Court Rulings

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Mendocino County. Robert L. Winslow, Judge. Modified and affirmed. Motion to dismiss appeal denied. Action to recover wages allegedly due to plaintiffs under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Judgment for plaintiffs modified and affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco and from an order transferring action to the Municipal Court of San Francisco. Preston Devine, Judge. Affirmed. Action for damages for wrongful discharge of railroad employee, and for declaration of rights under a collective bargaining agreement. Judgment for defendants affirmed.

<p>From Baker: Gustav Anderson, Judge.</p> <p>En Bane. Statement by Mr. Justice Bean.</p> <p>This is an action by the Baker City Mercantile Company, a corporation, against the Idaho Glazed Cement Pipe Company, a corporation, for the recovery of the value of goods, wares and merchandise furnished by the plaintiff and its assignors in the furtherance of the construction of a pipe-line by the defendant for the City of Baker. The cause was tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the following sums, to wit:</p> <p>For the claim of Baker City Mercantile Co. .$ 838 10</p> <p>For Perkins Bros.’ claim assigned to plaintiff................................ 37 65</p> <p>For Oregon Mill & Grain Co. ’s claim assigned to plaintiff.......................... 109 42</p> <p>For the claim of M. Weil & Co. assigned to plaintiff............................ 29 20</p> <p>For the claim of Baker City Packing Co. assigned to plaintiff.................... 623 55</p> <p>Total..........................$1,637 92</p> <p>From a judgment entered thereon, defendant appeals.</p> <p>The complaint declares upon five separate causes of action. For the first plaintiff alleges that the defendant entered into a contract with the City of Baker, a municipal corporation of Oregon, to construct a conduit in connection with the gravity water system of such city, and employed men to do the manual labor in the construction thereof at an agreed price; that while these men were so employed, the defendant, by J. A. Atchison, bought goods of plaintiff of the reasonable value of $840.10 for the use of the laborers; that it was stipulated and agreed between plaintiff and defendant that the latter would hold, out of the wages of the laborers employed in the construction of the conduit, sufficient to pay the aforesaid sum; that in compliance therewith defendant, in the settlement with such laborers, with their consent did withhold such sum for the use and benefit of plaintiff, and now holds

<p>Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County : Of January Term 1882, No. 227.</p> <p>Assumpsit, by Jacob Houck and Anne Houck, his wife, against Hiram Houck and Jacob Houck, executors of the will of Jacob Houck, deceased, “ for work, labor and services performed by the plaintiff at the special instance and request of the said Jacob Houck, deceased.” The narr. also contained a count for “ wages or salary of the said Anne Houck .... as the hired servant of the said Jacob Houck, deceased.” Pleas, non assumpsit; non assumpsit infra sex annos; payment; payment with leave, &c., and set-off.</p> <p>On the trial, before Futhey, P. J., the facts appeared be as follows : — The plaintiff, Anne Houck, lived with her parents Jacob Houck, Sr., and Mary Houck, on their farm, performing household work, and taking care of her parents, both of whom were old and diseased. In 1878, she married Jacob Houck (her cousin) who lived on the farm as a hired hand. She and her husband continued to live on the farm after their marriage in the same manner as before, for about two years, until her mother’s death, when they moved away. Her father died about a year and a half later. By his will Anne was left an equal share with his other children. About two months after his death Anne made a demand on his executors for the payment of wages as a domestic servant, and for nursing her mother, for a year and three months prior to her mother’s death. This demand being refused, this suit was brought. No express promise of payment for services was shown.</p> <p>The defendant presented the following points :</p> <p>1. The relationship of the parties is such that under the evidence the jury must find for the defendants. Eefused.</p> <p>2. The time which elapsed after the ' alleged claim accrued, and before any demand was made, such that the presumption of law, under the facts in this case, is ‘ either that the wages have been paid, or that the services were performed on the footing that no payment

R.C. 143.43—Public-records requests—Township-constituent addresses—Mail-distribution lists for township newsletter document functions, procedures, and activities of the township—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.

Workers' compensation—Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv)—Employer's petition for writ of mandamus reversing the Industrial Commission's award of additional compensation to an injured worker as a result of the employer's violation of a specific safety requirement was correctly denied by the appellate court when the employer failed to file timely objections to the magistrate's decision recommending the denial of the requested writ—Motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R.60(B)—Court of appeals was stripped of jurisdiction to rule on employer's motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) once employer filed notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio from the court of appeals' judgment denying the requested writ of mandamus—Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment against appellant, who had sued his employer for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Appellant, an at-will employee, failed to satisfy the "jeopardy" element that must be met to maintain such actions. While appellant claimed that his employer failed to provide a safe workplace as required by R.C. 4101.11 and R.C. 4101.12, appellant did not make clear to his employer when he complained about another employee that he was invoking a governmental policy as the basis for his complaint, rather than his own self-interest. Appellant gave the employer no indication that his complaint concerned the public at large rather than himself. Because this failure was fatal to appellant's claim, we need not address issues concerning the other elements needed to establish wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Judgment affirmed.

