Court Rulings

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a de facto date of marriage termination prior to the date of the final hearing where the evidence supported the trial court's finding there had been a clear and bilateral breakdown of the marriage. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that a sale of the marital residence was required in order to facilitate an equitable property division. However, the trial court abused its discretion by failing to assign value to the marital residence as of the de facto date of marriage termination and when it used appellant's gross income in calculating his spousal support obligation. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and cause remanded for a proper valuation of the marital residence and redetermination of spousal support.

A district court may revise any non-final order before entry of a final judgment and has discretion to extend deadlines in its scheduling order before trial. Once a claimant is allowed to participate in the workers' compensation fund, he or she may no longer elect to bring a lawsuit against the employer. The word "must" in a statute normally indicates a mandatory duty.

COUNTY – PARK DISTRICT – TORT IMMUNITY: A park district is not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of political subdivision immunity on two claims arising from an injury a 12-year-old boy sustained from a falling tree limb that struck him while he was golfing during a windstorm on the park district's golf course, even though the park district established entitlement to the general grant of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A)(1), where issues of material fact exist as to whether the injury, which occurred on the grounds of a building used in connection with a government function, was caused at least in part by the negligence of the park district employees in failing to maintain the tree limb and/or failing to manually activate a storm siren, and was due to a physical defect—an unmaintained tree limb—on those grounds, as required for the physical-defect exception to immunity set forth in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). [But see DISSENT: The physical-defect exception to immunity requires linkage between the physical defect and the employee negligence. The park district employees' alleged negligent failure to activate the storm siren is not related to the alleged defective tree limb and, resultantly, summary judgment should be granted to the park district on the failure-to-manually-activate-the-storm-siren claim.] Whether the danger from a defective tree is open and obvious to a 12 year old is not governed by the same standard that governs the determination of whether a park district's landscapers and arborists had constructive notice of the defect. A park district is entitled to summary judgment due to the immunity defense under R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) for a claim of reckless supervision in the failure to warn a 12-year-old golfer of impending weather, because the record contains no facts demonstrating that other potential golfers were turned away due to the weather. A park district is not entitled to the benefit of the immunity defense under R.C. 2744.03(A)(3) or (5) with respect to

State Health Plan retired state employees partial summary judgment interlocutory appeal substantial right US Const. art. I sec. 10 no impairment of contract unilateral contract NC Const. art. I, sec. 19

Trial court modification of child custody and child support obligations were not an abuse of discretion. Specific factual determinations were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Judgment affirmed. Divorce, parental rights and responsibilities, child custody modification, child support, modification, objections to magistrate's decision, abuse of discretion, manifest weight of evidence

Workers' compensation—R.C. 4123.61—Calculation of average weekly wage—Industrial Commission did not abuse discretion in concluding res judicata barred claimant's motion to recalculate average weekly wage—court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

The plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of her complaint against her former employer, the defendant, Rhode Island Hospital. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's termination of her employment was in violation of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 112 of title 42 (RICRA), and the Fair Employment Practices Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 5 of title 28 (FEPA). The Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights (the commission) was allowed to intervene pursuant to Rule 24 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. A hearing justice of the Superior Court granted the defendant's and the commission's motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiff had not initiated her RICRA claim before the statute of limitations expired and because the plaintiff had not timely requested the required right-to-sue letter from the commission for her FEPA claim. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the dismissal of her FEPA claim was in error because she had timely requested the letter from the commission, and, ultimately, the commission issued the right-to-sue letter. The Supreme Court held that, because the hearing justice considered documents outside the four corners of the complaint when she decided to dismiss the claims, the hearing justice erred by not converting the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment pursuant to the mandate contained in Rule 12(b). The Supreme Court also held that, even though the plaintiff had not submitted the commission's preferred form for requesting the right-to-sue letter, there was no dispute that the plaintiff complied with the formal requirements—set forth in § 28-5-24.1 and Rule 17 of the commission's Rules and Regulations—for commencing a FEPA violation action in Superior Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

DEFAULT JUDGMENT – VOID – LACHES: The trial court erred by overruling defendant's motion to set aside an allegedly void default judgment, because laches did not bar defendant from seeking relief from a void judgment, and the court was prohibited from making a credibility determination without first holding an evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of defendant's unrebutted assertion that he had not received service of the complaint.

