Court Rulings

1. <bold>Statutes — construction — factors considered. —</bold> In considering the meaning of a statute, the appellate court considers it just as it reads, giving words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language; if the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation; where the meaning is not clear, the court looks to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject; the appellate court will also look to the object to be accomplished and the purpose to be served by the statute. 2. <bold>Statutes — construction — standard on appeal. —</bold> Although the appellate court is not bound by the decision of the trial court, in absence of a showing that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the law, the appellate court will accept that interpretation as correct on appeal. 3. <bold>Statutes — construction — absurd conclusion will not be</bold> <bold>reached. —</bold> The appellate court will not interpret a statute in a manner so as to reach an absurd conclusion that is contrary to legislative intent. 4. <bold>Schools school districts — statute expressly directed that</bold> <bold>school districts incorporate its rights into their written personnel</bold> <bold>policies — general savings clause insufficient to comply with</bold> <bold>statute's express directive. —</bold> Where appellee contended that Ark. Code Ann. § <cross_reference>6-17-1209</cross_reference> did not provide a private right of action and simply required school districts to incorporate its terms into their written personnel policies, but presented no support for its argument that the general savings clause in the Professional Negotiations Agreement (PNA) was sufficient to comply with the express directive in Ark. Code Ann. § <cross_reference>6-17-1209</cro

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Indefinite suspension—Engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct—Engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice—Practicing law in a jurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction—Failing to disclose information required by law to be disclosed—Commingling funds—Improper division of attorney fees—Failing to promptly return unearned fee after withdrawal from employment—Charging a clearly excessive fee—Without solicitation, recommending one's self for employment to a nonlawyer—Harm to a client is not a necessary element of a violation of DR 9-102(A).