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dissolving his marriage to the plaintiff. At the time of the dissolution trial, the plaintiff worked as a per diem nurse with hours that varied considerably. The defendant worked as a biostatistician, and his income was dependent on the number of his employer's ongoing grant funded projects. At the time of the trial, his salary was approximately 50 percent of what his annual income had been during the five preceding years due to the expiration of at least three grants, which he and his colleagues were working to replace. The defendant remained in the parties' marital home in Ashford, which he had purchased prior to their marriage. The parties also jointly owned a home in Nicaragua. During the marriage, the defendant made two payments in excess of the scheduled monthly payments on the Ashford home mortgage without the plaintiff's consent. Additionally, after the filing of the dissolution action and the issuance of the automatic orders, the defendant transferred funds into education trust accounts for the parties' two minor children and the defendant's minor child from a previous marriage without consulting the plaintiff. The trial court, inter alia, dissolved the marriage, awarded the parties' joint legal and physical custody of their two children, entered a parenting time schedule, and permitted the plaintiff to relocate to Worcester, designating her residence as primary for purposes of school following the relocation. The trial court ordered the defendant to pay child support in the amount of $325 per week, which it stated was a downward deviation from the guideline amount. The trial court also ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff a lump sum property settlement, which it stated included settlement for the plaintiff's share of the Nicaragua property, along with partial reimbursement for the funds transferred into the children's education trust accounts and the overpayments on the Ashf

The trial court erred by finding in appellees' favor on their claims for defamation and false light. A law firm's complaint and an affidavit filed in support of a temporary restraining order were absolutely privileged, and appellees' counterclaims did not state a cause of action, because the alleged defamatory statements bore some reasonable relation to the judicial proceeding. As to statements that the firm's attorney made in a newspaper article and in a "tweet," even if these statements were considered defamatory, the law firm would be vicariously liable only if it authorized or ratified the statements. However, there was no evidence that the firm did so. Furthermore, the statements in a newspaper article and in the tweet were not defamatory as a matter of law, under the totality of the circumstances and reading the statements in the context of the publication and how a reasonable reader would interpret them. In light of these conclusions, the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment and post-judgment interest on the counterclaim. There was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's finding that the law firm and its attorney engaged in frivolous conduct concerning trade secret and fraud claims against appellees. However, the court's decision to assess fees from the date the complaint was filed was not supported by competent evidence and was not based on sound reasoning. Under R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii), parties only need minimal support for their allegations to avoid a finding of frivolous conduct parties are allowed to investigate the truth of allegations or factual contentions. However, if parties persist in relying on the allegations after it becomes clear that they are unsupported by evidence, then they have engaged in frivolous conduct. Here, the law firm and its attorney knew at a certain point in the litigation that its fraud and trade secret claims against appellees were unsupported by the evidence, and attorney fees and costs were properly

Stay arbitration R.C. 2711.02(B) arbitration agreement contract de novo waiver class action informed consent notice change in terms insufficient meeting of the minds. Affirmed the trial court's denial of motion for stay pending arbitration pursuant to R.C. 2711.02(B). Because the credit union failed to provide sufficient notice of the change of terms to an account agreement that added an arbitration and waiver of class action relief provision, there was no meeting of the minds and no binding agreement to arbitrate. The email notice that was sent implied that members had already agreed to the changes to the terms of the account agreement and did not alert recipients to the addition of the arbitration provision or set forth any opt-out requirement. A party cannot be forced to arbitrate a dispute that he or she did not agree to arbitrate.

no defamation due to opinion privilege also upholding trial court's decision finding no fraud or intentional interference with business relations contract damages for wrongful dissociation adequate (and not speculative as argued in cross-appeal) insufficient evidence to support damage award for violating non-compete clause cross-appeal alleges liability for conversion against weight of evidence and improper damages for conversion value at the time of conversion rather than the replacement cost.

Federal preemption—Vehicle-emissions anti-tampering claims—The federal Clean Air Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempts R.C. 3704.16(C)(3) or precludes an anti-tampering claim against a vehicle manufacturer under Ohio's Air Pollution Control Act for the manufacturer's post-sale tampering with a vehicle's emissions-control system—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Motion for reconsideration granted and decision in Key Realty, Ltd. v. Hall, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1237, 2021-Ohio-26 vacated where majority decision made obvious errors of fact and law. Consideration was exchanged for noncompete agreement where at-will independent contractor continued to perform services for employer after execution of agreement. Genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment for independent contractor on employer's breach-of-contract, business tort, and criminal claims.

