Court Rulings

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. P. Vail, Judge, presiding.</p> <p>On February 28, 1890, Paul J. Sorg, (now deceased,) father of the appellees Sorg, who was then the owner of the premises known as 178 Quincy street, in the city of Chicago, executed to one William J. Gunning a lease thereon for the term of ninety-nine years, at the annual rental of $1800, payable in advance, in quarterly installments of $450. The lease contained the following covenants: Said lessee also “covenants and agrees that during the existence of this lease he will not transfer or set over, or otherwise by any act or deed procure or permit his interest in the said premises and improvements thereon, or in any part thereof, to be assigned, transferred or set over, nor underlet said premises hereby demised, or procure the same to be done, to any person or persons whatsoever, without first obtaining the consent, in writing, of said party of the first part thereto; but nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to prevent the said party of the second part from renting the building or buildings on said premises, and that in the event that any assignment shall be made, (after complying with the conditions hereinbefore set forth,) the assignee shall be subject to same terms and conditions as to further assignment and to all covenants,, agreements, provisions and conditions contained in this lease. It is further mutually understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto, that in case at any time during the continuance of this lease default should be made by said party of the second part in the payment of the rent above reserved * * * for thirty days after the same shall fall due or become payable, or in case of default in carrying out any of the covenants and agreements required to be kept, done or performed by said party of the second part for the space of thirty days, th

<p>Appeal, No. 115, April Term, 1897, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Butler Co., Sept. T., 1895, No. 13, on verdict for plaintiff.</p> <p>Trespass. Before Barker, P. J., of the 47th judicial district, specially presiding.</p> <p>Trespass by the Standard Plate Glass Company, a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing plate glass against the Butler Water Company, an upper riparian owner, to recover damages alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff company as a riparian owner by reason of the diversion of the waters of a creek by the defendant company.</p> <p>Other facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $900 with interest and costs of suit. Defendant appealed.</p> <p>Errors assigned were (1) In instructing the jury in the general charge as follows: “Now, it has been argued by defendant’s counsel (and as to this we shall more formally instruct you -in answering the points submitted by counsel), that the plaintiff company had no right to use this water for artificial purposes created by it, after the defendant company had entered on the stream and commenced taking the water, and then complain because the supply is diminished. If the water company was rightfully taking water from the stream by virtue of its rights of eminent domain it had the right to take all the water, if necessary. If the water company was unlawfully using the water, or occupied the position of an upper riparian owner, as to it, the lower owner would have the right to use all the water for any purpose, and it would not lie in the mouth of the defendant to say to the plaintiff, ‘ you can use this water for watering cattle or irrigating the ground, but you cannot create an artificial use or demand for the water.’ ” (2) In the answer to the first point of plaintiff, said point and answer being as follows : “ In this action, being an action against a water company to recover injury to land caused by diversion of water from

<p>Error, to the Common Pleas of Chester county.</p> <p>This was an action of replevin, in which William Dripps was plaintiff, and Joseph M. Christian defendant.</p> <p>William Dripps, the plaintiff, was the owner of a foundry and machine shop in the village of Midway, which, on the 1st December, 1851, he sold by articles of agreement to Henry Bisbing and John P. Burn, to deliver them possession on the 1st of April, 1852, for the sum of $13,000; $1000 thereof, and for which they gave their promissory note, payable on the 1st April, 1852, and the balance in annual payments of $2000, Dripps to make them a deed when the amount of $4000 should have been paid; and the balance of $9000 to be secured by a mortgage on the premises. Bisbing & Burn made the payment, of $1000 due on the 1st April, 1852, and the payment of $2000 on the 1st April, 1853, together with $720, the interest due at that time.</p> <p>On the 20th June, 1853, the defendant, Joseph M. Christian, joined them as a partner in the establishment, and the following entry was made in their day-book:—</p> <p>“Midway, June 20, 1853.</p> <p>“Henry Bisbing, John P. Burn, and Joseph M. Christian, associate themselves together mutually for the purpose of carrying on the foundry, car building, and general machine business, in the village of Midway, Chester county, Pennsylvania, Bisbing & Burn transferring to said firm such of their liabilities and resources as may be mutually agreed upon, and Joseph M. Christian investing tools, stock, and cash to the amount of $2800, profits and losses to be equally shared, after paying each party interest on his investment.”</p> <p>The defendant objected to the admission of the books in evidence, but the court overruled the objection and admitted them, and sealed a bill of exceptions thereto at the instance of defendant’s counsel.</p> <p>There are no signatures to this statement. Immediately after it follows first a statement of the assets of the firm of Bisbing $• Burn, consisting o

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for "regarded as" disability discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02(A) and aiding and abetting discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02(J), but the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for "actual" disability discrimination in violation of R.C. 4112.02(A), failing to accommodate plaintiff's alleged disability, or failing to engage in the interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff's alleged disability. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dealing with the parties' discovery disputes.

