statute, for the employer's failure to properly pay tips, gratuities, and service charges. The trial court granted the defendant employers' motion to dismiss the plaintiff employee's claim pursuant to section 50-2-107 for failure to state a claim, on the ground that there was no private right of action under the statute. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, based in part on a 1998 Court of Appeals decision recognizing a private cause of action under the Tip Statute. On appeal, we find that the 1998 Court of Appeals decision is inconsistent in part with subsequent Tennessee Supreme Court jurisprudence on implying a private right of action under a statute. For this reason, we decline to apply the doctrine of legislative inaction to presume that the legislature knew of the 1998 Court of Appeals' holding, recognizing a private right of action under the statute, and acquiesced in it. We hold instead that the employee has no private right of action under section 50-2-107 and overrule the 1998 Court of Appeals decision to the extent that it is inconsistent with our holding herein. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court's judgment granting the motion to dismiss the employee's cause of action under section 50-2-107 for failure to state a claim.