Arbitration, waiver, abuse of discretion, enforceability, R.C. 2711.02. Appellants appealed the trial court's finding that they waived a contractual right to arbitrate Appellee's counterclaim. The trial court's decision was affirmed. There was no abuse of discretion where the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances, including Appellants' initiation and participation in the litigation before and after asserting the contractual right to arbitrate. The trial court did not rule that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable for possibly excluding class actions from arbitration. Accordingly, enforceability of the arbitration agreement was not properly before the court on appeal.

The plaintiff attorney appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, his appeal from the decision of the defendant Statewide Grievance Committee, which had denied his request to vacate a prior decision by a reviewing commit- tee of the defendant that imposed a disciplinary sanction against him. The plaintiff, who had represented L in a real estate transaction, intro- duced L to one of the plaintiff's then law partners, O, who was looking to secure a loan for the law firm. In 2001, L loaned the plaintiff's law firm $70,000, and, by 2008, when the law firm had not repaid the loan, the plaintiff and O each executed new notes for repayment of the loan by 2013. In 2011, L filed a grievance complaint against the plaintiff. The reviewing committee concluded in its 2013 decision that the plaintiff violated rule 1.8 (a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to advise L that he should seek the advice of independent counsel in connection with the loan, and by failing to advise L in writing that he was not acting as his lawyer in connection with the loan and to establish in writing the precise nature of the plaintiff's role in the transaction. The reviewing committee ordered the plaintiff to attend a continuing education course in legal ethics. The defendant thereafter denied the plaintiff's request for review, in which he stated that he accepted the discipline that was imposed and waived any appeal to the Superior Court. Four years later, the defendant declined to act on a motion that the plaintiff filed in 2017, pursuant to Disciplinary Counsel v. Elder (325 Conn. 378), in which he sought to vacate the disciplinary sanction on the ground that the six year time period in the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-32 (a) (2) (E)) for filing a grievance mandated the dismissal of L's grievance. The defendant also declined to act on the plaintiff's subsequent motion for reconsideration. In granting the defendan

Where the Industrial Commission had evidence to support its view that the employee was not fired for assaulting his employer, the court will not overturn that credibility assessment. The Commission did not abuse its discretion in awarding temporary total disability after finding that the employer did not prove that the injured worker voluntarily had abandoned his employment. Objections to Magistrate's decision overruled writ of mandamus denied.

Motion for reconsideration granted original majority decision contained obvious errors. Trial court did not abuse its discretion by staying discovery to decide issues of law trial court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing default and termination provisions in a commercial lease trial court did not abuse its discretion when it rejected one purchase offer and approved another purchase offer for a business in receivership.

Trial court did not err by granting summary judgment on breach of contract claim because proposed contract addendum did not constitute repudiation of contract or notice of termination, and breaching party was not entitled to unilaterally terminate contract. Trial court did not err by awarding damages in the amount of difference between contract price and subsequent sale price, because subsequent sale was proximate in time and made under similar conditions, thereby indicating that subsequent sale price represented fair market value of the property.

R.C. 5301.36 satisfaction of mortgage class action certification class definition arbitration agreement. Appellant class representative claims the arbitration agreements contained in the mortgage agreements are not valid and do not warrant exclusions of potential class members from the class unless signed arbitration agreements were produced by appellee bank. While a claim regarding the enforceability of the arbitration agreement could be raised by those individuals subject to an arbitration agreement in their own actions against appellee bank, the instant class action concerned the class of mortgagors who did not have an arbitration agreement in their mortgage agreements, as set forth in the class definition. Thus, whether appellee bank must prove the validity of an agreement to arbitrate by producing a separately signed arbitration agreement is not pertinent for this certified class. Conceivably, appellant could have proposed a class definition to incorporate the requirement that individuals with an arbitration agreement in their mortgage agreement can only be excluded from the class by a proof of a separately signed arbitration agreement. However, the class as defined does not incorporate this requirement. In addition, the trial court concluded appellee bank complied with prior discovery requests and previously made relevant mortgagor files available for inspection. Therefore, appellant's claim that appellee bank must produce evidence of a separately signed arbitration agreement in order to exclude the mortgagors whose mortgage agreements contained an arbitration agreement lacks merit.