Pursuant to the Public Accommodation Act (§ 46a-64 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of . . . sex . . . [or] to discriminate, segregate or separate on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to that act (§ 46a-64 (b) (1)), the provisions of § 46a-64 prohibiting sex discrimination ''shall not apply to . . . separate bath- rooms or locker rooms based on sex.'' The plaintiff, the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the commission's human rights referee, who found that the defendants, E Co. and C Co., had not engaged in discriminatory public accommodations practices by providing sepa- rate women's only workout areas in their otherwise public fitness facili- ties. The complainants, two members of the defendants' respective gyms who both identified as male, filed complaints with the commission after they experienced delays in completing their workouts because they had to wait for other members to finish using the equipment in the coed portions of the facilities. The human rights referee concluded that the defendants did not violate § 46a-64 by maintaining women's only work- out areas and dismissed their complaints. On appeal to the trial court, that court recognized that a women's only workout area is neither a bathroom nor a locker room but nonetheless concluded that the defen- dants' provision of such areas did not violate the sex discrimination provisions of the Public Accommodation Act because there was an implied customer gender privacy exception encompassed within § 46a- 64 (b) (1). In so concluding, the court considered the privacy interests underlying the bathroom and locker room exceptions, as well as the burden that the elimination of women's only areas would place on women of certain religious practices. The trial court observed that, wit

Appellee, a credit union, reserved the right to change the terms of its membership agreement, which included a provision to arbitrate disputes. By maintaining his account, appellant, a credit union member, manifested his assent to the arbitration provision. Furthermore, the arbitration provision in the membership agreement was not unconscionable. Judgment affirmed.

Ohio Public Employees Retirement System ("OPERS")—R.C. 145.38(B)(1)—R.C. 145.384—Reduction of health-insurance subsidy for a retiree reemployed by a state employer—Equal-protection claim—Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss—Retiree alleged sufficient facts to negate OPERS's argument that subsidy reductions for all OPERS-covered reemployed retirees are rational—OPERS's claim that it would incur additional costs in identifying retirees reemployed by an employer other than a state is not a sufficient rational basis requiring dismissal of retiree's complaint.

enforceability of non-compete agreement North Carolina Trade Secrets Protection Act

In this workers' compensation case, Christopher Batey ("Employee") filed a Petition for Benefit Determination after he sustained a back injury while working for Deliver This, Inc. ("Employer"). The trial court determined that Employee was entitled to 275 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2). On appeal, the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court erred in "defining an employee's burden of proof under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-242(a)(2) and in defining the phrase 'employee's pre-injury occupation' as used in subsection 242(a)(2)(B)" but concluding that the errors were harmless under the circumstances presented. Batey v. Deliver This, Inc., No. 2016-05-0666, 2018 WL 805490, at 7 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 6, 2018). Employer and its insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, have appealed. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, section 2, this Court directed that the appeal not be referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Panel. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and adopt its opinion in its entirety as set forth in the attached Appendix.

The trial court abused its discretion in adopting the magistrate's decision where the record shows the municipal court was without jurisdiction to determine landlord's forcible entry and detainer claims once tenants' related counterclaim that exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court had been filed. Tenants' first assignment of error sustained remaining assignments of error mooted. Judgment reversed and case remanded with instructions that the trial court to enter an order transferring this action to common pleas court for determination of all issues raised by the parties in their pleadings in this case.

Belvedere Test, pierce corporate veil, breach of contract, joint venture, third-party beneficiaries, incidental beneficiaries, Ohio Business Opportunity Plan Act, R.C. Chapter 1334. This case involves a commercial business arrangement evidenced by written contracts between multiple parties for the sale of goods and provision of related services. The trial court properly granted summary judgment denying breach of contract and violation of the Ohio Business Opportunity Plan Act, R.C. Chapter 1334. There are no written contracts between appellants and appellees. Existing contracts specifically state that all parties are independent contractors. The record does not demonstrate an intent by appellees to enter into a joint venture with any of the contracting parties. Appellants failed to pierce the corporate veil by establishing that appellees had no separate mind, will, or existence per Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners' Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos., 67 Ohio St. 3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075 (1993). At best, appellants were incidental beneficiaries of the commercial agreements. Appellees and appellants did not qualify as "sellers" and "purchasers" and no "business opportunity plan" existed between the parties under R.C. 1334.01 of the Ohio Business Opportunity Plan Act, R.C. Chapter 1334.

Taxation-Real-property valuation-R.C. 5717.02-Journal entry incorporating current agricultural-use values ("CAUVs") is a final determination subject to appeal to Board of Tax Appeals-CAUV journal entry is not a rule that needed to be promulgated in accordance with R.C. Chapter 119-Board of Tax Appeals' decision dismissing landowners' appeal vacated and cause remanded.