Court Rulings

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. McIntyre Faries, Judge. Affirmed. Action in eminent domain to condemn land for freeway construction. Judgment of condemnation affirmed both as to valuation of land and severance damages.

<p>Appeal, No. 110, Oct. T., 1911, by defendants, from judgment of C. P. Washington Co., Feb. T., 1910, No. 216, for plaintiff on case stated in case of Sarah E. Hyde, Lydia A. Bebout,- Nancy McGregor, James R. McGregor, Nora McGregor, William McGregor and Elizabeth McGregor v. H. H. Rainey, James H. Rainey and Retta A. Rainey.</p> <p>Case stated to determine rights and title- to the coal, oil and gas in and under a tract of land in Nottingham township. Before Taylor, J.</p> <p>By the case stated it appeared that Jane Rainey died on August 1,1890, at the age of eighty-one years, leaving a last will and testament made on January 4,1890.</p> <p>The fifth item of the will was as follows: “I will and bequeath to my son Hermon H. Rainey all that tract of land situated in Nottingham Township, Washington County, Penna. on which I now reside subject to the above named bequests which he is to pay to my daughters Lydia Bebout and. Maria J. McGregor, and One Hundred Dollars to John Dixon will be hereinafter mentioned. The above named farm contains Two Hundred and Twenty acres more or less, together with all the farming implements which I possess, including One Two Horse Wagon, One Four horse wagon and one Spring Wagon, and at the death of my son Harmon H. Rainey the above bequest is to descend to his children.”</p> <p>The sixth item of the will was as follows: “It is my will that if — during -the period- of my-natural life if the farm on which I reside shall be leased for the purpose of mining for coal, gas or oil'that the proceeds of the lease shall be divided between my four children, viz: Sarah-E. Hyde, Lydia A. Bebout, Maria J. McGregor and Harmon H. Rainey, share and share alike.”</p> <p>The tract of land on Which the said Jane Rainey lived at the time of the execution of the will, which is referred to in the ninth item of her will, is the same tract of land which was devised to Harmon H. Rainey for life, with remainder to his children, by the fifth item of her will.</p>

Pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 23-24), once a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed in the Superior Court, ''[t]he judicial authority shall promptly review [the] petition . . . to determine whether the writ should issue. The judicial authority shall issue the writ unless it appears that . . . the court lacks jurisdiction . . . the petition is wholly frivo- lous on its face . . . or . . . the relief sought is not available,'' and ''[t]he judicial authority shall notify the petitioner if it declines to issue the writ pursuant to this rule.'' Pursuant further to the rules of practice (§ 23-29 (3)), ''[t]he judicial authority may, at any time, upon its own motion . . . dismiss the petition, or any count thereof, if it determines that . . . the petition presents the same ground as a prior petition previously denied and fails to state new facts or to proffer new evidence not reasonably available at the time of the prior petition . . . .'' The petitioner, who had been convicted of arson in the first degree and conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree, filed a successive habeas petition, claiming that he was not canvassed properly about his right to appeal when the public defender assigned to represent him withdrew from representation before the start of the defendant's criminal trial. The habeas court, acting on its own motion and without notifying the parties, dismissed the petition as repetitious pursuant to Practice Book § 23-29 (3). Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court denied, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which summarily dismissed the petitioner's appeal. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court, claiming that the habeas court improperly had dismissed his petition pursuant to § 23-29 without providing him with prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. Held that, prior to dismissing a habeas petition on its own motion under Practice Boo

The plaintiff, S, sought to recover damages from the defendant attorney for alleged statutory (§ 52-564) theft in connection with the defendant's conduct during prior judicial proceedings involving the foreclosure of a municipal lien filed against S's real property. The defendant, acting as B Co.'s attorney, commenced the prior action to foreclose the lien, which B Co. had purchased from a municipality. During the foreclosure action, S was defaulted for failure to appear, and the court thereafter rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure. After the running of the law days, and approximately six months after title vested in B Co., the defendant filed a certificate of foreclosure in the municipal land records. B Co. subsequently sold the property to a third party. S alleged in the present action that the defendant, with the intent to deprive S of his property or to appropriate the property to B Co., had perpetrated a fraud on the trial court during the foreclosure proceedings by knowingly making materially false representations about the state marshal's inabil- ity to serve process on S and about the value of S's property, which purportedly led the court to render the foreclosure judgment. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the present action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that, because all of the defendant's alleged conduct occurred during the foreclosure proceed- ings, S's statutory theft claim was barred by the litigation privilege, which affords attorneys absolute immunity from liability for certain statements made or conduct during judicial proceedings. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that all of the defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct occurred within the underlying foreclosure proceedings and that the balancing of policy considerations weighed in favor of applying absolute immunity to S's claim of statutory theft. On the granting of certification, S appealed. Held: 1. The Appellat

Court of Claims erred when it granted summary judgment to appellee on appellant's breach of contract claim where the evidence presented by appellant permitted the inference that appellant's academic advisor harbored an age-related bias against appellant and subsequently persuaded another member of appellant's Ph.D. committee to change appellant's grade on the comprehensive written examination from "overall pass" to "fail," as such conduct, if proven at trial, represents a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that appellant's academic advisor and committee member did not actually exercise professional judgment. Even though appellant's dismissal from the Ph.D. program resulted in the loss of his position as a paid teaching assistant ("TA"), appellee was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, as to appellant's statutory age discrimination claim because the allegations of discriminatory conduct related to appellant's status as a student and not the conditions of his employment as a TA. Appellee was entitled to judgment, as a matter of law, as to appellant's statutory retaliation claim because the discriminatory practices opposed by appellant related to his status as a student and not the conditions of his employment as a TA. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part cause remanded.