Motion to compel arbitration motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration R.C. 2711.02(B) R.C. 2711.03(A) arbitrability tort and statutory claims waiver. Trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings pending arbitration. Based on the language of the arbitration provision and the factual allegations of appellant's complaint, appellant's claims for tortious interference with contract, unfair competition, violation of the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act and breach of loyalty against its former employees were within the scope of arbitration provision. Appellant waived the issue of whether it had the right to bring a court action for preliminary injunctive relief where it did not mention the injunctive relief provision in its filings below and never otherwise pursued its request for preliminary injunctive relief below. Trial court's judgment modified to clarify that it was only parties to the arbitration agreement who were compelled to arbitrate their claims.

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Criminal convictions for failure to file a complete and accurate campaign statement—Misuse of county resources and staff by allowing staff to work on judicial campaign during work hours and at public expense—Inappropriate sexual conduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Judicial Conduct, including committing an illegal act that reflected adversely on trustworthiness and honesty, undermining public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, and engaging in harassment based on sex in the performance of judicial duties—Indefinite suspension with conditions for reinstatement.

The common pleas court improperly vacated a school board's decision to terminate a teacher's contract because it applied the wrong standard for "good and just cause" in an R.C. 3319.16 termination proceeding, failed to give deference to the referee's credibility determinations, and impermissibly substituted its judgment for the school board's judgment.

The Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision In re Care & Treatment of Campbell, Op. No. 2016-UP-198 (S.C. Ct. App. filed May 11, 2016), wherein the Court of Appeals upheld a jury's determination that Kenneth Campbell met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP) under South Carolina's SVP Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2018). We reverse and remand for a new commitment proceeding.

Babion owned a car. With Babion's permission, Forster was driving the car with Ryser as a passenger. A one-car accident occurred and Ryser suffered serious injuries. When the accident occurred, Babion, Forster, and Ryser were Walmart employees acting in the course and scope of their employment. According to Ryser, Forster's negligence caused his injuries. Ryser received workers' compensation benefits and obtained uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits under his own auto policy. Ryser also submitted a claim for UM/UIM benefits from Babion's policy with Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. (Shelter). Shelter rejected the claim, and Ryser sued. Shelter moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled for Shelter based on co-employee immunity. On appeal, Ryser contended that the trial court erred in finding that he was not entitled to UM/UIM benefits under Babion's policy. The exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado, and the related co-employee immunity rule, bar a person who was injured in the course and scope of employment by a co-employee's negligence in driving a car from receiving UM/UIM benefits under an insurance policy maintained by another co-employee who owned the car. Therefore, Ryser was not legally entitled to recover damages from Forster and, as a result, cannot recover UM/UIM benefits from Babion. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Shelter on Ryser's claim for UM/UIM benefits. The judgment was affirmed.

CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court erred by granting summary judgment for a moving company on a consumer's Consumer Sales Practices Act claim, because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the mover violated the deceptive acts or practices provision of the CSPA, when the mover represented to the consumer, before the consumer paid for the services related to a move of a fountain, that it would pay to repair the fountain that was damaged by the mover's employees during the move, and then later refused to pay for the repair after it learned it lacked insurance coverage for the repair.

The plaintiff filed a civil action against Rhode Island College and several professors and administrators, alleging that their conduct toward him when he was a student in the School of Social Work pursuing a Master of Social Work degree had violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A hearing justice of the Superior Court resolved the case on the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, entering judgment in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice had abused her discretion by considering the defendants' successive motion for summary judgment, erred by entering judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants on all of the plaintiff's claims, and erred by granting the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. The plaintiff also argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity would not bar his suit against the defendants moving forward. The Supreme Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse her discretion by considering the renewed motion for summary judgment because the seven years that elapsed between the filing of the two motions yielded a significantly expanded record upon which to consider the presence or absence of genuine issues of material fact. After reviewing the summary judgment record de novo, the Supreme Court held there were genuine issues of material fact to be resolved by a factfinder with respect to whether the defendants' conduct: (1) infringed upon the plaintiff's right to freedom of expression (2) constituted impermissible retaliatory actions in response to the plaintiff's exercise of his right to freedom of expression (3) impermissibly compelled speech and/or (4) violated the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. With respect to the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims, the Supreme Court held that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the plaintiff's equal protection claim and the plaintiff's pr

motion to dismiss – personal jurisdiction – Civ.R. 12(B)(2) – long-arm statute – R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and (A)(6) – transacting business – Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) and (A)(9) – due process – purposeful availment – arising from – reasonableness – out-of-state attorney and law firm representing out-of-state party – negotiating loan transaction and drafting documents for a loan between a Nevada resident and an Ohio corporation – opinion letter – false statements – intentionally directed to Ohio resident

The trial court did not err in concluding that an arbitration award had a rational connection to the parties' collective bargaining agreement and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. Judgment affirmed. (Tucker, J., concurring.) (Hall, J., dissenting.)

compromise verdict damages employment contract learned profession exception