CIVIL - gender discrimination motion for summary judgment Civ.R. 12(B)(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction collective bargaining agreement grievance procedure requires final, binding arbitration R.C. 4117.10(A) abuse of discretion failure to consider evidence beyond court's jurisdiction prima facie case failure to establish replacement by male or that a similarly situated male with same deficiencies was treated more favorable failure to compel no transcript of conference.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL – ARBITRATION – CONTRACTS – JURISDICTION – PROCEDURE/RULES: The denial of a motion for a more definite statement is not a final, appealable order. The appellate court's standard for reviewing the trial court's determination of whether a party has waived a contractual right to arbitrate a dispute is an abuse of discretion. Defendants-appellants did not waive their right to arbitrate when they filed a motion to stay the proceedings pending arbitration within 93 days of the commencement of the litigation and, in the time prior to filing the motion, had filed only a few pleadings and conducted only one deposition. The appellate court's standard of review for determining whether a claim falls within the subject matter of a contractual arbitration provision is de novo. When determining whether a claim falls within the subject matter of a contractual arbitration provision, the trial court must consider the allegations made within each cause of action and determine whether the claim could be maintained without reference to the contract or relationship at issue. Plaintiff's claims for breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment and conversion arose from his status as a member of defendant company, his claimed ownership interest in the company and the rights resulting from his membership therefore, those claims were subject to the arbitration clause in the company's operating agreement. Plaintiff's claims for unjust enrichment, fraudulent concealment and civil conspiracy did not arise from defendant company's operating agreement or from plaintiff's status as a member of the company, and could be maintained without reference to the operating agreement or plaintiff's status as a member of the company therefore, those claims were not subject to arbitration. An entry by the trial court compelling a party to produce discovery is not a final, appealable order.

Summary judgment/Employer intentional tort/Spoliation of evidence/Property claims

Former employee was entitled to severance pay because employer's posted severance policy expressly defined eligible employees, plaintiff qualified for benefits, and company could not invoke plaintiff's failure to sign a release upon separation because company never tendered such a release. Trial court erred in granting summary judgment for employer and must enter summary judgment for employee upon remand.

Temporary Restraining Order—Preliminary Injunction—Motion for Directed Verdict—Abuse of Process. Plaintiffs (collectively, ART) provided training, seminars, and business support software for healthcare professionals specializing in "active release techniques." ART's owner hired Xtomic, LLC to manage ART's information technology (IT) services and provide IT support. Years later, a co-owner of Xtomic and a former employee of ART, among others, formed Select Seminar Services, LLC to market seminar training for a different soft tissue technique than that offered by ART, using software programs that Xtomic had developed, including a program that ART also used. ART petitioned for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and asserted several claims. Xtomic asserted counterclaims, including, as relevant here, a claim for abuse of process. Xtomic argued that ART had an ulterior motive to use the lawsuit as a means to harass Xtomic and run it out of business. ART moved for a directed verdict, which the court denied, relying primarily on (1) ART's settlement with the former employee (2) ART's reputation for filing lawsuits to control the behavior of former associates and business partners and (3) letters that ART sent to numerous individuals who were not directly involved in the litigation to preserve various documents. A jury found in favor of Xtomic. On appeal, ART contended that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict on Xtomic's abuse of process counterclaim. The abuse of process tort was developed as a remedy for the filing of what could be a meritorious action that is manipulated to obtain an improper advantage unrelated to the substance of the action. Abuse of process focuses not on the alleged wrongdoer's motivations or intentions, but on whether the legal system was used for its intended purpose. Here, ART's settlement with the former employee was not evidence of abuse of process because the settlement was used as intended, t