Court Rulings

<p>APPEAL BY DEPENDANT FROM THE COURT OP COMMON PLEAS NO.'2 OP PHILADELPHIA COUNTY.</p> <p>No. 156 July Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 577 December Term 1887, C. P. No. 2.</p> <p>On January 30,1888, Peter Trainor brought trespass against the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company and George DeB. Keim and others, receivers of said company, to recover damages for injuries received from the fall of a coal derrick upon him, averring in his statement of claim that said “ derrick was so carelessly, negligently and improperly constructed as to be dangerous to employees,” and that the “defendant carelessly, negligently and improperly placed said dangerously-constructed derrick in use where said Peter Trainor, the plaintiff, was working without notice or knowledge of said dangerous construction, and said derrick by reason of the premises fell,” etc. Issue.</p> <p>At the trial on February 14, 1889, it was shown that in the fall of 1887 the defendant had in operation at its coal yards at Port Richmond a new system of storing coal. The apparatus had not been long in use by the defendant, and consisted of a heavy pole fifty or sixty feet in length, set upright in a wooden cup on the ground and held in its place by guys. At the top of the pole was fastened an endless chain with scoops or pockets, by which the coal was drawn to the top of the pole and thence dropped down, the process being continued until the pile of coal was as high as it could be made, when the guys were taken down and attached to another pole in another place. To remove the coal for loading it upon cars or vessels, it was taken away from the bottom of the pile, and, as the removal reached the pole on the slope of the pile, the pole was to be drawn tight against the coal on the other side, by ropes attached to it above the coal. The poles and other appliances were furnished by one Berger, under a contract with the defendant company made in May, 1887, by which Berger agreed to “erect and operate” the plan

<p>Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 2, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1880, No. 134.</p> <p>This was’ an action in assumpsit brought by John A. Finney and Ada M. Finney, his wife, for use of fhe said Ada M. Finney, against A. H. Rowand, Jr., to recover the sum of $1965, with interest from August 3d 1875.</p> <p>A. H. Rowand, Jr., the defendant below, by warrantee deed dated August 3d 1875, conveyed to Ada M. Finney certain property in the borough of Verona, county of Allegheny, for the consideration of $2700. He received $1200 cash and a purchase-money mortgage with bond and notes of John A. and Ada M. Finney for $1500, payable in two instalments of $750 each, in four and six months respectively. The four months’ note he endorsed to the Franklin Savings Bank, of Allegheny. The six months’ note was endorsed to the Diamond National Bank, of Pittsburgh. When the first note matured, it was protested for non-payment, and a few days thereafter Finney paid one-half of the amount, and a new note for the other one-half, with interest added, was made by Finney and wife to Rowand’s order, and by him was endorsed to the Franklin Savings bank as before. This second note was also protested for non-payment at maturity. The six months’ note held by the Diamond National Bank was not paid and was protested at maturity. No further payments were made on these notes, and a scire facias was issued on the mortgage to No. 488, April Term 1876, marked A. H. Rowand, for use of the Diamond National Bank and George R. Riddle, trustee of the Franklin Savings Bank, v. Ada M. Finney and John A. Finney, her husband. Finney and wife appeared and made defence to this action, and on the trial there was a verdict against them for $848.92. Judgment was entered on the verdict and the property was sold on a levari facias, following the judgment, to the Diamond National Bank. After these ‘proceedings and sale, the present action was brought, wherein Finney and Avife claimed that

CONTRACT — CONDITION PRECEDENT — BREACH OF CONTRACT — UNJUST ENRICHMENT — GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING — PLEADINGS — MOTIONS — JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS — CIV.R. 12(C) — WRITTEN INSTRUMENT — CIV.R. 10(C): Defendant employer in a contract dispute was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the financial statement attached to its answer was not a "written instrument" and was an improper basis upon which to grant judgment on the pleadings. The complaint sufficiently alleged breach-of-contract and breach-of-good-faith-and-fair-dealing claims and therefore, the trial court erred in granting defendant a judgment on the pleadings as to these claims, but defendant was entitled to judgment on plaintiff employee's pleadings unjust-enrichment claim where an express contract existed between the parties.

The plaintiff, M Co., which designs and develops prototypes of medical devices, sought to recover damages for breach of contract and unfair trade practices from the defendants, A, a neurosurgeon and inventor, and I Co., which A and a partner had formed to develop medical devices for use in spinal surgery. In November, 2004, L, an owner of M Co., and A entered into a written agreement under which the parties were to share equally any compensation that resulted from the sale and/or licensing of a medical device conceived of by A, or any version thereof, for use in spinal surgery. The parties' one page contract provided that any required funding or financial commitments were to be part of a separate agreement they would negotiate later and that A was to promptly notify M Co. of any compensation he received for the device or any versions thereof. A further agreed that he was not under any contractual agree- ment with any other company concerning the device. At the time the parties entered into the written agreement, they also agreed orally that M Co. would create design drawings and a prototype of the device, and, at that time, A gave M Co. his initial drawings of the device. By early 2005, M Co. had prepared a prototype of the device and successfully installed it in a cadaver. M Co. thereafter utilized a different design and produced another prototype that it gave to A by October, 2005. By that time, A had become dissatisfied with M Co.'s work and continued to work on developing the device on his own without informing M Co. In December, 2005, A applied for a patent on an anterior intervertebral spinal fixation and fusion device that he had developed with the help of his son. A thereafter did not respond in writing to a letter from L in February, 2006, concerning the value of M Co.'s services and, in July, 2007, formed I Co. A also did not respond to e-mails from L in 2008 requesting an update on the project, and, in May, 2008, A and his son, without informing M Co., as

Race discrimination summary judgment R.C. 4112.02(A) Civ.R. 56(C) Ohio Civil Rights Act discriminatory animus direct evidence indirect evidence prima facie case. The trial court did not err when it granted the defendant's summary judgment motion on the plaintiff's race discrimination claim because the plaintiff failed to meet his burden in establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination through direct or indirect evidence. Accordingly, no genuine issues of material fact remained, and the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Divorce termination date de facto marital property separate property pro se. The trial court's order adopting the magistrate's decision granting plaintiff-appellee wife a divorce decree is affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to find a de facto termination date of the marriage earlier than the date of the final hearing because the parties presented no evidence of marital assets on the dates for which each party advocated. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the home defendant-appellant husband purchased prior to the marriage was not his separate property nor subject to a division of a property order because he transferred his interest in the home to his wife during the marriage who, in turn, transferred the home to the parties' adult sons. Likewise, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the funds from appellant's inheritance were no longer his because he had transferred the funds to a limited liability company owned by appellee without restriction. The appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate's decision and the division of property order. A review of the record did not lead to the conclusion that the order was inequitable.

Summary judgment/Disability discrimination and failure to accomodate

R.C. Chapter 2721, declaratory judgment, R.C. Chapters 5801-5811, Ohio Trust Code, Uniform Trust Code, trust, beneficiary, breach of fiduciary duty, impartiality, remedies. Members of the incorporated social club were not direct legal beneficiaries under a 1912 Trust Deed vesting beneficiary status in community lot owners. The Trust Deed interpreted using basic contract principles to determine settlor's intent however, determination of scope of derivative membership interest subject to extrinsic evidence. Trustees breached fiduciary duties of impartiality and failure to provide information. Reversed and remanded.