The plaintiff, as trustee, sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant L Co. In the first count of his complaint, the plaintiff sought foreclosure of his mortgage, alleging, inter alia, that there were encumbrances on the subject property that were subsequent and subordinate to his mortgage, including the mortgage of the defen- dants K and D. In the second count, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the mortgage of K and D, which was purportedly recorded before the plaintiff's mortgage, was subordinate to the plaintiff's mort- gage on the ground that the plaintiff had no notice of K and D's mortgage because it had been incorrectly indexed by the town clerk's office. K and D denied the allegation in each count that their mortgage was subordinate to the plaintiff's mortgage and asserted a special defense that L Co. had mortgaged the subject property to them and that their mortgage was prior in right and title to the plaintiff's mortgage. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on both counts and ordered a foreclosure by sale. Prior to the sale date set by the court, K and D appealed from the judgment of foreclosure to the Appellate Court. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the Appellate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the priority of mort- gages cannot be challenged until after the foreclosure sale has taken place, and that court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. On the granting of certification, K and D appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the appeal of K and D for lack of a final judgment, as the judgment of foreclosure by sale in the present case was a final judgment: the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, and against K and D, on both counts of the complaint and ordered the full measure of relief sought therein, and the determina- tion of priorities as between the plaintiff and K and D was an inte

Political-subdivision tort liability—R.C. 2744.09(B)'s exception to immunity for civil actions by an employee "relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision"—R.C. 2744.09(B) does not require that the alleged tortious conduct underlying a claim against a political subdivision have occurred during the plaintiff's employment by the political subdivision—Plaintiff's claim for false-light invasion of privacy is relative to a matter that arose out of her employment relationship with county—Court of appeals' judgment affirming trial court's rejection of county's assertion of immunity affirmed.

Workers? compensation, jurisdiction, interlocutory, transformation of 12(b)(6) into summary judgment, lent employee doctrine, no genuine issue of fact

In 2014, the General Assembly enacted a statute waiving Tennessee's sovereign immunity for claims brought against the State pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 to 4335 ("USERRA"). The waiver of sovereign immunity became effective on July 1, 2014, and applied to USERRA claims "accruing on or after" that date. After passage of the statute, the plaintiff brought a USERRA claim against the defendant, an entity of the State, but his claim was based on facts that occurred prior to August 8, 2011. The trial court dismissed the claim, explaining that the claim accrued prior to July 1, 2014, and remained barred by sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the claim accrued on July 1, 2014, when the plaintiff gained a judicial remedy by the enactment of the statute waiving sovereign immunity. We conclude that the claim accrued prior to July 1, 2014, and remains barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

In this attorney disciplinary appeal, upon petition by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, this Court ordered the temporary suspension of the attorney from the practice of law based on the threat of substantial harm he posed to the public. For a time, the attorney was placed on disability status later he was reinstated to suspended status. Subsequently, after an evidentiary hearing, a hearing panel found multiple acts of professional misconduct, including knowing conversion of client funds with substantial injury to clients, submitting false testimony and falsified documents in court proceedings, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, violating Supreme Court orders, and defrauding clients. The hearing panel determined that the attorney should be disbarred. On appeal to the chancery court, the attorney argued inter alia that the disbarment should be made retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the hearing panel. On appeal to this Court, the attorney does not question the disbarment but argues that it would be arbitrary and capricious not to make his disbarment retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension, in order to advance the date on which he may apply for reinstatement of his law license. We disagree. In contrast to suspension, which contemplates that the lawyer will return to law practice, disbarment is not a temporary status. Disbarment is a termination of the individual's license to practice law in Tennessee. Therefore, we decline to make the effective date of the attorney's disbarment retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension. Accordingly, we affirm.

disability discrimination - age discrimination - legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for employment action - pretext - timing of notifying employer

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee. Appellant was not an intended third-party beneficiary to the contract between appellant's employer and appellee, and appellant's tortious interference with contract claim fails because he presented no evidence that appellee, which had a qualified privilege, acted with actual malice. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court's determination that petitioner failed to satisfy the mandates of R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a) for the issuance of a domestic violence protection order is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the trial court's factual findings, appellee's admissions, and the evidence in the record overwhelmingly support the conclusion that appellee attempted to cause or recklessly cause bodily injury to appellant during a domestic dispute. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for the trial court to determine the scope of the domestic violence protection order.